Sustaining public healthcare

A version of this article first appeared in theSun here, on 18 January 2018.

IT is said that you get what you pay for. The more expensive the product or service, conventional wisdom assumes that the quality of the product or service is proportionately better. From what we now know about pricing strategies of companies, it is highly arguable whether the premium you pay corresponds proportionately to the quality and capability you get, compared to cheaper products or services. RM1,000 smartphones are not three times less effective than RM3,000 rivals. Nevertheless, the steadfast belief in this so-called rule of thumb prevails.

This is apparent when it comes to healthcare.

For those who can afford it, private healthcare is seen as superior to public healthcare. The perception is that by paying many times more for private healthcare over the equivalent cost in public healthcare, you get higher standards, smaller crowds, shorter waiting times, special attention, and most importantly, less risk. Supposedly.

My personal experience of going through women’s healthcare in both private and public hospitals is contrary to this belief. Yes, private hospitals do have the sheen and shine of being more exclusive. Their nurses and staff are assumed to be friendlier, and more hospitable. However, the encounters I have had thus far of the public healthcare system – in both the Klinik Kesihatan Desa Damansara which provides practically free services and University Malaya Medical Centre’s Women and Children Health Complex – have been nothing but positive.

The quality of medical expertise within this area of healthcare in government hospitals is comparable to what one would find within private hospitals. Doctors and specialists in government hospitals are often just as good as their private counterparts. In fact, it is commonly believed that complications are usually escalated to government hospitals, which are better-equipped to handle these high-risk cases.

So, if government hospitals have equally good medical professionals and equipment, what accounts for the difference? What patients are paying for under private healthcare – and the discrepancy in prices between these two opposing healthcare systems can be astoundingly large – seems to be the perception of more sophisticated bells and whistles: administrative niceties and creature comforts. They would be supposedly paying for the choice of private and more comfortable rooms, more attentive nurses and shorter waiting times.

Yet, it must be said that the occasional anecdotes about nurses and staff in public healthcare who might have been curt and direct have been generalised to the point of tarring all nurses with the same brush. And waiting times might also seem slightly longer, but there are just as many accounts of lengthy and frustrating waiting times at private hospitals.

One needs to add a caveat to these observations, of course, that these are only my personal experiences in one area of public healthcare. Second, the quality of public healthcare may vary significantly across the country. A public hospital in Petaling Jaya or Kuala Lumpur might not be comparable to that in smaller towns.

Which brings me to the more important question of sustainability of the public healthcare system. The current system seems to be working well in terms of providing quality healthcare, but there are early signs that anyone who cares about public policy would be concerned with.

I am no expert in healthcare policy in the country, but a 2016 report by the Harvard TH Chan School of Public Health, which is carrying out a study for the Ministry of Health, states that Malaysia’s health system is at a crossroads, and concludes that “the health system faces new challenges in the face of a rapidly evolving context – characterised by demographic and epidemiological transitions, a shifting socio-cultural environment, technological changes, and rising income levels, which have contributed to a nutritional transition, increasing health risks, and new user expectations.” It also states that the lack of coordination between primary and secondary healthcare results in the overcrowding of government hospitals.

In other words, because of our country’s population growth and rising costs of living, public healthcare will need to be well-funded to adapt to these rapid changes. The report is useful in recommending several proposals, chief of which includes aligning the financing, payment methods and regulation of this sector.

In terms of funding, the Malaysian government already contributes some 9.5% of its annual budget to healthcare, where RM26.58 billion is being allocated this year. This comes up to about 4.75% of the country’s GDP, close to the WHO recommended proportion of 5%, but lower than the OECD average of 9.7%. But if the increase in healthcare spending continues at its current rates – increasing an average of 12-13% per year from 1997 to 2009 – this may not be sustainable in the long run.

People tend to think that private hospitals are better than public hospitals, but this perception does not match the reality, which is that Malaysians are extremely fortunate to have comparably good quality healthcare at affordable prices. However, the government subsidies and funding that will rise exponentially year on year is not sustainable.

Having the choice to go to private hospitals is fair, for those who can afford it. But we should not neglect public hospitals and a solution to keeping their funding sustainable is extremely important. There were previous attempts at introducing a public insurance system called 1Care for 1Malaysia in the past, but this was eventually shelved. It is unclear whether there will be any new proposals for a public insurance system, but one thing is certain – learning from the outcomes of Obamacare in the United States, whatever new policy the Ministry of Health introduces will have to be clearly and transparently communicated with all stakeholders.

This is especially important now, as the costs of living are escalating, and a large proportion of Malaysians continues to depend on the public healthcare system. As all policymakers know, a healthy population is a key prerequisite for a strong economy and peaceful nation.

So, if you care for the people, do not neglect public hospitals and public clinics. Keep them well-funded, well-staffed and well-equipped. There are a good many problems in Malaysia, but public healthcare is not one of them. Not yet.

Posted in Healthcare, Public Administration, Reflections | Leave a comment

Policy and Persuasion

First published in theSun here, on 21 December 2017.

OVER the last few months, I had the privilege of teaching a class of final year undergraduate students at Nottingham University the 101 of public policy.

This seemed to be a perfect match, seeing as how I have been working in public policy in various capacities within government, think tanks and civil societies over the last decade or so.

Quite unlike some of the other more academic modules the students would have been exposed to, this would be one of the rare occasions in which they would examine the practical and real-life applications of their university knowledge, whether in the fields of economics, international relations or environmental science.

It is interesting that the university offers this subject at all – many students graduate from university (myself included) being equipped only with the knowledge provided by academic sources, with perhaps some research and experimentation thrown in.

Even essays and assignments are written towards an academic end; no harm in and of academia itself, since after all, this is the path I am pursuing myself.

But to transform this knowledge into the nuts and bolts of how things actually work in the real world was my task over the last semester.

That is, to make sense of the often complicated and highly complex way in which policies are adopted, implemented and evaluated within any political system of government.

In fact, the understanding of “how things work in public policy” is not common knowledge.

It does require firsthand experience of having worked in some capacity with or within government.

Probably worse is that there is poor comprehension of what “public policy” even means.

In my lecture preparation, I found there was very little Malaysian material on public policy to refer to.

Because so much of what is available out there is based on a largely Western context, it was important for me to ground examples and case studies within the Malaysian context instead.

For the purposes of my lessons, I referred to public policy as a course of government or public action or inaction in response to public problems.

In short, the issue needs to be public in nature, and one in which members of a community would have an interest, for it to qualify. Second, it should be a problem for which something can be done, and where a solution is possible.

Public policy is wide and all-encompassing, inclusive of formally approved policy goals and means, regulations and practices of agencies, and can take the form of laws, regulations, circulars and directives, long-term plans and very simply, policies.

In Malaysia, public policy would be derived from sources such as the Federal Constitution 1957, laws like the Petroleum Development Act 1974 and the Medical Act 1971, the Companies Regulations 2017, Ministry of Finance circulars on public procurement, long-term plans like Transformasi Negara 2050 (TN50) and even longer term policies like the National Vision Policy.

There are multiple actors in the public policy process.

Imagine any policy that is being proposed within Parliament – particularly a controversial one – and one could picture these interest groups playing their respective roles.

These stakeholders would be a mix of policymakers, politicians (since the process of policymaking is in fact very political), policy analysts, activists, academia, media, global interests as well as the general public.

But how is government policy approved?

A textbook model of understanding the public policy process is clean and methodical: First, you set the agenda by deciding which problems will be addressed by public policy; second, you formulate the policy by consulting with stakeholders, based on research and evidence; third, the policy is adopted via means of legal statute at the federal or state level; fourth, the policy is implemented through the government bureaucracy; fifth, the policy is assessed and evaluated as to its merits; and finally, a new policy issue emerges, which starts the process all over again from the beginning.

Of course, the reality of what takes place is far from constructed. There are multiple and sometimes, competing forces at play.

Policymakers are not always equipped with the full amount of information required to make informed decisions.

Economic, political and social conditions are dynamic and fluctuate violently, making it difficult especially for long-term policies – do you adapt according to changing times, or ensure stability for the country by maintaining a certain policy for good?

Governments may also tend to intervene when they see the need, depending on the ideological nature of whichever political party is in power.

In Malaysia, we have only ever known one coalition at the federal level, so interventions are more likely to be political than they are ideological.

There are instances where government might want to intervene for moral or ethical reasons, for example to break up monopolies or oligopolies that have formed.

Again, this is dependent on the country’s economic system and to what extent governments believe in the market system.

It has been interesting examining Malaysia’s public policy processes as an outsider over the last weeks, also coinciding with the reflective period of the end of the year.

The question weighing on my mind – and probably that of my students’ too – is whether any actors outside of the upper echelons of government (read: Prime Minister’s Office) have truly been successful in influencing public policy at all.

Have the efforts of the so-called independent intelligentsias been effective in changing policy? Swaying public opinion? The subject I taught was, after all, about persuasion as well. This I explore in future columns.

Posted in Public Administration, Reflections | Leave a comment

Are civil servants the biggest winners in Malaysia’s 2018 budget?

First published on Channel NewsAsia’s website here, on 19 November 2017.

Many say Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak’s 2018 budget brought cheer to Malaysian civil servants who form an important voting bloc in an election year. Tricia Yeoh discusses how much of an impact these benefits will have.

KUALA LUMPUR: The Malaysian government tabled a generous pre-election budget for 2018, as was expected.

The final budget before the highly anticipated upcoming 14th General Election, it dished out especially lucrative goodies for civil servants and pensioners, two groups it cannot afford to upset.

In this budget, civil servants were clearly given priority, in part a response to their own proposals that the government alleviate their economic burden.

Among the new initiatives that this budget announced were a one-off payment of RM1,500 (US$354), a second time-based promotion for support staff who received their last promotion 13 years ago, and the provision of full retirement benefits to those who retire early for health reasons.

Maternity benefits were also extended, with maternity leave increased to 360 days and shorter working hours for civil servants at least five months pregnant.

In-house Masters and PhD programmes will also be introduced to encourage lifelong learning.

Although past year budgets have always included special gifts for civil servants, the 2018 budget is particularly generous with its unprecedented array of benefits. This is even so when compared to the last pre-election budget of 2013, which provided for a one-month bonus but with no other significant initiatives.

Pensioners were a second group rewarded by the budget. They will receive a one-off payment of RM750, and see an increase of the lowest pension rate to RM1,000 a month which will benefit more than 50,000 pensioners who have been in the civil service for at least 25 years.

The pattern is obvious when one analyses the breakdown of budget allocations. Over the last decade, the operating expenditure has drastically increased compared to the development expenditure.

In the 2010 budget, the projected operating expenditure formed 73 per cent of total expenditure. Compare this to the 2018 budget, where it now forms almost 84 per cent of total expenditure.

This means the ratio between the projected operating and development expenditure respectively in this budget is 5 to 1, where for every RM1 spent for development purposes, RM5 is being used to fund operational costs, including manpower costs and the salaries of civil servants, pensions, subsidies and social assistance to the public.

Yet, emoluments – civil servants’ salaries – form a significant 33.8 per cent of the allocated sum for the total operating expenditure of RM234.3 billion, a proportion that has been growing in recent years. Emoluments have risen from RM42 billion in Budget 2010 to RM78.1 billion in Budget 2018.

Unfortunately, these benefits do not necessarily translate into an attractive package that brings the best and brightest of Malaysian talent into the civil service.

In fact, the concern is quite the opposite; the benefits may instead incentivise those who prefer a comfortable job to stay on over those who prefer a merit-based system that rewards talent and effort.

BLOATED CIVIL SERVICE

Analysts have also cautioned that the size of the civil service – there are some 1.6 million civil servants in Malaysia – is bloated and the increasing amount of funds required to service this number is not fiscally sustainable in the long run.

After all, an ideal budget would dedicate a substantial amount to development expenditure, where money could be used for longer term investments, in funding healthcare and education programmes for instance.

Nevertheless, the Malaysian government has always been careful in stressing it would not reduce the number of civil servants. While the benefits this time are particularly extensive, ensuring the welfare of civil servants has always been something the Barisan Nasional government has claimed credit for.

The main reason is likely this: Civil servants represent 12 per cent of registered voters, possibly the single largest voting bloc in the Malaysian electorate that would be most immediately loyal to the Barisan Nasional given the various perks they have received over the years.

It also happens to be that the vast majority of civil servants is Malay, a key target voter demography for the UMNO-led Barisan Nasional coalition. The opposition is fully aware of the situation, and both opposition-led states of Selangor and Penang also announced generous cash bonuses to state civil servants in their respective 2018 state budgets.

This growing dependency on government handouts is unfortunately not without reason.

The Congress of Union of Employees in the Public and Civil Services Malaysia (CUEPACS) reported in 2016 that between 700,000 to 800,000 civil servants fall in the bottom 40 per cent of Malaysian households, who receive a monthly income of RM3,900 and below.

In May this year, CUEPACS warned that up to 100,000 civil servants are in danger of being declared bankrupt, adding that many are resorting to taking loans from loan sharks. This is likely a combination of relatively low pay compared to salaries in the private sector, poor financial planning and the rising costs of living.

With these numbers in mind, it is no wonder that civil servants would require significant financial assistance.

Yet it also reflects a more alarming scenario of the socio-economic conditions under which Malaysian civil servants live, as well as the larger economy with costs of living that have risen so rapidly even the fully-employed are unable to survive.

TEMPORARY RELIEF

While Malaysian civil servants celebrate their winnings in this budget announcement, it will not be long before the accumulative economic burdens weigh on them again.

A one-off payment of RM1,500 will hardly last an average Malaysian household of five people very long. Maternity benefits may be welcome relief – and in fact these are forward-thinking measures that help women cope better in the workplace – but they will not adequately line families’ pockets with the extra income they require.

The government has its sights set on the election next year, and for good reason.

It will be one of the most hotly contested elections in recent history, given that former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed now leads the opposition coalition, the man many senior civil servants and pensioners would have served in the past and therefore have some allegiance to.

The Malaysian government has once again attempted to entice civil servants and pensioners with budget goodies, which have been well received. But the true impact of the government’s generosity will only be known at the ballot box.

Posted in Elections, General Politics, Public Administration | Leave a comment

A wider asset declaration scheme

First appeared in theSun here, on 23 November 2017.

IT is encouraging that 30 opposition parliamentarians recently agreed to declare their assets under a programme initiated by PKR body Invoke, many declarations of which can already be downloaded by the public on their website. However, the scheme could benefit from adopting international standards for it to be considered of good value.

Asset declaration is one way voters can keep their elected officials accountable. Carried out regularly to track any major changes in assets held by high-level public figures, it prevents conflict of interest, reduces the misappropriation of funds, allows auditors to detect any form of illicit enrichment and most importantly, promotes transparency and accountability.

A World Bank survey in 2012 showed that out of 176 countries, 137 (78%) of them have financial disclosure systems, most of which make it compulsory for asset disclosure for cabinet members, MPs and high-ranking prosecutors.

Some countries in the region do practise forms of asset declaration, in the case of the Philippines it is backed by the constitution and embedded in primary law, while in Indonesia it is an executive decree.

In Malaysia, ministers and top government officials declare their assets confidentially to the prime minister annually, which are accessible to the chief commissioner of the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) only. Civil servants and family members are required to declare their assets, but only to their heads of departments.

Although a ‘Code of Ethics’, approved by the Cabinet, requires MPs to declare their assets every two years, this is not a legal requirement. It is unclear to whom these MPs are required to declare their assets to, and whether it is even being practised.

Both the opposition-led Selangor and Penang state governments have made it a requirement for their Executive Council (Exco) members to declare their assets, but again this is not legally binding. All declarations have been therefore made on a voluntary basis only.

Invoke’s drive to get parliamentarians to declare their assets is a good start to encourage other elected officials to adopt principles of good governance in their political leadership. It certainly puts pressure on other opposition parliamentarians, as well as the Barisan Nasional leaders to follow suit.

Nevertheless, in order for this process to be properly followed through and be implemented well, it is important to establish certain rules and principles. It is unclear based on the current Invoke pledge to declare assets what are the detailed policy changes they would adopt. Some recommendations are as follows.

First, the requirement should be for ministers and MPs including senators to declare their assets by law. This can be done by enacting a new legislation in Parliament where they should make the declaration to a parliamentary committee that is independent from the executive.

Second, instead of having civil servants’ asset declarations verified internally by department heads, the MACC should take over the role.

Third, it is important for there to be a verification and monitoring system. The MACC can be this independent body that oversees, verifies and monitors the process. It needs to also be authorised to work with government bodies like the Inland Revenue Board and Financial Intelligence Unit of Bank Negara, in order to verify if the declarations made are accurate. Of course, this also requires that the MACC itself is completely independent of the executive.

Fourth, information on declared assets needs to be made publicly available. There is oftentimes an argument made for privacy, where exceptions can be made in certain circumstances. Assets of MPs, ministers and high-ranking civil servants ought to be made public, but information can be made available by request only for lower-level civil servants. This also requires a Freedom of Information Act in place.

Finally, the same amount of scrutiny should be imposed on state-level officials. Enactments should be in place in all states that makes asset declaration compulsory for state Exco members, state assemblymen and state civil servants annually.

However, one of the challenges would be verification and monitoring, since states would not have access to individuals’ financial information. This is why simultaneous reforms need to take place at the federal level first, in order for them to be meaningful.

Given the low levels of public trust in political leadership today, it is more imperative than ever that asset declaration is made a legal requirement at federal and state levels. Providing information to the public is the most effective form of check and balance against abuse of power for private gain. This is a good start and it is hoped that other political leaders from both sides of the divide would also independently commit to declaring their assets should they become MPs or ministers.

Posted in Civil Society, Corruption, Public Administration, Transparency and Good Governance | Leave a comment

Reducing illicit trade

First appeared in theSun here, on 9 November 2017.

WHILE it is positive that Malaysia is projected to be the world’s 24th most powerful economy in the world by 2050, as Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Abdul Razak announced two months ago, attention must also be turned to what could likely derail these efforts altogether: The grossly understudied illicit trade in the country.

The cost of illicit trade to the Malaysian economy generally is difficult to measure. But the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development has estimated the cost to be around US$250 billion, while the International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition estimates the figure to be US$600 billion per annum, as of 2015. Illicit trade seems to be growing in scope and magnitude due to freer movement of goods and internet usage.

A separate study also estimated that Penang lost approximately RM16 million in uncollected taxes due to illegal economic activities in the state in a single year, based on confiscated products including cigarettes, food and beverages, motor vehicles and electrical machinery. The fact that these trading activities are taking place under the radar means that authorities are unable to capture the economic value – namely, taxes – that otherwise would contribute to the overall gross domestic product and economic growth.

It also adversely affects the film and entertainment industries. A local filmmaker once reportedly lost a projected revenue of up to RM15 million as a result of pirate DVDs, sold before the movie was even released. A separate study has shown that an increase of 15% in takings for the local box office is possible if piracy was completely stamped out.

Another significant impact of illicit trade is that it contributes to the loss of jobs in the formal sector. As it thrives, the means and networks that facilitate the movement of these goods and services tend to also build close relationships with organised crime syndicates.

A recent policy paper by IDEAS has shed new light on several sectors in Malaysia whose industries are increasingly affected by the rise of illicit trade, including music, cigarettes, alcohol, branded products as well as medicines. One of the most startling statistics is that contraband cigarettes account for 57.1% of cigarettes consumed in 2016.

Although efforts have been taken to clamp down on illegal traders, primarily by the Royal Malaysian Customs, more important questions must be asked about the overarching regulatory framework that governs the economy. Have regulations improved or reduced the efficacy of reducing illicit trade in the country?

To answer that, one must examine the factors that led to the flourishing of illicit trade. First, a critical factor, is how rigorous enforcement is by the relevant authorities. Lack of transparency and border corruption are among the most important influences of poor enforcement. It is here that Malaysia could do with improvement; the lack of transparency and efficient enforcement has earned us the fourth biggest online piracy hub in the world.

Second, cumbersome business regulations also lead to worsening illicit trade. The Global Enabling Trade Report 2014 by the World Economic Forum listed tariffs, burdensome import procedures, domestic technical requirements and standards, as well as corruption at the border, as the most problematic factors for Malaysia.

Although tariffs are a form of raising revenue for the government’s own expenditure, there must be wise policy decision-making in deciding rates. The rapid increase in illicit cigarette consumption directly corresponded to the excise increase on cigarettes, especially between 2014 and 2016. The government must be able to balance its own policy targets with other negative consequences, in this case where both black-market traders and consumers are incentivised to turn to cheaper contraband products.

The paper lists down several recommendations that could be adopted by the government in its fight against illicit trade. Although we are ranked 6th in the Illicit Trade Environment Index 2016 among countries engaged in preventing illicit trade, which means we are tackling the situation already, much more should be done.

First, the government’s taxation policies could be reviewed. Second, examining with the aim of reducing price gaps between legitimate and illicit products can be done, but the trick would be to do this in a market-driven way.

Other measures include increasing enforcement activities, using technology to authenticate products to prevent counterfeit goods and finally, and perhaps most importantly, improving the relationship between the government – whether the relevant ministries or the Customs Department – the private sector and independent professional organisations.

Having meaningful consultations through formal or informal committees is an ideal way to ensure that data is being transparently and regularly communicated to each party, in joint and collaborative efforts in combating illicit trade.

Tackling it is an equally crucial part of growing the Malaysian economy, which policy-makers ought to pay careful attention to.

Posted in Economics, Transparency and Good Governance | Leave a comment

Why the budget speech is not enough

First published in theSun on 26 October 2017 here.

THE prime minister presents the budget each year in Parliament with great fanfare. Although the speech – and its accompanying budget documents – does lay out a roadmap of what the country’s financial plans are for the following year, the information provided therein is simply insufficient for researchers and citizens to have a complete and accurate picture of the state of the nation’s economy.

There are several reasons why this annual presentation provides only half the story.

First, the budget tabled in October of every year is usually not the only amount of funds the government injects into the economy for the following year. The practice in Malaysia has been to table a supplementary budget of a substantial figure, bringing up the total expenditure of any given year to a greater amount.

For instance, while the originally tabled 2016 budget was RM267.2 billion, there was a supplementary budget passed in March 2017 to seek an additional allocation of RM3.08 billion for 2016. The bulk of this was for “contribution to statutory funds”, of RM2.25 billion. This tendency to overspend beyond what is originally allocated is unhealthy and reflects badly on a government that lacks the fiscal discipline to keep to its original budget.

Second, the annual budget does not shed comprehensive light on the actual amount of debt that is borne by the federal government. The government does publish some of its contingent liabilities, such as federal government-guaranteed debt for government-owned or government-linked companies like Khazanah Nasional and Prasarana Malaysia, and depositors guarantees like the Employees Provident Fund and Lembaga Tabung Haji in its Financial Statement prepared by the Accountant General’s Department. Debt guaranteed by the federal government has grown from RM69.2 billion in 2008 to RM178.06 billion in 2016 – that is a growth of 157%. The largest contributor of these is the National Higher Education Fund Corp (PTPTN).

However, this published data of government guaranteed debt is not part of the budget documents. Neither does the budget include other obligations the federal government would have, including having to step in and bail out debt holders when a privatised entity they hold debt in goes belly up. There are also off-budget agencies that are owned by government ministries whose finances are not captured in the budget. In short, one needs to look beyond the budget itself.

Additionally, implicit liabilities, which are essentially the spending promises made by the federal government that would form obligations for future expenditures, also go unreported in the budget (they are usually not included in usual debt statistics in other countries as well). For example, in the case of 1MDB, apart from explicit guarantees from bonds and loans, some of which may be captured in official documents, there were also implicit guarantees that needed to be accounted for to understand the financial implications it would have on our national coffers which are not published.

Taken together, these other contingent liabilities that are not reported in the budget – both explicit and implicit – ought to be better clarified. Although debt repayment would eventually go back to Malaysian taxpayers since most of these debt liabilities are owed to domestic and not international institutions, it is still challenging to determine a more accurate assessment of Malaysia’s financial position without a disaggregated and detailed breakdown of all debt, which the budget should rightfully contain.

A third and final reason why the budget presentation in Parliament is an insufficient source of information is simply that the prime minister’s speech has been found to contain commitments that are not followed through with in the actual financial documents themselves.

Last year, several Members of Parliament pointed out the inconsistencies between his 2017 speech and what the expenditure document contained; for example, the Serdang MP wrote that “new programmes” in the speech were actually already in existence, while the Bukit Mertajam MP found that mammogram screenings and HPV vaccinations were not budgeted for although they were within the speech text.

No doubt there will be lots of enthusiasm for goodies and tax breaks for what after all is the final budget before the upcoming general election. But if past budgets are anything to go by, it may not be an accurate reflection of the reality. Be ready to scrutinise the document line by line and expect yawning gaps in relevant information that belie the glowing promises.

Posted in Economics, Transparency and Good Governance | Leave a comment

Malaysia’s general elections, an uphill battle for the opposition

Commentary: Malaysia’s general elections, an uphill battle for

the opposition

(First published on Channel NewsAsia, 22 October 2017, here).

Najib Razak has yet to call the elections. Tricia Yeoh explores the challenges and likely strategies the ruling Barisan Nasional party and the opposition coalition will take.

KUALA LUMPUR: Malaysia’s general election will have to be held by August 2018 at the very latest, but can be called for any time before that.

For months now, pundits were positive the election would be set for September 2017, but now it looks like the next window of opportunity available to Prime Minister Najib Razak is between March and April 2018, after Chinese New Year in February and before fasting for Ramadhan begins in May.

If, however, he chooses to forgo this option, the next opportunity would be between the end of July and August, which would cut things a little too close for him. If any incident were to occur then that would jeopardise his reputation, he would not have the flexibility of postponing it yet again.

Recall, for instance, that there is an ongoing criminal investigation into money laundering allegations related to 1MDB being carried out by the Department of Justice in the US, apart from other similar 1MBD money laundering probes in Switzerland and Singapore.

Regardless, delaying the polls for now seems like an astute strategy as it buys Najib the time to ensure any projects and goodies being allocated from the upcoming budget trickle down to the expectant beneficiaries ranging from contracting companies to low-income communities that receive cash handouts each year.

The budget announcement slated for the end of this month is expected to be a generous pre-election budget, as has been the case previously, before the ruling government goes to the polls.

These final months are also crucial for Najib as he seeks to unite various factions in UMNO, including and especially the powerful division chiefs across the country.

POSITIVE PROSPECTS FOR NAJIB

Prospects for Najib seem positive despite his woes over 1MDB, since the issue is fast fading from Malaysians’ minds. The complexities of the 1MDB scandal are not as easily relatable compared to the everyday concerns of Malaysians, save for perhaps a select group within the urban, cosmopolitan class.

The vast majority of Malaysian voters are preoccupied with more immediate concerns like job security, home ownership, and the rising costs of living.

Although urban voters are likely to lean towards the opposition, this may not be enough to overthrow the incumbents.

In 2013, there was a groundswell of support for the opposition, resulting in the opposition winning the popular vote.

In 2018, the wave of support will not be as strong as the last two election cycles given the break-up of the original coalition, the loss of a unifying figure leading the coalition, and the public’s general disenfranchisement with politics.

Urban seats will still be important in the upcoming election, where the ruling government finds little loyalty from urban professionals. More importantly, fence-sitters may sway the election results.

However, there may be a small percentage of disaffected voters who will choose to spoil their vote or not come out at all given their dissatisfaction with the opposition’s handling of Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), its internal fighting, and willingness to cooperate with former Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamed.

Some consider this last move to be an unethical compromise on the opposition’s part given how critical they had been of Mahathir’s policies when he led the country.

But the real battleground lies in rural, Malay-Muslim Malaysia.

RURAL MALAY-MUSLIM MALAYSIA THE REAL BATTLEGROUND

This may also be why the tenor of political and policy issues has become predominantly religious of late.

Over the last few months, controversies have arisen over books that supposedly take a liberal approach to Islam, beer festivals, and the detention of a popular Turkish intellectual, Mustafa Akyol, who was allegedly speaking on the commonalities between Islam and Christianity without the permission of local authorities.

More of such controversies are bound to arise given that ethno-religious politics form the frontiers of socio-political contestation in Malaysia. We can expect political parties on both sides to capitalise on racially and religiously charged incidents going forward – because to win the hearts and minds of a majority Malay-Muslim Malaysia, one must prove to best represent their interests.

Newcomers Parti Bersatu, which has now teamed up with the opposition coalition, is led by Dr Mahathir and his son Mukhriz Mahathir, alongside disgruntled former Deputy Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yasin.

The party is aiming precisely at the rural states of Johor, Kedah, Perlis and Perak. These states form the Malay-Muslim heartland and if, as the Democratic Action Party (DAP) has asserted, there is indeed a Malay tsunami this time round with a vote swing of at least 10 per cent, this may be the clincher required for the opposition to take power at the national level.

PAS THE SPOILER PARTY

Having left the opposition coalition, PAS now plays the spoiler party and is well-aware of its ability to be kingmaker. At the same time, Najib will continually attempt to entice the Islamic party PAS to remain on his side in the name of Malay-Muslim unity.

In February this year, Najib sent a food flotilla off to Myanmar in a public display of aid to the Rohingya refugees. Present at the flag-off were PAS’s deputy president and secretary-general.

PAS contesting as a third party in a first-past-the-post electoral system is far more likely to weaken the opposition coalition than UMNO in key marginal seats.

In exchange, UMNO may agree to support PAS’s Bill to amend the Syariah Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act, which would enhance syariah court punishments in line with hudud laws. Put on hold temporarily, this was the first time that an opposition Member or Parliament’s Private Member’s Bill was tabled in Parliament.

PAS as a third force directly threatens the People’s Justice Party’s (PKR) performance in many Malay-majority marginal seats.

The DAP on the other hand would not be as greatly affected as its seats are mainly Chinese-majority.

This combination unfortunately plays to UMNO’s narrative of the opposition being DAP-dominated.

However, given how racially tinged Malaysian politics has become, it is hard to imagine the Chinese-dominant DAP taking a leadership position at the national level. In 2008, despite the DAP winning the largest number of state seats in Perak, the position of Chief Minister was eventually given to PAS.

In short, given that this election will be essentially centred on economic and Malay-Muslim issues, both of which UMNO has cleverly shaped to its advantage over recent years, it is unlikely that the opposition coalition will be on the winning end. The opposition won the popular vote in 2013, and still could not form the government.

An additional factor would be the degree to which opposition parties are able to make inroads into Sabah and Sarawak, traditionally known as the UMNO “vote bank”, but which have recently voiced their dissatisfaction over what they perceive to be a lack of autonomy and socio-economic rights.

Former UMNO vice-president Shafie Apdal is leading a new opposition party in Sabah, but his efforts have been thus far waylaid by a string of arrests by the party’s top leaders by the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC).

UMNO has continually made full use of its infrastructure and resources, government institutions, political patronage and ethnic-religious politics to ensure its survival.

This time will be no different, and it is the opposition’s uphill battle to fight.

Tricia Yeoh is chief operating officer of the Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs.

Posted in Elections, Ethno-Religious Politics, General Politics | Leave a comment

Catalonia’s lessons on federalism

(First published in theSun on 11 October 2017, here).

ON Oct 1, the Spanish region of Catalonia – in which its capital Barcelona is located – held its second independence referendum in three years. The Catalan government announced that the official results showed the referendum passed overwhelmingly. But all of this took place amid heavy action by the Spanish police who attempted to seize ballot boxes and disperse voters, resulting in hundreds getting injured; the police were enforcing a court ban on the vote.

The Spanish government has good reason to fear Catalan independence. The region makes up 16% of the country’s population, and more importantly, contributes some 20% to the Spanish national economy. In 2014, Catalonia paid about US$11.8 billion more to Spain’s tax authorities than they got back, although it is difficult to calculate returns that are received in the form of health and education services.
Spain’s government has reacted quickly by adopting a new law to facilitate the relocation of companies outside Catalonia. Should there be a unilateral declaration of independence, which the Catalan government refuses to back down on, this will surely implicate Spain’s business and overall economic environment.

This is not the first time the world has seen regions threatening to secede from its parent nation. In 2014, Scotland held a similar independence referendum, in which the “no” vote eventually won, but 44.7% voted in favour of leaving the United Kingdom. Closer to home, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines have all experienced threats of secession based on perceived marginalisation of ethnic minorities.

In Malaysia, no states have gone so far as to agitate for any sort of referendum, but in recent years there have been calls for secession in states like Sabah and Sarawak. A similar comparison of the economic contributions Catalonia makes to Spain would be Selangor’s contributions to Malaysia – an estimated 20% of the country’s GDP is said to be contributed by Selangor, the most industrialised state in Malaysia. This is made more interesting by the fact it is being run by a political coalition that is in opposition at the federal level.

Although Spain is not technically a federation, it certainly operates very much like one, in which self-government is granted to its autonomous states. And the principle behind any federation – or decentralised government – is that unity and regional diversity can be accommodated by distributing power among central and regional governments in a manner constitutionally safeguarding the existence and authority of each.

Regions and states are bound to possess unique characteristics that are different from their counterparts, whether this is along ethnic, linguistic, religious or simply, territorial lines. The very purpose of having a federation would be to recognise these differences, and accommodate for these by allowing some degree of autonomy and self-rule.

After all, if one adheres to the idea of subsidiarity – that states and local governments are best placed to respond to issues of local concern, being closest to the problem at hand – then federal intervention is only necessary for extra-territorial issues like defence and foreign affairs. Taking Malaysia as an example, local leaders in Sarawak would be better placed to advise on the education needs of its village children compared to the federal leaders in Putrajaya, although the latter may have good intentions.

However, in granting greater autonomy to regions or states, the federal government would quite naturally feel the pinch of sacrificing some degree of control. Some even argue that centralising control is more efficient for policymaking and management of the economy. In fact, this is exactly what Britain intended when it first established the Federated Malay States, which resulted in Selangor being deprived of much of its previous independence and initiative in public affairs. State autonomy is also the main reason the Unfederated Malay States initially refused to join the federation.

But to allay these fears, it is worth noting that one of the preconditions of successful decentralisation is a high degree of central state capacity, which means the federal government need not fear that its powers are removed altogether. Coordination between different layers of government is important, so here the federal government would play an important regulatory role to ensure good governance in the decentralisation process: is there transparency, accountability and adequate representation at each level?

However, herein lies the dilemma. If autonomy has been granted, yet the state continues to demand for more, what then? One argument is that if autonomy has already been granted, the federal government cannot then proceed to suppress local autonomy in order to avoid the break-up of a state – then there would be no point in federating in the first place. On the other hand, if the autonomous states were being treated well, why would they push for independence? In the case of Spain, Catalonia was historically an independent region with its own language, laws and customs. The economic crisis exacerbated matters, leading to wealthy Catalonia seen as propping up the poorer regions.

This is why there needs to be a balance struck between the amount of autonomy given to regions or states, and their representation at the national level. While the former would satisfy the element of self-rule, the latter fulfils that of shared rule, in which the region in question would be more than adequately represented in national decision-making matters. On this note, Malaysia’s states are represented by both parliamentarians in the Dewan Rakyat and senators in the Dewan Negara. However, over the years the proportion of state-appointed representatives to centre-appointed senators has drastically reduced from 28:22 to 26:32. A robust Senate would mean states’ interests are protected whenever new legislation is debated; otherwise, they might feel a bad deal was being made centrally without concern for their regions’ interests.

These are fascinating events, which we in Malaysia – and certainly, Southeast Asia – must learn from. There is no one formula by which a federation successfully contains its multiethnic or territorial differences, since each has its own unique history, cultural values and laws. Nevertheless, it is worth investigating the circumstances under which decentralisation succeeds or fails. Federalism can coexist with and promote democracy, but only when the states in question believe that they have been fairly and adequately treated by the nation they consider themselves a part of.

Posted in Federalism, General Politics, Public Administration, Selangor | Leave a comment

The Malaysian Idea

(First published in theSun on 14 September 2017, here).

WHEN we come together to celebrate Malaysia Day on Sept 16 each year, what is it that we really celebrate?

Are we celebrating a united nation that has brought all races, regions and religions together to live in apparent harmony? Or are we celebrating the political ingenuity of the then Malayan leaders who successfully executed the idea of what essentially was greater Malaya?

Throughout our relatively short history, there has always existed the tension between administrative control from the central government and the autonomy exercised by individual states.

In fact, up to the 1940s, there was no strong nationalist sentiment towards Malaya, and Malays thought of themselves as belonging to their own states like Selangor, Pahang, Kelantan, and so on, rather than to Malaya.

It was therefore no surprise when the Kelantan state government opposed the formation of Malaysia in 1963; they even filed a case against the Government of the Federation of Malaya and Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman to call for the Malaysia Act to be declared as null and void, or, alternatively that it was not binding on Kelantan. However, they lost the case as the court ruled that Parliament acted within its constitutional power.

Sabah and Sarawak were even more cautious in their agreement to form Malaysia.

The Cobbold Commission of Inquiry was set up to determine whether the people of North Borneo (Sabah today) and Sarawak supported the proposal to create the Federation of Malaysia, where only one-third of the population was reported to be strongly in favour of Malaysia.

The remaining two-thirds were either concerned with safeguards and conditions, and either wanted to achieve independence first or remain under British rule for the time being.

In short, the reaction from Sabah and Sarawak was rather mixed. The two states submitted proposals for inclusion into the Malaysia Agreement, which are known today as the 18-point and 20-point agreements respectively for Sarawak and Sabah.

While some points were incorporated eventually into the amended Federal Constitution (such as the point on the special position of indigenous races), others were not.

Another source of unhappiness was that a new constitution was not in fact drafted for Malaysia as a new country; instead, the existing Constitution of the Federation of Malaya 1957 was merely amended.

It was felt that if a new country was being born in 1963, why was there not a new constitution being introduced alongside its birth?

Suffice to say that Malaysia was formed under rather tense conditions, possibly under less hopeful circumstances than during Malaya’s independence celebrations just six years earlier.

Even the inclusion of Singapore (which, as we now know, left the Federation in 1965, two short years after Malaysia was formed) was partly due to the Tunku’s fear that the communists had a growing stronghold on Singapore – bringing it into the Malaysian fold would partly contain any insurgency that would otherwise spill over into Malaya.

The common concern felt and expressed by individual states in Peninsular Malaya, East Malaysia and even Singapore was that there would emerge excessive control from the central government, which would erode their own autonomy.

Nevertheless, this was an experiment that was considerably bold. Malaysia was – and is – certainly well-placed within the region to establish itself as an economic and trading powerhouse, flush with natural resources, and inheriting infrastructure like roads and schools that the British had left behind. It was a formula that had all the right ingredients, only if there was a wise chef behind its cooking.

As we celebrate Malaysia’s 54th year of being, one wonders about this idea of Malaysia: was it the best solution, and have there been sufficient safeguards to protect the interests of all states that formed the nation?

Tunku Abdul Rahman’s speech on Sept 16, 1963 admits that “The road to nationhood has not been an easy journey. Surprises and disappointments, tensions and crisis, have marred the way.”

That Malaysia was born in a time of uncertainty seems to be evident. But then he goes on to say that “Now finally the peoples of Malaysia are celebrating the establishment of Malaysia. This is the time to think earnestly and hopefully on the future of Malaysia as the whole country resounds with joy”.

States have always been wary of central government powers from the very beginning of Malayan history. In an age where our neighbouring countries are promoting greater decentralisation for improved governance, the federal government could consider devolving additional powers to states. To see the Malaysian idea truly flourish and not fail, this would be a wise path to take.

Posted in Federalism | Leave a comment

Ideas of Freedom

First published in theSun on 31 August 2017, here.

OVER the last four years, I am proud to have been part of a young, dynamic team of people working hard to produce research-based ideas and policy proposals at a local, independent think-tank. My study leave to pursue a PhD in political science coincides with the celebration of the country’s 60th anniversary of its independence, so for this column I shall share reflections of specific instances in which I felt IDEAS offered me the right platform and opportunities to contribute to the nation’s future.

One of the projects that I am most proud of was a nine-month programme that brought selected young Malaysians from all over the country together under the banner of a national unity youth fellowship. Every other weekend, we would bring them from state to state: fishing villages in Kuala Terengganu, Iban land rights activists in Sarawak, Chitty village in Malacca, Thai community in Perlis, and one of the most memorable to me – the post-flood devastation in a small Kelantanese village.

These visits were to expose our youth to the realities on the ground, and discuss challenges and issues being faced locally. We met local politicians and community leaders who gave us the inside story of the political economy and governance of each of the states. Mostly, they shared their hopes and fears about their future, which were unsurprisingly similar in nature: better economic and educational opportunities for themselves and their families.

During these intensive workshops, speakers would educate the young fellows on the economic and political shape of the nation. Discussions would take place about our constitutional history, economic policy, interethnic and interreligious challenges – a safe space that I helped facilitate to achieve rational discourse (something rare and precious these days). Today, some of these fellows have gone on to join politics, start their own movements and one was even awarded the Queen’s Young Leaders Award by Queen Elizabeth. I watch on with pride.

Second, our undying belief in the principles of liberty and justice (a quote from Tunku Abdul Rahman’s declaration of independence that we often use). We organised numerous conferences over the years, but the flagship one that always reminded me of why this work was so gravely important was our Liberalism Conference. Held annually, it was the one conference that would attempt to dispel the unfounded views that put liberalism in negative light.

Unprecedented, this was the only platform that brought together speakers from disparate perspectives on one panel: from right-wing conservative groups like ISMA (Ikatan Muslimin Malaysia) and Perkasa (Pertubuhan Pribumi Perkasa) to the more liberal IRF (Islamic Renaissance Front) and Sisters in Islam (SIS). Sure, the speakers would consistently disagree since they had different worldviews altogether, but this was the rare opportunity for the issues to be discussed openly. Only through engagement can there be any resolution on how we can live together in a common space.

The Liberalism Conference would also bring together varied perspectives on the economy: should there be more or less government intervention in managing our economy? Again, there are vastly different opinions. We explored the negative impact that poorly managed government-linked companies have on the country’s fiscal health; how opaque and non-transparent public procurement practices mean that even bumiputra companies do not benefit s long as they are not well-connected; how excessive government regulation makes it tough for companies, both small and large, to operate in the country.

How about the political future of the country? Bringing together political leaders from both sides of the divide was this conference’s forte. What is the right model that works to secure the future of Malaysia? The Barisan Nasional consociational model that was meant to allow different ethnic groups a political party to air their grouses, or the Pakatan Harapan model where each party is at least in theory multiracial? More importantly, what public policies should be implemented to ensure the long-term wealth to allow all communities to prosper and flourish, living the lives they desire?

These are all questions that have been explored deeply throughout my years here, and it is this enabling of such intellectual debate that I believe has added value.

The Malaysia of today has the burden of dealing with multiple faultlines, and it is these we must carefully navigate. At a time when these faultlines – race, religion, geographical distance, urban-rural divide, language – seem to be rearing their ugly heads more often than we like, it is ever more important for there to be avenues for us to understand “the other”.

Finally, the working together with other members of civil society was a valuable experience. Through a coalition of governance, integrity, accountability and transparency (GIAT), we launched several campaigns to promote good governance in the public sector. One of the most prominent ones was to establish an even more independent Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission and the separation of powers between the attorney-general and the public prosecutor, both roles of which are fused into one person today.

Separately, a “Good Governance Agenda” that political parties can sign up to included the need for open data practices, transparent budgets, the review of the Official Secrets Act, Whistleblower Protection Act and the tabling of legislation to allow for transparent political financing, and freedom of information. It is these governance frameworks that can help existing systems to mitigate the effects of any possible human failure.

It is always a challenge to measure the public policy impact that a think-tank makes, especially one that is independent of government. However, four years on, there were certainly key occasions during which some role was played in contributing to Malaysia, now and beyond: educating young Malaysians; expanding the space for discussions on liberty, justice, governance and economic development; painting a vision of the future we want.

While we celebrate 60 years of independence, it is all too easy to romanticise the past and imagine what it was like in those early years, brimming with hope. We have accomplished a lot, let us not deny this.

But let us keep moving to greater heights. And to do this, we will need more such platforms that I believe IDEAS has been able to provide Malaysians, by bringing together people from all walks of life to face the realities of present-day crises, and ultimately seek practical public policy solutions that will best provide us the freedom we seek. Selamat Hari Merdeka ke-60.

Posted in Liberalism, Personal, Reflections, Transparency and Good Governance | Leave a comment