This was first published in Fulcrum here, on 2 September 2024.
Malaysia should consider a Constituency Development Act which would lay out the roles and responsibilities for disbursing constituency development funds to MPs.
In July, Malaysian opposition Member of Parliament (MP) Syed Saddiq of the Malaysian United Democratic Alliance hit the headlines for reportedly running 200km from Muar to Parliament to protest the lack of constituency development funding (CDFs) received. Six opposition MPs from the Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (Bersatu) had made the strategic decision of signalling support for Anwar in exchange for constituency allocations. They were sacked from their party, and despite the Anti-Hopping Law, which involved amendments to the Federal Constitution, the six will remain in their seats with no by-election called.
The practice of offering CDFs only to government-aligned MPs, while denying them to opposition MPs, has existed since the Barisan Nasional (BN) era prior to 2018. This practice was slightly changed when Pakatan Harapan (PH) took over in 2018. PH, which had taken the reins of power from BN, pledged to provide government MPs RM500,000 annually and a concession of RM100,000 to opposition MPs (much smaller, but still something). PH MPs had actually received RM1 million annually in 2018, which increased to RM3.5 million in 2019, and which was maintained for 2020.
Under the Perikatan Nasional (PN)-BN government between 2020 and 2021, opposition MPs reported receiving no CDFs. It was only under Ismail Sabri’s government, when an MOU was signed in September 2021, that equal CDFs for all signing parties were guaranteed, including for some opposition parties, which received RM600,000 for 2021 and RM1.5 million in 2022.
Today, government MPs receive RM4.1 million annually, which includes an additional RM2 million allocated this year for Projek Mesra Rakyat (people-centred projects) (the numbers were provided in an interview with an officer of a Member of Parliament). Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has stated clearly that opposition MPs will have to negotiate and “discuss their allocations”.
CDFs, which are a historical fund administered by the Prime Minister’s Department, have been central for MPs to carry out their constituency work, especially in rural areas. Some MPs argue that this practice is burdensome, as they have to deal with constituent expectations daily, especially opposition MPs who have to finance these demands without government support. But in reality, politicians also benefit from being the sole provider of such funds.
Ideally, constituents in need should seek help directly from the Welfare Department, but bureaucratic delays mean they often prefer to turn to MPs, especially in less urban areas, where literacy remains a problem. MPs therefore benefit from an inefficient system by being society’s brokers — after all, they have the connections and position to do so. And they are more likely to perpetuate a system that ultimately benefits them electorally, since voters remember their good deeds when they are in power.
Stability is not just about maintaining power between elections but also about ensuring predictable, clear and accountable financial measures within the political party system.
The CDF system is likely to persist, although a position paper by think tank IDEAS and NGO BERSIH argues that one way out of this is to remove CDFs altogether, channelling the funds directly through local councils. This may not be politically palatable at the moment, since politicians would prefer to be recognised for their role in brokering CDFs and channelling aid; in addition, for this to work well, local government elections must be reinstated.
If politicians continue to depend on CDFs for constituency service, then the government of the day must acknowledge that the political instability over the last few years signals that no party is guaranteed power forever. Punishing constituents for electing opposition MPs may backfire, since any political party runs the risk of being in opposition after GE16.
Deputy Prime Minister Fadillah Yusof announced that the Unity Government’s Leadership Council agreed to channel allocations to the opposition via an MOU, but no concrete results have emerged. Under the Ismail Sabri administration, a similar MOU was signed that guaranteed equal allocations amongst signing members.
CDFs-by-MOU are highly unproductive and worse, temporary. There is no guarantee that these CDFs will stay in perpetuity. This is why instituting such reforms over the long term is crucial, and this should be done in the form of legislation. Having a Constituency Development Act at the federal level and a similar state-level enactment is ideal as it makes clear the terms and responsibilities of all parties, and rightfully relocates its role away from under the Prime Minister’s Department.
The formula for calculating CDFs should also be made transparent, where the same terms and conditions of CDFs should be equitably distributed to all MPs regardless of political affiliation. On this note, it is worthwhile mentioning that the practice of equal CDFs actually began at the state level in Perak and then Kelantan, albeit without an accompanying law. States can and should pave the way forward for the same to apply at the federal level.
There is a human tendency to lash back after politicians emerge to become the victors, and as such deny funds to opponents in the same way they themselves were denied financially. In reality, this is not strategic, since PH-BN also occupies the positions of opposition in several states like Kelantan, Kedah, Perlis and Sabah. Surely if at the federal level they provided CDFs equitably to all, their state assemblymen would also benefit from receiving the same at the state level.
The monetisation of politics in Malaysia is not new. Hence, new proposals like including public funding (which is practised in more than 100 countries worldwide) into a Political Financing Act, where the government allocates funds to parties based on the percentage of seats in Parliament, would introduce stability into the political party system. Public funding differs from CDFs; where CDFs are transferred to individual politicians, public funding would channel funds to parties, which would help with basic operating costs such as covering overheads. This, alongside equitable CDFs, would reduce the likelihood of corruption by providing basic operational funds to parties and politicians.
Anwar Ibrahim said that political stability is what draws investors to Malaysia. Stability is not just about maintaining power between elections but also about ensuring predictable, clear and accountable financial measures within the political party system. If political stability is what his administration is after, equitable CDFs and public funding of parties are crucial steps towards achieving this.
2024/266
Dr Tricia Yeoh is a Visiting Fellow at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute and Associate Professor of Practice at the University of Nottingham Malaysia’s School of Politics and International Relations.
