(From theSun, 14th December 2012)
The recent public war of words between former Inspector-General of Police Tan Sri Musa Hassan and his ex-colleague Datuk Ramli Yusoff over criminal links, abuse of power and political connections has awakened what has up to now been considered the widely known but largely unaddressed problem of police corruption.
These are former top leaders of the Royal Malaysian Police (RMP) making serious allegations of political patronage and granting of favours, which begs the question, to what extent is this culture still prevalent today, seeping across all levels down to the rank and file officers? Worse, what impact does this have on the ability of the police force to address our daily needs of crime-busting in the neighbourhoods?
The discussion on police management intensified over the past few months with the ‘perceived’ notion of crime escalation. Just how best should the Malaysian police be managed, to ultimately deliver the services in a “Firm, Fair and Prudent” manner, as its slogan seeks to establish?
Decentralising as an Option
One resource is the Tun Dzaiddin-led Royal Commission to Enhance the Operation and Management of the Royal Malaysian Police, which recommended amongst others that 22% uniformed personnel could be freed to go back to active core policing work. Redeployment is a solution that has been proposed by several crime-watch groups, think tanks and political parties. Yet another is that of decentralisation, which this column has previously considered. I raise this again to explore the deeper issues of decentralisation that were not previously covered.
At a recent Forum of Federations, a global coalition promoting the practice of decentralised government, I presented aspects of Malaysia’s highly centralised system of administration. The fact that most powers are centred at the Federal Government makes it difficult for either the State or Local Governments to make any meaningful decisions that could truly impact the lives of people’s everyday needs.
A colleague from India, for example, expressed surprise that in Malaysia, the police force is controlled completely by the Federal Government, with no say from the State or Local authorities. Although the Chief Police Officer (CPO) of each state would provide updates in regular meetings with the Menteri Besar/Chief Minister respectively on crime and other statistics, the line of authority comes clearly from the central government and no other.
The Decentralisation Argument: Pros and Cons
I have previously argued for a decentralised police force, where State and Local authorities, together with their local police officers, are allowed to tackle street crime. The RMP responded that decentralising the police force would reduce efficiency and effectiveness, increase the cost of maintaining peace and order, and cause overlapping of powers and responsibilities. This is generally the same response given by those who disagree with the very idea of decentralisation, including those who are against the bringing back of local government elections.
On the one hand, it is true that a less centralised government may not always result in improved efficiency. For instance, another colleague at the Forum from Indonesia spoke of the problem of local elite capture, where corruption was essentially decentralised as well, rife with money politics. In addition, the quality of public service had not necessarily improved throughout its numerous regions across the country following the very intentional process of decentralisation policy it adopted in 1999, post-Suharto.
However, one of the most compelling reasons for decentralisation was raised, which I consider extremely relevant for the Malaysian context, and it is this: that decentralisation was necessary in countries in which there are high levels of diversity. In Indonesia, decentralisation was needed to unite its 13,667 islands. In India, cultural diversity is the very reason for which local communities are empowered; they would never agree to give more powers to the central government otherwise.
In these culturally diverse countries, decentralisation was required to maintain a healthy relationship between the central government and local communities. Failing which, there would be a growing dichotomy of interest between the elected head and local constituents. An extreme case would be minority regions or states wanting to secede from the country altogether.
Governance should therefore not be viewed solely with the end goal of achieving efficiency alone. This is certainly an important aspect of running a nation, for sure. But a federalist system ought to be seen as a way to combine regional or cultural interests and demands, with self-rule, and then making use of a range of tools to ensure the best efficient outcomes possible (which are too lengthy to elaborate upon here).
Federalism and decentralisation can be used for greater efficiency if executed well. But perhaps more importantly, as we consider issues as wide-ranging as that of police force management to the growing demands of Sabah and Sarawak to restore their position as partners in Malaysia, we must consider how to respond to local needs and circumstances, as well as promoting participation, local responsibility and accountability.
Ultimately, another lesson learnt from my recent intense discussion on decentralisation is that in order to make it really work, the culture of wanting self-rule is crucial. If Malaysia is to be ready for such a discussion at both the theoretical and implementation levels, this must be the desire of locals in each district, state and region. This is important food for thought as we continue to discuss Federal decisions on other matters such as Lynas (Kuantan, Pahang), Automated Enforcement Systems, or AES (all states of Malaysia), water management (Selangor), oil royalty (Sabah, Sarawak, Kelantan, Terengganu), and so on.
