When the RCI on Teoh Beng Hock’s death was released, I was appalled at its findings, especially certain paragraphs which others have now described as “bad fiction”. This was my piece in theSun on 27th July 2011 on my analysis of it.
When we begin to doubt
The much-awaited Royal Commission of Inquiry (RCI) report into Teoh Beng Hock’s death, and manner of interrogation by the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) was finally released publicly last week, but has instead led to more questions.
The report gave scathing remarks and severe admonishing of three specific MACC officers, finding they had used “continuous, aggressive, and improper questioning tactics on [Teoh] which had breached its existing standard operating procedures”. It also found that, ultimately, Teoh was driven to commit suicide and gave detailed reasons for this.
Numerous parties have responded to these RCI conclusions, amongst which a former criminal investigation chief stating that the three MACC officers can be charged for Abetment of Suicide under Section 306 of the Penal Code. Naturally, there is a lot of anger directed towards these MACC officers who seem to have shown gross misconduct, negligence, and “a total lack of consideration for human sensitivities” in the entire affair.
That the three behaved in the most oppressive and unscrupulous manner is something that most agree on.
But to come to the conclusion that these interrogation tactics “drove” someone to commit suicide is a step further, and a grave conclusion indeed. The Malaysian Bar, for example, in its statement disagreed with the RCI finding that Teoh had committed suicide, as it is “unsupported by facts and evidence”.
It does seem a leap that the RCI makes, for many reasons, only two of which are explored here.
First, and this is a crucial distinction to make: it was important to establish whether or not the deceased was conscious at the time of death. Whilst all pathologists brought in to examine the case agreed that Teoh was alive upon landing, whether he was conscious or not was deliberated upon at length. This finding would impact upon one’s conclusion as to the manner of his death.
In the RCI report, it says that “it was also agreed by them that TBH was conscious when he fell”, where “them” referred to “all the forensic pathologists who testified before us” in a previous sentence. However, this is inaccurate, as Dr. Porntip Rojanasunan, the Thai forensic pathologist, had testified at the RCI that the fractured injuries to Teoh’s leg were not necessarily indicative of his being conscious upon impact. She had also indicated there were possible pre-fall injuries. To say that all pathologists categorically agreed that Teoh was conscious when he fell is actually misleading.
Second, the RCI report refers to forensic psychiatrist Professor Paul Mullen’s comments. Quoting from the report, “TBH, according to Mullen, ‘was firmly in the lowest risk group for suicide when he was taken into MACC custody’ ”, an opinion formed based on Teoh’s personality and behaviour at the time.
The RCI then concludes on its own accord in a later paragraph that “when he was taken by Anuar on the 15th, TBH shifted psychologically from the low-risk group to the high-risk group for suicide”. Note that the expert psychiatrist himself did not come to the conclusion of this sudden change from “low-risk” to “high-risk”. The RCI members gave several reasons for this, which included: a high-pressured series of interviews, the circumstances surrounding the case, sleep deprivation, an unfamiliar environment and being held in custody which all led to “doubt, extreme emotional conflict and the immense feeling of guilt”.
Here, the question is whether or not a qualified psychiatrist would make the same assessment, that Teoh went from being in a “low-risk” group for suicide to a “high-risk” one. The RCI members came to this conclusion without any clear supporting testimony from any of the three external qualified experts in the field of psychiatry who were called upon to testify. This report has otherwise dutifully based its conclusions on authoritative testimonies, but on this key issue, the conclusion is reached with the least amount of supporting evidence and expert testimony.
Since Teoh’s death, there have been other incidents that have occupied media space, and consequently the minds of Malaysians, including the unfortunate death of customs officer Ahmad Sarbani, also found at the MACC premises.
Many institutions set up to provide recommendations to improve the systemic rot have failed to be effective. One need only recall the Independent Police Complaints and Misconduct Commission (IPCMC), Interfaith Committee, and SUHAKAM recommendations as examples.
Whether or not the MACC will take up recommendations of the RCI following the Teoh Beng Hock tragedy, there are fundamental questions that arise from its conclusion of suicide.
As Malaysians, we have a right to expect the state’s institutions to protect us. We ought to be confident in, and not fear the very apparatus set up for the sake of its citizens. However, it is when people begin to cast doubt on these institutions that the government must be aware of a deep distrust, lest all its efforts at reform prove futile.
