Melaka State Government: What DAP’s Departure Portends for Federal Government

Posted on August 4, 2026 by Tricia

This article was first published on the Fulcrum platform on 28 July 2026, here.

DAP’s departure from the Melaka state assembly will have repercussions for the PH-BN unity government at the federal level.

It appears that Pakatan Harapan (PH) and Barisan Nasional (BN) are about to part ways. The two coalitions contested each other in the recent Johor polls and are doing so again in the upcoming Negeri Sembilan state elections. In Melaka, four members of the state assembly from the Democratic Action Party (DAP) – which is part of the PH coalition – resigned from all government positions and withdrew from the state administration on 14 July.

The DAP representatives did so after the BN-led state administration passed a controversial law that allows for the appointment of up to seven additional unelected individuals as members of the state assembly. The four had rejected the motion tabled by the state government and had also opposed it when it was raised at the executive committee (exco) meeting. As a result, they will also relinquish all other state-level posts within village development and security committees (JPKK) and local councils. Apart from the four DAP politicians, PH chairman Adly Zahari (from Parti Amanah Negara, a party in PH) also opposed the bill. While DAP now sits on the opposition bench of the assembly, Adly has chosen to remain in the government bloc, citing continued support for Ab Rauf Yusof as chief minister. 

Other state governments have done the same. The BN administration in the state of Johor tabled and passed a similar bill on 7 May, with the same justifications. Previously, other states had made the same move. Sabah was the first to do so in 1963. In 2003, a Terengganu bill allowed the state assembly to appoint up to four female or non-Muslim members. In 2020, Pahang tabled a similar bill with the stated objective of improving service delivery. The latest development in Melaka marks the fifth time a state in Malaysia has allowed appointed members in the state legislative assembly.

Melaka’s Chief Minister, Ab Rauf Yusof has defended the Melaka State Constitution (Amendment) Bill 2026, stating that this would allow the appointment of individuals with expertise and experience in fields such as law, education and investment to contribute to policymaking and legislative debates. The chief minister is from the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), the key party in BN.

The five politicians voting against the bill believe otherwise. They argue that such appointments contravene the principles of parliamentary democracy and the electoral system, and that such representatives – who could then vote on policy matters affecting the state – should be elected by the people. Professional experts could, they argued, be appointed as advisors to the state.

The profile of the future appointees will reveal more about the state government’s technocratic intentions. However, the history of local government appointments shows that partisanship eventually crept in. In 1976, local government elections were abolished; members of local councils were to be appointed instead; parties would typically appoint their party members. In 2008, the Pakatan Rakyat (PR) government in Selangor initiated the practice of appointing a proportion of “non-partisan” NGO representatives to local councils. However, this quickly descended into factionalism. DAP and other parties accused the PR government of appointing partisan councillors under the NGO quota.  

The PH-BN fractures across multiple state governments might put sustained pressure on the coalitions’ ability to cooperate at the federal level.

Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, who is also PKR leader, has attempted to intervene, urging Melaka DAP to defer its decision to withdraw. Anwar states that differences of opinion within a coalition are normal and should not deviate from “policies for economic growth and the people’s well-being”. PKR had opposed the BN-proposed bill when it was tabled in the Johor state assembly.

Anwar would certainly have cause for concern. Melaka is due for an election soon. The state legislative assembly’s five-year term will end in December 2026, with the dissolution and election expected as early as September. Heading into an election without holding any positions in the Melaka state government — and importantly, the resources that come attached to such positions — may put PH in a disadvantageous position from the onset. The reality at the federal level is such that state constituency development funds (CDFs) are typically allocated to members of the state assembly aligned with the state government, and are automatically withdrawn from those who are not. To compound matters, a DAP withdrawal from the state government signals dissension in what is supposed to be a coherent and cohesive unity government in Putrajaya.

From a wider perspective, the trend of more states including appointed members in their respective state assemblies is worrying; this might indicate that ruling state governments are attempting to solidify their political capital against potential opposition, shoring up higher margins in the event of a stalemate vote in the assembly. This may be state ruling coalitions’ response to the speed at which Malaysia’s political parties are fragmenting: new parties such as the Malaysian United Democratic Alliance (MUDA), Parti Pejuang Tanah Air, Parti Bersama Malaysia and Parti Wawasan Negara (Wawasan) have emerged relatively quickly over the last few years. The consolidation of power may be the more convenient thing to do, instead of negotiating across the aisle, to achieve consensus and pass laws and policies efficiently.

Looking Ahead

What does this augur for the state of Melaka? The BN state government does not need DAP in its government; Chief Minister Ab Rauf has even said that PH was there merely for perhiasan (decoration). BN still controls 20 of the 28 seats in the Melaka state legislative assembly, a comfortable two-thirds majority, while PH has five. Bersatu, Parti Islam Malaysia (PAS) and Wawasan have one seat each. While BN never needed PH’s support to form the Melaka state government, Ab Rauf Yusof had reached out to invite DAP to join the Melaka government before the state elections in 2021. This was before the PH-BN unity government was officially formed at the federal level in November 2022. This indicates BN’s goodwill towards DAP was in place regardless of the numbers. Such goodwill may have since dissipated.

Only several months remain before the Melaka state election is set to take place. Melaka is BN’s for the taking. If it was not certain that PH and BN would contest separately at the federal level, it is now. The PH-BN fractures across multiple state governments might put sustained pressure on the coalitions’ ability to cooperate at the federal level. The unity government still needs to perform as a single, holistic entity, or Anwar Ibrahim may be forced to call the 16th General Election before finishing a full term in December 2027.

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Negeri Sembilan State Polls Will Shape National Politics

Posted on July 27, 2026 by Tricia

This article was first published on the Fulcrum platform on 20 July 2026 here.

The inter-party dynamics in the upcoming Negeri Sembilan state polls provide some indicators of how they could pan out at the national level.

Following the Johor state election on 11 July, all eyes will be on the next state election in  Negeri Sembilan on 1 August. This election will be a reprise of the July poll, pitting the main coalition of Pakatan Harapan (PH) against Barisan Nasional (BN) and Perikatan Nasional (PN). The PH-BN contest in Johor, and now Negeri Sembilan, might portend – if the trend continues – a parting of ways at the federal polls, which have to be held by early 2028.

While the current state government features PH and BN in a coalition, the Chief Minister is from Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR), Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s party – making PH the incumbent. The stakes are high for PH, as it performed poorly in Johor, winning eight out of 56 seats — a decline from its previous 12 seats. Negeri Sembilan, one of the three PH stronghold states in Peninsular Malaysia, will be pitched as a bellwether for support for PH more broadly, which currently helms the federal government alongside BN. Prior to dissolution, PH held 17 seats in Negeri Sembilan’s state assembly, with BN’s 14 and PN’s 5. In the 2023 state election, PH earned a popular vote of 38.7 per cent, followed by PN’s 37.7 per cent and BN’s 22.2 per cent.

Negeri Sembilan was not due for a state election until 2028. The state’s legislative assembly was dissolved following a dispute over Chief Minister Aminuddin Harun’s legitimacy. Initially, 14 United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) members of the state assembly withdrew their support for him, but the party’s national leadership reversed the decision. Aminuddin eventually called for the dissolution of the state assembly. These events were in turn precipitated by a royal tussle, in which the position of Negeri Sembilan Ruler Tuanku Muhriz was contested.

The background is important, since this royal feud will likely be the centrepiece of the state election. Negeri Sembilan has a unique Adat Perpatih tradition, in which four territorial chiefs, known as Undang Yang Empat, select the Ruler. The present crisis began when the four Undangs disputed the removal of the Undang of Sungei Ujong, elaborated upon here. By 12 June, the crisis had precipitated into politics at the national level, as the Conference of Rulers — a constitutional council comprising nine hereditary Malay rulers and four state governors — was asked to decide which claimant to recognise as the legitimate Negeri Sembilan Ruler. This Conference, originally scheduled for 23 to 25 June, was postponed.

Political alignments are fast forming alongside the different ‘sides’ of the dispute. Broadly, supporters of PH lean towards Tuanku Muhriz, while BN and PN supporters side predominantly with the Undangs, with some exceptions. The electorate in the more rural and semi-urban seats would be considered strong adherents of the Adat Perpatih tradition and would closely follow its rules. One major challenge is that the Adat Perpatih is an unwritten customary law, which has sometimes resulted in inconsistent interpretation and application.

If this outcome (BN-PAS win) prevails, it would lead to a state-level coalition distinctly different from the current federal-level coalition government, in that BN is cooperating not with PH but with PAS.

The dispute has also become fodder for finger-pointing. For instance, political activist Chegubard has alleged that Democratic Action Party (DAP) secretary-general Anthony Loke disbursed large funds to parties seeking to stir issues involving the Undang institution, which the latter has dismissed as serious slander. The Chief Minister’s press secretary had even referred to Loke as the “fifth Undang”, which was a term initially used in BN circles to portray DAP as meddling in state affairs beyond their ambit. This led an UMNO Negeri Sembilan committee member to issue a statement, demanding an apology from the press secretary. The committee member added that the Undang title carries with it history and dignity, and that it was inappropriate to make such a statement even in jest. Although the press secretary has since apologised, these comments serve to buttress the sentiment that DAP (and by extension PH) do not respect Malay customary traditions. The press secretary is from Parti Amanah Negara, a party in the PH coalition.

The seats within Malay-majority, and rural or semi-urban constituencies will therefore be the closest watched, since opinions are now deeply divided regarding the royal dispute. Even small swings in support can have an impact. In the 2023 state election,  11 seats were won with less than 1,000 vote majorities; eight of them were held by BN incumbents. These 11 seats include BN’s Sungai Lui, Palong, Jeram Padang, Lenggeng, Juasseh and Seri Menanti (where the royal palace is situated).

Other seats to watch include Ampangan, where PH won with a slim majority of 329 votes, as well as PKR stronghold Sikamat, Aminuddin’s seat since 2008 (won in 2023 with a 2,662 majority). Linggi is another seat worth watching: Aminuddin is set to contest in the new constituency, a BN stronghold, as well as Chennah, in which DAP’s Loke will face MCA in a straight fight. Apart from the royal-cum-political dispute, housing, the cost of living, public transport (within urban areas), FELDA settler issues, agricultural subsidies and youth migration from rural to urban areas), will be amongst the issues affecting grassroot sentiment.

However, how the coalitions coordinate with each other in terms of seat negotiations will impact the election outcome. For instance, UMNO and PAS have indicated they will cooperate to ensure that there are no three-corner fights, with UMNO retaining its 14 seats and PAS its three seats, while the two seats previously held by Bersatu would be allocated to UMNO or PAS.

If the number of seats held previously is an indication of electoral outcomes, there is a possibility that an UMNO-PAS state government can be formed (19 out of 36 seats), a simple majority which would inch out PH (17 out of 36 seats). If this outcome prevails, it would lead to a state-level coalition distinctly different from the current federal-level coalition government, in that BN is cooperating not with PH but with PAS. This could be indicative of national-level dynamics in the general election to come – but this is predicated on the UMNO-PAS relationship working well. The Muafakat Nasional (MN) coalition comprising UMNO and PAS was a short-lived experiment after BN lost its hold on federal power in May 2018. The MN coalition was never tested against any real political stakes of government formation.

However, PH could succeed if it pushes the narrative that UMNO — with its initial withdrawal of support — was the one that ‘betrayed’ the coalition and caused the state government collapse. This gambit may win over sufficient votes in marginal seats to retain PH’s incumbency. It will be a tight race on 1 August, and one to watch as state dynamics continue to shape national politics in Malaysia.

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Negeri Sembilan’s Tenuous State Assembly: Procedural and Political Tests

Posted on June 10, 2026 by Tricia

This was first published on the Fulcrum platform on 3 June 2026, available here.

The recent withdrawal of support for the chief minister of Negeri Sembilan raises pertinent questions about the precedent and role of institutions determining state leadership.

On 27 April 2026, 14 United Malays National Organisation-Barisan Nasional (UMNO-BN) members of the Negeri Sembilan state assemblty announced the withdrawal of confidence from the Chief Minister (CM), the Pakatan Harapan (PH)-appointed Aminuddin Harun. PH was left with only 17 members — falling below the 19 seats needed to form a majority in the 36-member state assembly. The Ruler (Yang di-Pertuan Besar, YDPB) of Negeri Sembilan, Tuanku Muhriz Tuanku Munawir, himself battling a dispute over his position amongst the state’s chieftains, directed that Aminuddin remain in office, presiding over a minority government. After meeting with UMNO President Zahid Hamidi, however, the 14 politicians have since reversed their positions and remain within the PH-BN state unity government.

These events are taking Malaysian politics into a new, highly volatile phase, with ripple effects now escalating quickly. With Johor officially dissolving its state assembly on 1 June for state elections to take place within 60 days, and key PH political leaders now openly advocating for a simultaneous dissolution in Negeri Sembilan to return the mandate to the people, resolution remains distant. The stability of the BN-PH Madani coalition has been shaken. For instance, BN is already, through its Chairman Zahid, stating publicly that it is almost certain to contest the next general election alone. Previously, it had announced that it would work alongside PH.

This incident raises several relevant questions about historical precedent and the role of institutions in determining state government leadership. First, what is a minority government, and has this ever occurred in the past within state or federal governments? Legally and constitutionally, is a minority government technically acceptable?

The concept of a minority government may seem counter-intuitive to the democratic tenet of majority rule but has, in fact, been accepted within Westminster systems, including Canada, Ireland and the UK.

Under the Federal Constitution 1957 and various State Constitutions (which are all similarly worded), the ruler must appoint a person who, in his judgment, is likely to command the confidence of the majority. However, how the ruler makes this assessment and comes to his conclusion about who is “likely” to command the “confidence of the majority” is not explicitly spelled out.

Minority governments have occurred in Malaysia, but only for relatively brief periods. For instance, Stephen Kalong Ningkan continued to lead a minority government in Sarawak in 1966. Minority governments have also taken place at the federal level. Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin led a minority government from July to August 2021.

The concept of a minority government may seem counter-intuitive to the democratic tenet of majority rule but has, in fact, been accepted within Westminster systems.

Despite legal legitimacy and historical precedence, however, minority governments may not necessarily augur well in terms of perceptions of political or economic stability. In the case of Negeri Sembilan, for example, the SME Association of Malaysia has urged the state’s royal and political turmoil be resolved quickly, as it believes prolonged uncertainty carries economic consequences.

A second point of interest is the role of the ruler in granting an audience with the incumbent or alternative leader. In this case, UMNO had reportedly requested an audience with Ruler Tuanku Muhriz to inform him of their withdrawal of support for Aminuddin and claimed they had the numbers to form a new state government, with the backing of five representatives from Perikatan Nasional (PN), making up 19 seats. It is not known how the palace would have responded, if at all, but this was overtaken by the reversal.

Table 1 provides a historical overview of cases in Malaysia in which state governments changed as a result of defections or loss of support. Of the 16 documented cases, only four had no-confidence votes held in the respective state legislative assemblies (1961 Terengganu, 1966 Sarawak, 1977 Kelantan and 2020 Perak), whereas five had their state assemblies dissolved, leading to fresh elections (1977 Kelantan, 1987 Sarawak, 2020 Sabah, 2021 Malacca and 2022 Johor). Of the latter, only Kelantan (1977) saw a no-confidence vote and state dissolution. In all other cases, the governments of these states changed when there was no motion or vote of confidence/no-confidence, nor did their state assemblies dissolve. In other words, the changes occurred without any public means of displaying confidence in the new political leadership, whether by a vote in the state legislative assembly or fresh elections.

Table 1: Defections Through History

Name and Party of Original Chief MinisterReason for crisisNo confidence vote and consequenceAssembly dissolved?Name and Party of Replacement Chief Minister
1961 – Terengganu
Mohammad Daud bin Abdul Samad (Parti Islam SeMalaysia, PAS)2 PAS and 3 Parti Negara defections to UMNO.No-confidence vote was held (tabled by UMNO); passed against PAS CMNoUMNO (Ibrahim Fikri Mohammad)
1966 – Sarawak
Stephen Kalong Ningkan (Sarawak National Party, SNAP)21 out of 42 legislators stated in a letter that they had lost confidence in Ningkan.Governor initially dismissed Ningkan based on the letter. He was reinstated when the Court ruled the dismissal unconstitutional. Ningkan’s request for dissolution denied by the federal government and its Ruler.   No-confidence vote was held (only after state of emergency declared to hold special assembly sitting). Ningkan was dismissed for the second time.NoTawi Sli (Sarawak Heritage Party, or PESAKA)
1977 – Kelantan
Mohammad Nasir (PAS)PAS led no-confidence vote against CM, seeing him as too close to UMNO though both parties were in a coalition.No-confidence vote was held. CM then asked for dissolution, Ruler said no. Fresh elections held three months after a state of emergency was declared by the Agong.Yes (three months later)Mohammad Yaacob (UMNO)
1987 – Sarawak
Taib Mahmud (Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu)27 members of the state assembly (the “Maju group”) declared that they had lost confidence in Taib. No vote held; Taib requested for dissolutionYesTaib Mahmud (Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu)
1994 – Sabah
Joseph Pairin Kitingan (Parti Bersatu Sabah, PBS)Defection of 20 out of 25 legislators from Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS), led by Bernard Dompok.No vote heldNoSakaran Dandai (BN)
2009 – Perak
Nizar Jamaluddin (PAS)3 Pakatan Rakyat (PR) members of the state assembly defected.No vote held; Nizar requested for dissolutionNoZambry Abdul Kadir (UMNO)
2018 – Sabah
Musa Aman (Sabah BN)6 legislators defected to Warisan.No vote held. Governor instructed Musa Aman to step down.NoShafie Apdal (PH-aligned Warisan)
2020 – Johor, Malacca, Perak, Kedah
Johor: Sahruddin Jamal (Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia, (Bersatu)-PH)Bersatu legislators switched to align with UMNO and PAS, aided by PH legislators’ defection to PN parties.No vote held.NoHasni Mohamad (UMNO-BN)
Malacca: Adly Zahari (Amanah – PH)Sulaiman Md Ali (UMNO-BN)
Perak: Ahmad Faizal Azumu (Bersatu-PH)Ahmad Faizal Azumu (Bersatu-PN)
Kedah: Mukhriz Mahathir (Bersatu-PH)Muhammad Sanusi Md Nor (PAS-PN)
2020 – Sabah
Shafie Apdal (Warisan)13 and eventually 34 out of 66 legislators defected to support former CM Musa Aman, who claimed he had support to form government.No vote held; Governor denied Musa Aman entry into palace, Shafie requested for dissolution, which was granted.YesHajiji Noor (Gabungan Rakyat Sabah). Musa Aman was dropped from UMNO candidate list.
2020 – Perak
Ahmad Faizal Azumu (Bersatu), PN-BN governmentUMNO moved a motion of confidence in him.Motion/vote of confidence was held (tabled by UMNO), which Faizal Azumu lost.NoSaarani Mohamad (UMNO), in restructured BN-PN government.  
2021 – Malacca
Sulaiman Md Ali (UMNO)4 members of the state assembly withdrew support from him (led by Idris Haron).No vote held; Sulaiman requested for dissolution.YesSulaiman Md Ali (UMNO) was re-elected.
2022 – Johor
Hasni Mohd (BN)A member of the state assembly died, state government left with one-seat majority.No vote held; Hasni Mohd requested for dissolutionYesOnn Hafiz Ghani (UMNO)
2025 – Perlis
Mohd Shukri Ramli (PAS); PN government8 PN members of the state assembly (5 from Bersatu, 3 from PAS) submitted statutory declarations expressing a loss of confidence in the CM.No vote held; crisis resolved through leadership realignment within PN coalition.NoAbu Bakar Hamzah (Bersatu); PN government
2026 – Negeri Sembilan
Aminuddin Harun (Parti Keadilan Rakyat, PKR)14 UMNO members of the state withdrew support from Aminuddin but still maintain they are part of the PH-BN coalition.Situation still developingDissolution is rumouredSituation still developing

Based on Table 1, it would seem as if the current situation, where the disputed Chief Minister’s position is retained with no confidence vote or dissolution is unprecedented – for the time being, though this is being tested as events unfold. This is partially to do with the Ruler Tuanku Muhriz choosing not to grant an audience to the potential alternative leadership (UMNO-BN), and partly to do with the consequent reversal of the 14 UMNO politicians.

A third and fascinating development is that the Negeri Sembilan state government will now have to consult a national-level UMNO-PH Leadership Consultative Council, especially regarding sensitive executive decisions. While state governments are by nature an extension of the political parties that appoint individuals to represent them within the Executive Council (EXCO), there have been instances in the past when the Chief Minister and his own political party did not see eye to eye, such as in Selangor (Khalid Ibrahim), Terengganu (Ahmad Said) and Johor (Osman Sapian).

In the past, previous consultative committees have also been set up to ensure coalition stability between PH and BN, such as in Perak and Pahang shortly after they formed joint coalition state governments in 2022 and 2023 respectively. However, the Negeri Sembilan case is a rare instance of state party leaders deferring decisions that could “trigger sensitivities or create discord” to a national council, even while needing to navigate the delicate relationship with the rulers.

Although the situation has stabilised, there will still be pressure to determine a clear majority, or to determine methods towards a more sustainable minority government, such as via a confidence and supply agreement, as this may affect how decisions are made at the legislative assembly. However, this fragile status quo may be short-lived, given the dissolution of the Johor state assembly and rumours that Negeri Sembilan might do the same.  

Even if its state assembly does not dissolve immediately, the state government may find itself under pressure to ensure that the BN representatives do not vote against the state budget in November this year, which would be a proxy no-confidence vote against PH’s Aminuddin — indicating the Negeri Sembilan state government has a six-month lifeline. This episode will certainly affect future PH-BN cooperation, including seat negotiations and electoral strategies in the upcoming Johor state election ahead of GE16, not to mention other state elections that are coming up, including in Malacca.

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Ambition Without Alignment: Managing Malaysia’s Rare Earth Value Chain

Posted on April 23, 2026 by Tricia

This policy paper was published by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute as a Trends (Issue 14, 2026) in April 2026. It can be viewed here.

Executive Summary

  • In the escalating US-China trade war and projected increased demand for critical minerals, deposits of rare earth elements (REE)—highly essential in a range of manufacturing, defence and electronic items—have become highly sought after.
  • According to Malaysia’s Mineral and Geoscience Department (JMG), the country has identified as much as 16.1 million metric tonnes of non-radioactive REEs across several states, although this will need to be independently verified.
  • Under Malaysia’s Federal Constitution 1957, the federal government has jurisdiction over the development of mineral resources, import and export policy, regulation of labour and safety in mines, the direction of strategic industrial development, selected operating licences, and radioactive and waste management, while state governments have jurisdiction over land, forests, and exploration permits and licences. The implementation of mining regulations and environmental compliance, however, requires the co-operation of both federal and state governments.
  • Malaysia’s federal government has banned the export of raw rare earths, intending to develop a fully integrated supply chain by attracting investments and partnerships, especially in the more valuable midstream and downstream sectors.
  • Legal and institutional frameworks have, however, led to a somewhat fragmented policy outcome since authority over land resources, regulations and industrial strategy are split. While coordination exists, the decisions of some state governments do not align with federal policies—for instance, negotiating rare earth partnerships with external investors separately from the federal government—while illegal mining persists, which is environmentally damaging. States are also permitted to set their own royalty rates for rare earth mining.
  • The two states with the highest percentage of rare earth deposits are Terengganu and Kelantan, both northeastern Peninsular Malaysia states that also happen to be controlled by a party in the national opposition, the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS).
  • The four PAS-led states, including Kedah and Perlis, have expressed displeasure at centralizing the regulation of rare earths, noting the need for consultation, fairness and transparency. Opposition-controlled states have had a history of being discriminated against by the federal government over resource and fiscal distribution.
  • For Malaysia to achieve its lofty ambitions and benefit financially from its rare earth deposits, and doing so while minimizing adverse environmental and social effects, it will need a comprehensive strategy in which all stakeholders, chiefly the federal and state governments, are in agreement.

For the full paper, please visit the link here.

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Balancing Malaysia’s Economic Ambitions and Political Constraints

Posted on April 10, 2026 by Tricia

This article first appeared in the Caravanserai Magazine of the Royal Society of Asian Affairs (Spring 2026 Issue 9) here.

Balancing Malaysia’s Economic Ambitions and Political Constraints

Tricia Yeoh

Malaysia is at a critical juncture. Amid a rapidly shifting global geopolitical landscape, the country benefits from multinational companies adopting a China+1 strategy – a business approach in which companies diversify their manufacturing and supply chains beyond China to reduce risks associated with rising costs, geopolitical tensions, and potential disruptions. At the same time, Malaysia continues to maintain an open trading relationship with the United States, further strengthening its position as an attractive alternative hub for investment and production.

While Malaysia has a clear roadmap for high-value growth, especially in the logistics, semiconductor and rare earth sectors, it continues to grapple with internal structural legacies that, if not managed efficiently, will weigh it down. The country’s success is still tethered to a political economy defined by its State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) dominance, ethnic distributive policies and federal–state friction. As the next General Election is due by February 2028 at the latest, there is only about a year left for any significant policy implementation – and even less if early polls are called, possibly as soon as the last quarter of 2026 if the intention is to hold national elections simultaneously with the state elections of the two Peninsular states of Malacca and Johor.

The country has long established itself in the global semiconductor industry, primarily in the back end of assembly, testing and packaging. Most recently, its National Semiconductor Strategy has put forward ambitious goals of moving into front-end integrated circuit (IC) design and advanced manufacturing.

The federal government’s deal signed with UK chip design firm Arm Holdings was meant to do precisely this. Under the 10-year agreement, Malaysia would pay US$250 million (RM1.11 billion) to Arm in exchange for its intellectual property licences and computer subsystems (CSS), assets that would be made available to domestic companies in the electrical and electronics sector.

Domestic politics, however, has introduced some complications. The Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) is currently investigating several individuals involved in alleged mismanagement and haste in the deal. The investigation, however, has been accused by the former Minister of Economy of being politically motivated and retaliatory, following his public calls for the suspension of the MACC Chief Commissioner after incriminating Bloomberg reports alleged that the commission was involved with “the corporate mafia”. While the Arm deal is still ongoing, these developments risk spooking other investors who may fear being caught in a similar political-economy quagmire.

Malaysia has also been keen to showcase other industrial Foreign Direct Investment, particularly in the data centre space. Clusters in the central Klang Valley region and the southern Peninsular state of Johor have benefitted from global demand for data centres and the increasing use of artificial intelligence (AI). While some local infrastructure sectors – particularly construction and ICT – as well as knowledge transfer may benefit from this influx of investment, data centres could also significantly deplete the country’s resources. The water and electricity appetite of this sector is expected to place unprecedented strain on Malaysia’s water sustainability and energy supply, and may also risk jeopardising the nation’s own climate goals. The National Energy Transition Roadmap (NETR), for instance, aims for 70% renewable energy capacity by 2050.

Another major policy decision Malaysia will have to grapple with is whether the state should continue to be the primary engine of its economy. SOEs, better known in Malaysia as Government-Linked Companies (GLCs), have a heavy presence in the economy. Nine of the 13 largest listed companies in Malaysia are GLCs, while 41 GLCs account for 55% of assets, 40% of revenue, and 42% of equity and market capitalisation among the 1,043 publicly listed companies. They crowd out private investment and dominate sectors ranging from public utilities to banking, property and plantations.

The Economic Planning Unit (EPU) has now introduced a new regulation that may affect market liquidity and investor perception even further. Under the new ruling, companies intending to acquire properties of GLCs and GLICs (government-linked investment companies, of which there are seven in the country) valued at RM20 million and above will be required to “have at least 50% bumiputera equity ownership”, increased from the previous 30% threshold. The Ministry of Economy states that this is meant to align with national socioeconomic objectives and the bumiputera agenda.

In Malaysia, bumiputera comprises the Malay and indigenous populations. The nation has a long history of ethnic-based affirmative action policies tracing back to the New Economic Policy of 1971, which continues to exist in various forms, including the latest Bumiputera Economic Community (BEC), across multiple sectors such as housing, education and enterprise development. While the results of these policies, implemented over the past 50 years, have been mixed, the latest regulatory changes will likely introduce uncertainty in the short term. Market competitiveness may also be affected, given that the policy significantly narrows the pool of potential buyers.

The nation will also have to strike a delicate balance between closing its fiscal deficit and navigating the effects of the “three-headed monster”: post-COVID recovery, the Ukraine and Iran conflicts, and global inflation. In 2025, the government made positive strides in reducing its subsidy bill on electricity, diesel, RON95 petrol and some basic goods, although the reforms remain incomplete. Proceeding to remove blanket subsidies wholesale will be politically challenging, given rising living costs combined with relatively stagnant wages.

Malaysia continues to rely significantly on its petrol-related dividends, signalling the oil and gas sector’s sustained relevance to the economy. The country’s fragile internal union, particularly concerning the Sarawak factor, is now putting this to the test. In recent months, both Petronas (the national oil company) and the Sarawak state government in East Malaysia have filed lawsuits at the Federal Court seeking clarification on whether the national law – the Petroleum Development Act 1974 – has jurisdiction in Sarawak. Sarawak is contesting the federal government’s ownership and rights over mining in the state, the consequences of which could reshape both the political and economic arrangements of the nation.

Even in the case of the country’s “new oil” – rare earth elements – the federal–state equation has yet to be resolved. While the nation has ambitions of building its midstream and downstream capabilities in the rare earth sector – elements that are in high global demand due to their use in medical, technological and defence industries – international investment will not be forthcoming if the country cannot present a coherent narrative and policy environment. In Malaysia, land and mining fall under state jurisdiction, environmental regulation is a joint responsibility, and export licensing is controlled by the federal government.

While global bifurcation is unfolding across technological, trade and digital spaces, with standards increasingly splitting down the middle, it may prove difficult for any country to maintain a neutral regulatory environment. Malaysia, however, is well placed geopolitically and geoeconomically to benefit from these developments. It will leverage its pre-existing Port Klang, the China-invested East Coast Rail Link (ECRL), and the upcoming Kuantan Port to link the Straits of Malacca on the Peninsular west coast with the South China Sea on the east coast – both crucial maritime channels for logistics and transportation. These developments could position Malaysia as an essential hub in regional supply-chain linkages.

Malaysia’s economic story has been a compelling one since its early years, particularly during its rapid growth in the 1990s. Since the fall of its dominant Barisan Nasional coalition in 2018, however, the country has been undergoing democratic consolidation alongside increasing political fragmentation, adding another layer of complexity to how its economy should be understood.

To truly escape the middle-income trap and become the global tech hub it aspires to be, the government must ultimately harmonise its national socioeconomic objectives with the ruthless efficiency demanded by global supply chains. To achieve this, sound policies grounded in both competition and equity must demonstrably deliver for its people regardless of ethnicity. Nevertheless, Malaysia’s economic execution will almost always be political – something all stakeholders will need to keep in mind, especially as the country moves closer to the next election cycle.

Posted in Economics, General Politics, Outside Malaysia | Leave a comment

Malaysia’s fiscal reset collides with global trade politics

Posted on February 18, 2026 by Tricia

This article first appeared on the East Asia Forum website on 11 February 2026, accessible here.

In Brief

Malaysian efforts at domestic fiscal balancing and external economic rebalancing remained unfinished at the end of 2025. Progress on fiscal consolidation — particularly with reductions in subsidies — were counterbalanced by new cash assistance to protect poorer Malaysian households and problems in the oil and gas industry. Externally, new trade relations were cultivated, but the immediate threat from US tariffs saw Kuala Lumpur make significant concessions to Washington.

2025 saw Malaysia press forward with fiscal consolidation amid rising global tensions and trade adjustments. Targeted domestic subsidy reforms were part of broader efforts to redirect resources towards social priorities. Malaysia also navigated external pressures, contending with evolving US trade policy, while deepening integration with other partner countries.

Malaysia has long footed a heavy subsidy bill, paying almost RM80 billion (US$20.3 billion) in total subsidies in 2022. But since 2023, the government has steadily reduced subsidies using a tiered system for electricity and diesel. 2025 saw further reductions, targeting chicken, eggs and RON95 petrol. But the reformed petrol subsidy plan does not achieve full market efficiency, as eligible citizens still pay RM0.06 (US$0.015) less per litre, while foreigners pay RM0.55 (US$0.14) more per litre, than they did originally. The expansion of the Sales and Service Tax in mid-2025, both in scope and rate, will further improve Malaysia’s fiscal outcomes with RM5 billion ($US1.27 billion) in additional revenue expected.

These fiscal measures did not come without negative consequences. They caused a level of distress to business, while increased inflationary pressures — especially rising food and material costs following the Sales and Service Tax implementation — affected households and traders.

Sensitive toward citizens’ inflation sentiments, the government redistributed RM15.5 billion (US$3.93 billion) in savings as cash handouts to low-income Malaysians, with similar concerns likely to motivate further cash assistance. Additional fiscal pressures were also generated by extended benefits to the civil service. These moves defy economic logic, but they reflect the government’s need to balance fiscal responsibility and political popularity.

Oil-related revenues, which comprised an estimated 16.9 per cent of total federal revenue in 2025, were under pressure due to problems in the oil and gas sector. National oil and gas company Petronas’s profits declined amid a challenging global environment, while the Sarawak state government and the federal government vied over oil and gas resources in a series of legal battles.

Malaysia’s federal government will have to negotiate delicately, given Sarawak contributes 14 per cent of seats to the national Parliament. The dispute spilled over into 2026, with Petronas filing a motion at the Federal Court in January to seek clarity on the applicable regulatory framework governing its operations in Sarawak.

Internationally, much of Malaysia’s 2025 was spent dealing with threats posed by the announced US tariffs — the initial 24 per cent rate was later negotiated down to 19 per cent through the US–Malaysia Agreement on Reciprocal Trade.

The agreement, while eliminating US tariffs on 1711 Malaysian exports, made significant concessions to US interests. These included exempting US tech companies from contributing to the Universal Service Provision Fund, agreeing to impose measures on third countries to protect US economic or national security, preferential market access and continued critical mineral exports.

The heaviest criticism is that the deal was rushed through with no transparency or consultation with relevant stakeholders. Malaysia’s then minister of investment, trade and industry, Tengku Zafrul Aziz, admitted that it was lopsided but stated the outcome ultimately benefited Malaysia, with the US–Malaysia relationship upgraded to a comprehensive strategic partnership.

Ultimately, despite the attention afforded to the United States in 2025, Malaysia needs international partners from all sides and persuasions, given it is deeply integrated with the global economy. As the United States overtook China as Malaysia’s largest export market in 2025, approved foreign investments surged 47.5 per cent year-on-year, attracting investments into renewable energy, semiconductors and advanced mineral processing.

These sectors align with Malaysia’s policy portfolio, with rare earths and critical minerals in particular identified by the government as an upcoming strategic sector, projected to contribute some RM91.9 billion (US$23.3 billion) to GDP by 2050. As countries seek to ensure a reliable supply chain of critical minerals essential in the production of advanced technologies, Malaysia will seek to be a key player in rare earths processing, banning exports of raw rare earths with the exception of a Chinese-led pilot project. But without alignment of interests and incentives between the federal and state governments, this remains but a lofty ambition.

Malaysia straddles the growing US–Chinese trade tensions by being friendly to all parties. Malaysia officially became a BRICS partner country on 1 January 2025, allowing closer engagement with the bloc’s large emerging economies. And as the 2026 ASEAN Chair, it hosted an inaugural ASEAN–Gulf Cooperation Council–China Summit. Still, it might be the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership — which Malaysia is a member of — that will deliver actual trade benefits.

Simultaneously, Malaysia signed an agreement to expand trade ties with Switzerland, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. Negotiations on the Malaysia–EU free trade agreement are expected to conclude by 2027.

Moving into 2026, Malaysia’s strategic priorities will remain largely unchanged. Ongoing pressures on debt and its budget deficit necessitate fiscal consolidation. The domestic economy, particularly small and medium enterprises — which contribute nearly 40 per cent of GDP — will require support to remain competitive amid rising costs, stricter regulatory pressures and US tariffs.

Malaysia will continue seeking new markets and international partnerships. Given the weakening of the rules-based international order, it is imperative that Malaysia, alongside its ASEAN neighbours, gives greater emphasis to open and interconnected trade — all the while preparing for a general election that must be held no later than February 2028.

Tricia Yeoh is Associate Professor of Practice at the University of Nottingham, Senior Fellow at the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada and Visiting Senior Fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.

This article is part of an EAF special feature series on 2025 in review and the year ahead.https://doi.org/10.59425/eabc.1770804000

Posted in Economics, General Politics, International Relations | Leave a comment

Malaysia’s Budget 2026: Fiscal Reform or Fragility?

Posted on November 5, 2025 by Tricia

This was first published on Fulcrum on 3 November 2025 here.

Malaysia’s 2026 budget continues fiscal reforms but exposes structural fragilities such as heavy operating costs and rising debt. These factors may threaten long-term fiscal stability.

Earlier this month, the Malaysian Madani administration tabled its fourth annual budget. The expansionary budget of RM470 billion for 2026 continues the administration’s emphasis on fiscal reform, but still lags on key issues such as heavy operating expenditures, a narrow revenue base, and governance accountability. 

This was not an election budget but a continuation of the administration’s generally prudent fiscal approach. However, the RM470 billion figure includes RM50.8 billion in investments from government-linked companies (GLCs), which are not conventionally recorded as government expenditure. Deducting the injections from government-linked investment companies (GLICs), federal statutory bodies (FSBs) and Minister of Finance Incorporated (MOF Inc) companies, total operating and development expenditure amounts to RM419.2 billion – only slightly higher than 2025’s RM410.9 billion.

Since the pandemic, the government has increasingly relied on its GLICs and GLCs to cushion public spending and stimulate recovery. While they serve an important socio-economic function, over-dependence risks displacing what truly drives long-term growth: a competitive private sector operating in a predictable, business-friendly environment.

From a public finance perspective, it is a positive that subsidies and social assistance are expected to fall by RM8 billion, or 2.7 per cent. The government projects annual savings of RM15.5 billion from reduced subsidies for chickens, eggs, electricity, diesel and RON95 petrol. However, there have been calls for the government to be transparent about its math and how these figures are computed.

These savings have been channelled into cash handouts and assistance schemes. The RM100 Sumbangan Asas Rahmah (SARA) cash aid for adults will continue. The same applies to Sumbangan Tunai Rahmah (STR) for low-income families, whose allocations will be increased from RM13 billion to RM15 billion in 2026. While politically popular, such handouts reduce the fiscal room gained from subsidy rationalisation.

Cancelling out the increase in savings will also impact the country’s fiscal outlook. Although the fiscal deficit is projected to narrow slightly from 3.8 per cent in 2025 to 3.5 per cent in 2026, achieving the 3 per cent target under the Public Finance and Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA) 2023 within five years is uncertain. Debt levels also continue to rise, with the debt-to-GDP ratio climbing from 64.7 per cent in 2025 to 65.8 per cent in 2026 – above the FRA’s 60 per cent target.

This was not an election budget but a continuation of the administration’s generally prudent fiscal approach.

The debt service charge (DSC) will also increase from 16.3 per cent to 17 per cent of revenue, meaning RM17 of every RM100 earned will go toward servicing debt (principal and interest), leaving only RM83 to pay for other types of spending. Under the IMF-World Bank Debt Sustainability Framework for low-income countries, countries with strong debt-carrying capacity like Malaysia should maintain an external debt service-to-revenue ratio below 23 per cent. Malaysia remains within this range, but the upward trend is of concern.

At the same time, development expenditure — which funds infrastructure, public transportation, schools and hospitals — is declining as a share of GDP, from 4 per cent to 3.8 per cent, despite a modest 2.9 per cent increase year-on-year. This indicates there is reduced fiscal space for long-term growth investments. 

Operating expenditure continues to weigh disproportionately heavily, constituting more than 80 per cent of total spending. Two particularly concerning components are emoluments and retirement charges, both of which are seeing allocations increasing by 5.7 per cent and 7 per cent respectively. Emoluments — civil servants’ salaries — the largest component of operating expenditure, will see a 7-15 per cent salary increase for some of them. This follows a 13 per cent increase in December 2024. Retirement charges are also set to grow as the number of pensioners is expected to increase. To address this, the government plans to introduce a defined-contribution pension scheme administered by the Employees’ Provident Fund, which could help reduce long-term fiscal pressure. 

Given the spending and debt pressures, it is troubling that revenues as a percentage of GDP are projected to fall from 16.6 per cent in 2025 to 16.1 per cent in 2026. Compounding this is the lowest Petronas dividend in nine years at RM20 billion. The government plans higher excise duties on tobacco and alcohol, and a new carbon tax on steel, iron and energy set to be rolled out in 2026. But these are modest measures. This was a missed opportunity to broaden Malaysia’s narrow revenue base by restoring the goods and services tax (GST).

The currently expanded sales and service tax (SST) is expected to generate RM51.7 billion in 2025, but it covers only 41 per cent of goods and services, compared to GST’s 76 per cent (when it was in force). Restoring the GST, while politically sensitive, would strengthen fiscal resilience and provide more sustainable revenue. Expanding revenues and national productivity must therefore form the backbone of the country’s medium to long-term strategy.

Malaysia has seen improvements in the legal and regulatory framework governing public finance with the passing of new laws in recent years, such as the FRA and the Government Procurement Act (GPA) 2025. Despite flaws, these laws enhance Malaysia’s fiscal framework by institutionalising transparency and responsibility.

However, more is needed to strengthen government accountability further and curb abuse and leakages. Several new laws, such as the Freedom of Information Act, Ombudsman Act and State-Owned Enterprises Act, were mentioned in the pre-budget statement but were omitted from the Prime Minister’s budget speech. These omissions are disappointing given the government’s heavy reliance on the GLC ecosystem. 

The Madani Budget 2026 has already generated much debate and praise, but its omissions and shortcomings deserve continued scrutiny. It signals continued reform, but reveals certain structural fragilities that the government must urgently tackle to ensure fiscal and governance resilience. With these in place, Malaysia will be laying strong foundations to withstand any unexpected global shocks while working toward sustainable future long-term growth.

Posted in Economics, Public Administration | Leave a comment

What We Don’t See is Harming Our Children: The Smartphone Blackhole

Posted on October 30, 2025 by Tricia

By Dr Tricia Yeoh and Dr Chua Sook Ning

This piece was first published on Makchic.com on 22 October 2025, here.

Last week saw a tragic incident that few expected in Malaysia. The country was jolted by the shocking news on 14th October 2025 of Yap Shing Xuen, a 16-year-old girl being stabbed to death by a 14-year-old boy at a local public secondary school.

While details of the investigation are still unfolding, what is apparent is that the boy left a handwritten note, indicating that he may have been influenced by a range of different cultural artefacts including anime, video games, and past US school shooting incidents. The Selangor police also raised the possibility that certain social media content may have shaped his mindset.

This event has compelled Malaysians to reconsider its many policies and approaches towards children and teenagers. In the coming weeks and months, the Ministries of Education, Youth and Sports, Women, Family and Community Development, and Home Affairs will be inundated with policy decisions as they confront the realities at our doorstep.

To Ban or Not To Ban: What Other Countries are Doing

At the time of writing, the government has announced it is considering a ban on the use of personal devices in schools for those under 16, as well as to raise the minimum social media age access to 16. While some studies show that use of digital and social media does have some benefits, including opportunities for social contact and exposure to new knowledge, the converse is also true – there is an increased and unsupervised risk of exposure to inappropriate and unsafe content and contacts.

For instance, the American Academy of Pediatrics’ technical report on digital media found high levels of media use are associated with negative health outcomes such as increased risks of depression and obesity, and problems with sleep, attention, and learning. The real and significant negative effects of social media on children and adolescents have led to governments taking steps to protect young people by applying age-restrictions to social media platforms. Australia was the first country to ban social media for those under 16 (to be implemented by December 2025), while Singapore will likely roll out similar age-appropriate content with social media platforms. The UK has also enforced new laws, protecting under-18s from harmful content.

While the efficacy and feasibility of a social media ban is not yet known, there is a broad consensus among experts that a ban alone is insufficient to prevent harm and promote the well-being of Malaysian children and adolescents. This goal requires a whole-of-society approach, including having clearly defined duties of care for digital service providers, teaching digital literacy in schools, and having clear household rules on content, communication, and co-viewing.

How We Got Here — The Generation Rewired by Smartphones

In the US, mental illness increased exponentially between 2010 and 2015 for adolescents, while older generations were much less affected. Social psychologist Professor Jonathan Haidt, in his book “The Anxious Generation” (2024) attributed the sharp increases in depression and anxiety among adolescent boys and girls between 2010 and 2020 to the wide-spread adoption of the smartphone. Haidt argues that it was precisely the arrival of the smartphone that changed life for these youth through what he calls the “Great Rewiring of Childhood”.

How did this happen, precisely?

In Haidt’s research, amongst the harms that smartphones created in the US – and by extension, easy access to either social media or other digital platforms – were social deprivation, sleep deprivation, attention fragmentation and addiction. As adults, we too find ourselves “doom scrolling” our various social media platforms; how much more difficult it would be for young children to resist the constant alerts and notifications.

He argues that girls’ social lives moved onto social media platforms in which existing peer pressure of comparing themselves with others to fit a social image escalated, while boys “burrowed deeper into the virtual world as they engaged in a variety of digital activities, particularly immersive online multiplayer video games, YouTube, Reddit, and hardcore pornography”, available for free, right on their smartphones.

The “gradual disengagement with the real world and deepening immersion in the virtual world” appears to be more common among boys who feel frustrated, isolated, and disaffected. They turn to virtual reality (such as gaming, online networks, or pornography) to escape and avoid real-world problems and their own emotional experiences. These boys become increasingly drawn into “virtual packs”, which is only natural given that boys thrive when they have a group of friends. While we understand that there is expert debate over Haidt’s arguments, even his critics seem to agree that adaptation is needed for children to have a safer internet experience.

Malaysia is not exempt from this pattern. Our own National Health and Morbidity Surveys shows that mental health issues among children aged 5 to 15 have risen from 12 per cent to 16 per cent in less than a decade. Among secondary school students, loneliness has doubled from 8 per cent to 16 per cent, and suicidal thoughts have increased from 8 per cent to 13 per cent. In 2022 alone, almost one in five secondary school boys and over a third of girls reported symptoms of depression.

The 2023 Malaysia Youth Mental Health Index paints an equally troubling picture in older youths (15–30 years old): 16 per cent experience anxiety and a staggering 40 per cent experience symptoms of depression. New research is needed to establish whether these trends are linked to the usage of digital media in Malaysia.

Another concerning development within some online spaces for some vulnerable boys is the rise of the “incel” culture (involuntary celibate). The rise and impact of incel culture was highlighted in the widely applauded Netflix series “Adolescence”. Referring to men who blame women and society for their lack of romantic success, they are considered part of the “manosphere”, an ideological web of men’s rights activists and “alpha male” influencers that attract primarily young men searching for meaning and community. At the core of this lies misogynistic tendencies, which may facilitate violence targeting women and girls.

Could these global trends be deeply embedded in Malaysian online spaces too? It is time that Malaysian parents, as well as the whole of society, approaches the internet and access to it, through smartphones, with great wisdom and care.

Raising the Age of Internet Adulthood

We call for society to raise the age of “internet adulthood” to 16. Having a nationwide ban on social media for those under 16 may help parents who are trying to restrict their children from smartphones. This is less of an argument for the effectiveness of a social media ban, but the acknowledgment that contextual factors can hinder or help the effectiveness of parental mediation, the latter of which often feels daunting, confusing, and impossible to implement. Common barriers to parental mediation of digital media use include adolescents’ expectations, rules set by other parents, and social norms.

Regardless of the ban, if the entire village of parents collectively agrees not to provide smartphones (use basic phones instead) and social media access for children under 16, this could help shape teenagers’ own expectations and reduce peer pressure for both parents and children. In the UK, a parent pact to withhold smartphones from children under 14 has been signed by signatories representing just under 35,000 children. Parents are also creating ‘landline pods’, where children can call each other on landline phones that are helping them communicate and listen better.

When children eventually receive personal devices, these should ideally be used in communal, family spaces – not in the private space of a bedroom. Adopting healthier digital media habits does not mean abolishing them completely; family movie nights, for example, allow for active interaction amongst family members.

For parents of children who are already accessing digital media, the American Academy of Pediatrics’ 5 C’s of Media Use might be useful. It encourages parents to:

  1. Think about the unique risks and benefits of media for their child.
  2. Know what digital activities are engaged in and to actively discuss aspects of the content with their child (such as unrealistic beauty standards, or use of violence).
  3. Learn how to manage strong emotions and challenges rather than relying on avoidance coping or escapism.
  4. Increase real-life engagement – reducing screen time frees up energy and time to do other things families care about, but that have been crowded out by screen time.
  5. Communicate about media early and often to build digital literacy and to help identify when their child is struggling.

In addition, there is a need to develop digital parenting training programmes to equip parents with the necessary strategies related to the rules of using digital devices both online and offline to protect children’s safety from the threat of its use. This may include the use of parental controls and content filters on all digital devices in the home. Initial data is promising with improvements in children’s digital use habits and parental bonding.

On this note, a feasible next step for Malaysia is to follow Australia’s eSafety Commission in offering free webinars online on topics such as understanding AI Companions, using parental controls, and recognising online coercive control. These webinars are essential for parents and carers to give them the knowledge, skills, and tools to provide safe digital spaces for their children in the fast-evolving digital world.

While parents play a central role, they cannot and should not be expected to carry this responsibility alone. Many are working long hours, lack digital literacy, or feel outpaced by constantly evolving technology. They need clear guidance, accessible tools, and a supportive community to help them set boundaries, supervise use, and rebuild connection at home.

When families are backed by schools, communities, platforms and policy, they are far more able to create homes with meaningful conversations, screen-free time, outdoor and free play, and opportunities for children to lead in real life rather than escape into virtual worlds. This is not just a parenting issue – it is a societal responsibility. If we act together, we can protect childhood, strengthen families, and prevent the mental health crisis from deepening. Our children should not have to pay the price for our collective inaction.

And now is the time for us to act. The research is clear, the risks are visible, and we can no longer claim ignorance or inevitability. We have enough information to act with intention. What we now need is alignment. If parents, educators, policymakers and technology companies each take responsibility for their part, we can create healthier social and digital norms, and overall safer environments for our young people. May last week’s tragedy be a wake-up call for all members of society to do their part.

Dr Tricia Yeoh is a public policy analyst, social science lecturer, and parent. She is also advisor of Relate Malaysia.

Dr Chua Sook Ning is a practicing clinical psychologist and public health practitioner, lecturer and founder of Relate Malaysia, a not-for-profit mental health organisation.

Posted in Civil Society, Media, Media, Culture, Literature, Public Administration | Leave a comment

The 2025 PKR Party Election: Feuding, Factionalism and the Future of the People’s Justice Party

Posted on October 10, 2025 by Tricia

This Perspective was published by ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute on 22 September 2025. For the full publication, please visit this link here.

  • The People’s Justice Party (PKR)’s party election in 2025, its first while holding executive office in federal government, generated heated contests and attracted extensive public attention.
  • The 2025 party election saw a series of surprising outcomes. More than 30,000 delegates representing 222 divisions voted for central leadership positions. At the division level, several senior or upcoming figures lost their contests, and there were allegations of fraud and complaints of electoral inconsistencies made to the party, which were eventually dismissed by the party’s central election committee.
  • The contest for the Deputy Presidency between incumbent Rafizi Ramli and Nurul Izzah Anwar (daughter of Anwar Ibrahim), was the most heated. Nurul’s ‘unity’ defeated Rafizi’s ‘reform’ campaign by a large margin, but this result and the preceding controversies have raised questions about whether there will be another round of factional strife that may split the party.
  • Rafizi and Nik Nazmi subsequently resigned their ministerial positions, and Rafizi has become highly critical of the federal administration. 
  • The future of PKR continues to be of great importance to Malaysia, given the likelihood that PKR will remain a significant player in the country’s coalitional politics. In this context, the issues of party cohesion and leadership succession that have arisen in the aftermath of the 2025 PKR party election will remain closely watched by observers of Malaysia’s political scene.

INTRODUCTION

The 2025 election of the People’s Justice Party (Parti KeADILAN Rakyat, or PKR) has been one of the most hotly contested and reported of its party elections historically. It is the first time the party held its elections while also holding executive office within the federal government. The winning individuals would be considered successors to the party president, favourable and influential in political and policy decision-making. The stakes were certainly high going into the election. The party had previously held its elections in 2022, 2018 and 2014. In the 2025 edition, the results have given rise to deep fissures in the party, and it is uncertain whether the faction out of favour with the party’s leadership will eventually leave.

This Perspective traces the events of the PKR party election in 2025, focusing on the division between key personalities, as well as the underlying events that led to that moment. It concludes with thoughts about the party’s future, which will invariably impact the country’s immediate and long-term future.

For the full publication, please visit this link here.

Posted in Elections, General Politics | Leave a comment

Increasing Government Efficiency in Malaysia through a New Act

Posted on August 29, 2025 by Tricia

This article was first published on Fulcrum, the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute platform, on 20 August 2025 here.

A new Act to improve government efficiency in Malaysia would help streamline the bureaucracy and reduce regulatory burdens. It could be improved, however, by adding some parliamentary oversight.

Since taking office in November 2022, Malaysia’s MADANI government has rolled out at least 12 official national master plans and policy frameworks. Under the 13th Malaysia Plan, it aims to deliver 95 per cent of government services fully online by 2030, positioning Malaysia as a “high-income digital economy powered by artificial intelligence (AI)”.

Yet, the implementation of such plans remains a perennial question. Monitoring and evaluation of these targets are rarely done or reported. To address this, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim is banking on the Government Service Efficiency Commitment Act 2025. This was passed earlier this year to “enhance the quality, efficiency and effectiveness of the government service” by streamlining the bureaucracy, reducing regulatory burden and introducing service performance ratings.

The Public Service Department, which will lead reforms with the Ministry of Economy and the Malaysia Productivity Corporation (MPC), aims to transform work culture and strengthen public-private sector collaboration. These efforts also align with the new Chief Secretary (CS) Tan Sri Shamsul Azri Abu Bakar’s plans to revamp the civil service.

The Act enshrines principles of service efficiency, governance responsibility, structural reform and regulatory effectiveness. Significantly, it embeds governance, integrity, and transparency — language rarely adopted by the civil service — against a backdrop where 43 per cent of those detained by the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) in 2024 were civil servants.

Under the Act, Government entities are required to reduce the regulatory burden by at least 25 per cent every three years, as well as review the procedures under their regulatory instruments. Then Economy Minister Rafizi Ramli had said in August 2024 that the intention was for the legislation to reduce bureaucracy and simplify procedures for businesses. However, which entities will be required to do so and how exactly “regulatory burden” is defined or measured is not stated within the Act.

Notably, the Act provides wide powers to the CS to design rating methods for service delivery, issue directives and require heads of government entities to prepare and submit periodic service performance reports, and “any other information as may be directed”.

This is a significant development. While the CS already oversees the administration of ministries and their agencies, this law extends reporting to statutory bodies, state government entities and even local governments, which are not currently under the CS’ purview. If the reporting line for state government entities and local governments bypasses state governments, this potentially further centralises authority within federal hands. Clarification on how the provisions relate to individual statutory bodies’ Acts is also required.

The CS may at his discretion request reports “from time to time”, without a standardised rating procedure or schedule across all government entities. Ministers may appoint qualified persons to examine and assess these reports, the findings of which are submitted to the CS. However, without an independent verification process, self-reporting risks becoming both highly subjective and perfunctory. Since better ratings can lead to greater federal recognition and funding, the stakes for these assessments are high.

Accountability gaps still remain. Ministers are not obliged to table performance reports in Parliament; the Act only says they “may” do so. A “Government Service Efficiency Commitment Report” on overall performance is to be prepared every three years. At the very least, a redacted version of this report should also be published online and tabled in Parliament for public access.

The Act provides a broad framework to improve service performance in Malaysia, but detailed governance mechanisms are needed to truly transform the public service’s work culture.

The third element of the Act that is striking is that service performance reports can be submitted voluntarily by any state government entity to the CS. This is consequential to federal-state fiscal relations in the country, given that these reports – and ratings contained therein – can be used as criteria to determine federal financial allocations to the state entity.

Apart from federal-to-state grants based on population, road coverage, revenue growth and ecological indicators, other forms of federal government transfers to state governments have no formula. In the past, the politicisation of development funds took place, favouring states aligned with the ruling government. While some performance requirements already exist for some federal-state transfers, the new Act links performance to financial rewards in a more direct and concrete way.

The Act provides a broad framework to improve service performance in Malaysia, but detailed governance mechanisms are needed to truly transform the public service’s work culture. This could drive a culture shift in the country’s public service, if implemented transparently and fairly. However, without sufficient checks and balances, it risks consolidating power in the hands of the federal executive through the CS, whom the government of the day appoints.

One way of improving the Act’s governance is to introduce parliamentary scrutiny on top of existing executive oversight. Lower House Standing Orders were recently amended to enhance executive accountability to Parliament, by elevating the status of Special Select Committees to Standing Select Committees. This made them permanent. That said, however, important public institutions like the MACC do not fall under the purview of any permanent select committees. A new select committee could be set up to oversee government service efficiency, where the Government Service Efficiency Commitment Report could be reviewed.

Finally, federal and state-level government-linked investment companies and government-linked companies (GLICs and GLCs) could be included under the Act, while a separate State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) Governance Act should also be enacted. These moves would strengthen transparency and accountability, ensuring the government fulfils its promise of delivering a more efficient and responsive public service. They would also help the government to implement policies and plans more effectively.

Posted in Public Administration, Transparency and Good Governance | Leave a comment