Malaysia’s Federalism Reverts to a Vanishing Past

Posted on April 7, 2020 by Tricia

By Tricia Yeoh, Fellow, the Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs (IDEAS)

First published on Asialink, The University of Melbourne, on 6 April 2020, here.

The Malaysian government’s National Action Council, set up to address the Covid-19 emergency, held a meeting to discuss mitigation measures on 17 March 2020.

Chaired by the newly sworn-in 8th Prime Minister, Muhyiddin Yassin, the meeting included the chief ministers of all states except the five states controlled by the national opposition coalition Pakatan Harapan (PH). Until a month ago, the PH coalition was the federal government, having won the historic 2018 general elections and deposing the Barisan Nasional coalition that had been in power since independence over 60 years ago.

This act of excluding opposition states in national decision-making, especially over such a grave and critically urgent issue as the global pandemic, alarmed many Malaysians, in a divisive move that was widely criticised. But the reality was that this has always been the practice given the country’s highly centralised and politicised federalist system. In an immediate reaction to the furore over the snub, the government’s top civil servant, the Chief Secretary, apologised for not inviting the chief ministers, that he had only invited the State Development Directors of those opposition states (the directors were actually federally-appointed officers).

It was reminder of how a new coalition government known as Perikatan Nasional (PN), formed only weeks earlier on 1 March 2020 through backroom deals and unexpected realignments, had dramatically altered the landscape of federal-state relations in one fell swoop. Within a week, in frantic new negotiations that took place in multiple states, inter-party and intra-coalition dynamics meant that several elected representatives’ joined and swapped new parties across the new PN coalition, anchored by Parti Pribumi Bumiputera Malaysia (Bersatu), the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) and old partners MCA and MIC within Barisan Nasional (BN), alongside the Islamic Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS).

Different coalitions in different states

The events over the past month have resulted in three different state governments changing hands and falling to the new PN government. Pakatan Harapan (PH), reforming as the federal opposition with three remaining parties Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR), Democratic Action Party (DAP) and Parti Amanah Negara (PAN) after the exit of Bersatu, lost the states of Johor, Melaka and Perak in successive order. This is an overall gain by the new PN coalition, now controlling seven states compared to PH’s four.

Following the PH federal government collapse, the PN-controlled states are now Kelantan, Terengganu, Perlis, Pahang, and the newly-acquired Johor, Malacca and Perak. PH remains in control of Kedah, Negeri Sembilan, and the industrial powerhouses Selangor and Penang. Sabah remains a PH-friendly state, and Sarawak is a PN-friendly state. Given the Sarawak state elections will take place in 2021, such political support may likely change, since local sentiment with its accompanying demands from the central government usually drives state elections – for instance, restoring state autonomy under the 1963 Malaysia Agreement.

Get Out the Vote


Image Credit: Kean Wong.

For the first time in Malaysia’s history, there exists different coalitions in different states. While the core PN parties of Bersatu, UMNO and PAS typify the same co-operation that exists at the federal level and within most of their states, this is not true for all of them. For instance, where Bersatu formed government together with BN in the states of Johor and Perak, it is actually maintaining its original co-operation with the PH parties in the state of Kedah. The situation is tenuous in Kedah, given the state’s Menteri Besar (Chief Minister) is the son of deposed prime minister Mahathir Mohamad, who is in an opposing faction of the same party with the new Prime Minister.

In Malacca, the two Bersatu state elected representatives initially joined forces with the new PN partners alongside defectors from DAP and PKR. But the Bersatu duo later reversed their decision and Bersatu now belongs in the state opposition. More incredibly, the two Bersatu legislators are even being investigated for corruption, one of whom is a senior party leader and a member of the party’s Supreme Council.

How federal-state relations are impacted

These changes deeply impact the complex dynamics of federal-state relations in Malaysia. The first immediate consequence is in the way federal resources are allocated and disbursed to states. Although there are several constitutionally-guaranteed federal-state grants, only some grants like capitation, state road and cost reimbursement grants are based on set formulae. Others such as the development and contingencies fund grants are arbitrary and subject to discretion, which is highly subjective and politically influenced.

History has shown how the UMNO-led BN federal government has often punished states controlled by the opposition, including through direct political intervention and reducing a variety of federal-controlled funds. The most obvious and well-reported infraction has been the withholding of oil royalties from oil-producing states Kelantan and Terengganu under then-opposition PAS. Now that PAS is part of the federal government, it will hope to restore these oil royalties – negotiations were already underway with the PH government when it collapsed. But given the fragile state of federal government funds, restoring these royalties will be tricky to execute.

The Sarawak state government had long called for 20 per cent oil royalty as part of the production sharing contracts (PSC) of oil mined off its shores, to replace its existing 5 per cent cut. Given Sarawak’s coalition government (Gabungan Parti Sarawak, or GPS) has backed new Prime Minister Muhyiddin, it will likely also expect some policy deliverables in exchange for providing the parliamentary numbers of seats required to enable the new PN federal government. This may come in the form of other development funds in lieu of increased royalties, the terms of which are considered not business-viable to international oil companies.

While the BN government has been shown to exercise impartiality when allocating budgets to states in its Five-Year Plans (from 1976 to 2005), actual disbursement was conditional upon the electoral outcomes in those states. BN rewarded states in which it performed well, but punished states that experienced opposition takeover through reduced budget disbursements1. With the original BN parties back in power at the federal level, these similar practices may return where states controlled by the PN will likely enjoy better development funds, and the opposite will be true for the PH states that would need to explore alternative strategies. The federal government also controls Federal Development Offices within opposition-led states, which receive direct development funding from the Implementation and Coordination Unit (ICU) under the Prime Minister’s Department that completely bypasses state governments.

Penang’s ambitious Penang Transport Master Plan (PTMP) may also be at risk of downsizing, or being altogether scrapped. The federal government had in November 2019 confirmed it would provide sovereign guarantees for bonds issued under Penang’s special purpose vehicle (SPV) to raise money for its light rail transit (LRT), one of the many PTMP components. The guarantee will likely be reversed now, and Penang’s plans to issue bonds to fund the PTMP stalled. Article 111 of the federal constitution requires federal government approval for any states intending to raise funds of their own.

The times they are a-changin’

For more than 50 years, Malaysia had an incredibly stable and highly institutionalised political party system, first in the form of single-dominant party coalition BN and its component parties UMNO, MCA and MIC, and second in the form of also highly institutionalised opposition parties such as DAP and PAS. With political change in 2008, when the BN coalition was denied its two-third majority in parliament, a two-party or perhaps more accurately, a two-coalition system progressed well for the following decade.

This changed in the lead-up to the 2018 general election, and much more so during the 2020 reshuffle and change in government when parties shifted allegiances and alliances multiple times towards securing their best interests. This fluidity in party politics is what marks the shift in Malaysia’s political landscape, especially evident in the coalitions that have been formed at the subnational level.

Malaysia Elections


Image credit: Kean Wong.

Where observers may only take note of the resultant homogeneous “Malay-Muslim government” at the federal level, the more complex nuances at the state level should not be missed. For instance, if Bersatu Kedah chooses to stay in a working relationship with PH, perhaps it should be permitted to do so. Although party politics in Malaysia is conventionally a highly centralised affair, the Bersatu headquarters at the central level may have to make concessions to ensure the survival of its party at the state level.

In Terengganu, PAS does not actually need UMNO to control the state, and while at the central level the two parties have been in a Muafakat Nasional coalition even prior to the PN formation, how will this play out in the next election, when UMNO may want to vie for the Menteri Besar position again? More worrying at present is the lack of opposition – and therefore the lack of checks and balances – within the state, since there exist only PAS and UMNO state legislators. Again, could there be UMNO-PAS co-operation at the federal, and not necessarily state, level? And how will this change the way these undefined coalitions within states interact with the federal government?

Finally, now that it no longer helms the federal government, PH’s senior leadership must resist wanting to directly control the governments of Selangor and Penang, their resource-rich ‘home base’ states that PH has governed for over a decade. Already the Selangor Menteri Besar is allegedly being pressured to replace executive council members who were known allies of Azmin Ali (the Anwar Ibrahim rival and former protégé, who had been removed from PKR and joined forces with the PN coalition alongside nine other parliamentarians), while Bersatu members are already being removed from state leadership positions as they are no longer in coalition with PH.

While these are political party decisions to be worked out internally, they have an impact on public policy and how these are implemented on the ground. The Selangor Ruler in a statement on 16 March called for close co-operation between the Selangor state government and the federal government. He also said calling the current administration a ‘backdoor government’ was baseless and inaccurate, warning against elected politicians who intentionally seek to disrupt Selangor’s administration, and calling for political stability for the sake of economic and social development.

These latest developments spell the need for new ways of shaping Malaysia’s institutions. Resource allocation and disbursement from federal to state governments must be redrawn along much less politicised lines. An independent grants commission must be formed, with bipartisan members, to determine mathematical formulae of funds given to states regardless of political affiliation. Political parties too must recognise that the authoritarian, archaic ways of operating are stale and unsustainable for the future of state and regional development.

BN Malaysia


Image credit: Kean Wong.

Decentralising party politics may be considered radical for all parties, opposition ones alike, but the unchartered territory that the collapse of PH left Malaysia in must also mean new ground is to be explored. The current PN government is weak, with Bersatu contending with dissatisfaction from UMNO as to the Cabinet appointments, amongst other intra-coalition tensions. This means that the parties in government would also stand to benefit from a more rigorous approach to an unbiased fiscal federalism, since they too are at risk of falling to opposition at any given moment.

The changed – and still changing – federal-state relations landscape is possibly one of the more fascinating things to emerge from Malaysia’s recent dramatic change in federal government. Hopefully, the political parties and their leaders will emerge from this experience cognizant of the lessons learnt – that the opportunity lies within their reach to ensure all states are treated equally in the future, whichever party or coalition is in control, even in – and perhaps especially during – times of crisis.

Tricia Yeoh is a Fellow at think-tank the Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs (IDEAS) and was its chief operating officer, currently on PhD study leave at the University of Nottingham Malaysia. The author of States of Reform: Governing Selangor and Penang, editor of The Road to Reform: Pakatan Rakyat in Selangor, and the director of award-winning documentary ‘The Rights of The Dead,’ about the mysterious 2009 death of political staffer Teoh Beng Hock, Tricia was also an aide to a previous Selangor chief minister.

1 Washida, Hidekuni. 2019. Distributive Politics in Malaysia: Maintaining Authoritarian Party Dominance. London: Routledge.

Rebirth: Reforms, Resistance and Hope in New Malaysia is now available. To purchase a copy in Australia, email rebirth2020@protonmail.com.

Posted in Federalism, General Politics, Public Administration | Leave a comment

Approve an interim protocol for government to work with NGOs — Altaf Deviyati, Tricia Yeoh

Posted on March 31, 2020 by Tricia

First published in The Malay Mail on 31 March, here.

MARCH 31 — As the novel cornavirus (Covid-19) continues to spread in an unpredictable manner it presents a growing risk to all stakeholders involved in food assistance, particularly in the area of food distribution. The latest government policy is to disallow NGOs, with the exception of a few approved ones, to directly distribute aid to vulnerable groups. It is strongly proposed that an interim protocol on partnership between health personnel, federal and local governments and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) be proposed to ensure that aid distribution is maintained.

The implementation of the movement control order (MCO) and the subsequent two weeks extension until April 14, 2020 was much needed to ensure that the spread of the virus is curtailed and further health risks avoided. However, this would mean Malaysians would be house bound for 1 month in total which would be financially challenging for many, especially daily income earners, bottom 40, undocumented — the vulnerable groups. Conditions will worsen if the MCO is further extended, which is a possibility given that the number of positive cases continues to rise by more than 100 daily.

Under normal circumstances, NGOs play a crucial role in assisting vulnerable groups meet their daily needs from providing food through soup kitchens and food banks to informal microfinancing to help pay bills, rent and providing other basic services. This is on top of on-going federal and state government aid programmes. This has continued and even ramped up during the MCO, where numerous NGOs self-organised themselves organically and have played an essential role in facilitating donations and other forms of contributions to vulnerable communities.

The #kitajagakita phrase, also used as an online platform to connect NGOs with the wider public keen to help, encapsulates this spirit of Malaysians helping each other, especially the vulnerable, during a time of great need.

It therefore came as a surprise when on 28 March, the government, due to the need for more stringent social distancing, announced for all CSOs to cease all aid distribution. Instead, the military and Rela would take over the provision of food and shelter in coordination with the National Welfare Department (JKM). Some confusion arose when a letter from the Ministry of Health on March 30 approved 12 NGOs to continue functioning throughout the MCO period, accompanied with stringent health and hygiene conditions, fairly so. What was even more confusing is that the National Disaster Management Agency under the Prime Minister’s Department stated that the letter is only valid up to March 31.

NGOs are mostly community-centred, are acutely aware of their target groups, and have built rapport and trust with these communities over the years. Studies have consistently shown that in times of crisis, strengthening local community resources ensures resilience for both short and long term timelines.

Therefore government should not be clamping down on existing, trusted, experienced and communal resources but instead strengthen it. Examples of other governments working alongside the NGO community during this global crisis already exist. The New Zealand government recently allocated $27 million to ensure NGOs and community groups keep providing for the most vulnerable during their four week Covid-19 lockdown.

The French government created a website to recruit volunteers for emergency food aid, childcare for healthcare personnel, checking in on isolated and fragile people, and neighbourhood solidarity. The Open Government Partnership (OGP) platform has a growing list of more than 90 examples in more than 20 countries of governments around the world working alongside civil society organisations to produce platforms and working jointly on disaster response strategies. The Malaysian government can surely learn from these case studies and adopt a more open, transparent working relationship for the greater good.

In the principle of do no harm, it is hence proposed that the government work together in collaboration with NGOs to continue providing services within local community while still abiding to the social distancing strategy as directed by the Ministry of Health and the World Health Organisation.

In tackling future national security circumstances, it is strongly recommended that the membership of the National Security Council Act 2016 be amended to include representation of civil society. The terms and conditions of this membership can be negotiated and clearly spelt out, where for instance, one NGO representative would be essential in tackling community issues and in the case of public health crises such as this, one public health representative would also be necessary.

However, in the interest of urgency as we collectively fight the COVID 19 pandemic at present, an interim protocol for collaboration between government and NGOs should be established immediately to ensure that no one falls through the cracks. We recommend that this be adopted by the government immediately.

The interim protocol should be based on the following principles:

Protection

It is important to ensure equal access to impartial assistance according to need and without discrimination. All vulnerable communities should be given equal social and economic protection to ensure they have the resilience to survive throughout the MCO period. Beneficiaries who reluctant come forward because of existing marginalisation (such as migrant workers and refugees in the Malaysian context) should be identified.

Sensitisation of information

Information should be shared with communities which is in line with national guidelines, including advice for at-risk groups (elderly and persons with pre-existing health conditions).

Community engagement

Community engagement and clear communications and feedback mechanism will be crucial to reduce transmission, contain the spread of the disease and reduce fear, misinformation, confusion and tension. Existing community mechanisms as well as distribution activities should be leveraged to disseminate information at community level.

Distribution planning

Adjustments may include increase in the number of distribution sites/food outlets to avoid large gatherings, staggering of distribution cycles (e.g. providing rations that will cover a longer duration) and loading procedures to reduce frequency of gatherings, changes in packaging/kitting procedures to reduce time on site and contact. Spaces must be clearly organised so as to avoid crowding, and hygiene and social distancing measures must be practised.

Open collaboration

Government should encourage and not discourage NGOs willing to contribute their time and resources in helping vulnerable communities during times of crises. A spirit of open collaboration should be adopted by government, and a standard set of health guidelines and standard operating procedure (SOP) should be issued to all NGOs intending to engage in aid distribution. Selecting only a dozen or so organisations without the necessary transparent selection procedures creates distrust.

Allowing society to self-organise organically is the only way to ensure the most vulnerable groups will be given protection during this time.

We understand and respect that the government has good intentions of avoiding further risk of virus spread, and reacted in a way to mitigate potential risks by restricting aid distribution to only several NGOs. However, government resources are not infinite, financial or otherwise.

There is already anecdotal evidence of government ministries and agencies reaching out to the NGOs for assistance.

More importantly, it is impossible for the government to be aware of all vulnerable communities that simultaneously exist in all corners of the country. NGOs have worked for many years to build a deep understanding and trust within these communities, and have an acute knowledge of how they function and what their needs are.

Balancing the need to contain the COVID 19 virus while ensuring our vulnerable communities are well-protected is challenging, but the government can emerge with a systematic response to working closely with NGOs. Since the MCO started, thousands of ringgit have already poured in from everyday Malaysians to NGOs, who in turn have assisted in providing food and other forms of aid to vulnerable communities.

Government must begin to realise that it must work hand-in-hand with NGOs to resolve national crises, including health pandemics such as what we currently face. Moving forward, a systematic approach where resources are pooled and willing collaborators identified for a positive working relationship is the best option in tackling the social and economic consequences of Covid-19. Approve an interim protocol, while future long-term measures must also be considered.

* Altaf Deviyati is Director of Operations at IMAN Research. Tricia Yeoh is Fellow at IDEAS.

Posted in Civil Society, Health, Human Rights, Public Administration | Leave a comment

Fiscal transparency should not be missed out in the “Prihatin” Stimulus Package

Posted on March 30, 2020 by Tricia

First published on the IDEAS website here on 30 March 2020, and reported on in The Edge Markets on the same day here.

Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin on 27 March 2020 announced a RM250 billion economic stimulus package intended to tackle the negative economic impacts of the Covid-19 crisis. While it is commendable that the government has taken bold measures to address what we expect will be an unprecedented fallout in the economy, whether in the form of income lost from individuals or businesses, there are several points that need to be clarified.

First, although the total announced package is RM250 billion, the total actual fiscal injection amounts to only RM25 billion, as stated by the Prime Minister himself. It should also be pointed out that what was announced is inclusive of the first two stimulus announced, the first of which was unveiled by then Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed on 27 February.

Second, the Prime Minister did not include several crucial points in his announcement, important information which is the duty of a fiscally responsible government. For instance, he did not state what the financing source would be for the fiscal injection.

Will the RM25 billion be drawn from the national Contingencies Fund? Article 11(3) of the Financial Procedures Act 1957 states that the Minister of Finance may make advances from the Contingencies Fund to meet an “urgent and unforeseen need for expenditure for federal purposes for which no other provision exists”, which presumably this would fall under. In fact, the available balance in the Contingencies Fund as at the end of 2018 was only RM250 million. While the 2020 Budget allocated RM2 billion to the Contingencies Fund, this is nowhere close to the RM25 billion intended to be spent, and even so it is meant for development, not operating expenditure.

This leaves the second option, which is for the RM25 billion to be reallocated from the existing 2020 budget. Although the Financial Procedures Act is not very clear about the rules of virement between ministries (it only prohibits virement within ministries), any budget reallocation would under normal circumstances require the convening of Parliament, in the interest of democratic oversight, good governance and accountability. All national budgets – and supplementary budgets – are by convention tabled, debated and approved by Parliament so that our elected representatives can transparently discuss matters of national interest.

Additionally, under the Movement Control Order (MCO), all states in the country (and the federal territories) are currently defined as “infected local areas” under the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases Act 1988. Because they are not classified as a “security area” under the National Security Council Act 2016, by law the National Security Council cannot supersede Parliament. However, given the special circumstances we are in, where 222 Members of Parliament meeting in the Dewan Rakyat would contravene the basic tenet of the MCO – social distancing – perhaps an alternative would be to form a bi-partisan Special Finance Committee for the virement purposes. This Committee should consult all Members of Parliament remotely prior to the budget reallocation, then table its report to Parliament immediately once the latter convenes.

A third option is for the stimulus to be financed through borrowing. If so, how much will it add to the outstanding debt? As at end-June 2019, the federal government debt stood at RM799.1 billion or 52.7 percent of GDP, below the self-imposed limit of 55 per cent. Even if a small percentage of the RM25 billion is financed through borrowing, the government needs to be transparent in stating how the debt to GDP ratio will be affected, and whether it breaches the 55 percent limit.

However, if the source of financing is not from budget reallocation, then the new stimulus package will add to the 2020 current operating expenditure estimates, increased from RM244 billion to RM266 billion. Current fiscal rules prevent the government from borrowing for operating expenditure, where operating expenditure cannot exceed forecasted revenues for that financial year. If the current stimulus is not financed by budget reallocation, the government would be breaching this fiscal rule and should provide justification to parliament for the purposes of transparency.

Third, the Prime Minister did not elaborate upon the impact of the economic stimulus package on the budget balance. The estimate of 2020’s budget deficit was 3.2% of GDP. If the current source of financing is not from the budget’s reallocation and is in fact an additional expenditure, Malaysia’s 2020 budget will amount to RM322 billion in total. This would increase the deficit rate from 3.2% to 4.8% to GDP, calculated based on 2020 GDP estimates which may change due to the current economic situation.

A less efficient budget deficit is not entirely bad considering we are facing a crisis. Countries around the world have also announced equally large economic stimulus packages since the onset of Covid-19, and a balanced budget target is not necessarily the first priority of many governments given the current economic climate. But what is clear is that the government needs to acknowledge the fact that it will likely miss the balanced budget target and be open about it.

One may well argue that desperate times call for desperate measures, since sharing information publicly and consulting parliament may hamper the government’s effectiveness in tackling the crisis. However, consulting parliament and sharing information is the fiscally responsible thing to do. More importantly, there must be oversight and accountability mechanisms over what is still a relatively large amount of money being spent. Consultation should not of course derail the implementation of the stimulus.

The experience of the past month will inform policymakers and lawmakers of the future, specifically in providing lessons for handling future national crises such as the one we are facing. A pandemic of this scale will not likely, we hope, repeat in the coming decades, but situations will invariably arise that demand urgent action and fiscal injection into the economy. The Fiscal Responsibility Act, which is due to be tabled in 2021 must therefore include clauses to account for such circumstances in which the government can provide the necessary immediate financing but at the same time do so in a transparent and fiscally responsible manner.

Posted in Economics, Health, Public Administration, Transparency and Good Governance | Leave a comment

Government must take specific steps to ensure food security during the MCO ― Projek Wawasan Rakyat

Posted on March 26, 2020 by Tricia

This is something I drafted alongside several others (names below the article) for Projek Wawasan Rakyat, published in the Malay Mail on 26 March 2020. Also available here.

MARCH 26 ― The extension of the movement control order (MCO) until April 14, 2020 was a necessary and proportional step by the government to contain the unabated spread of the Covid-19 virus. The national effort must now shift from only focusing on health risks, to also ensuring food security. Therefore, the government must urgently address its existing restrictions on the supply chain of goods to ensure Malaysians have enough food supply over a prolonged period of time. It is crucial for all Malaysians, especially the most vulnerable like the poor, sick or elderly.

There are already signs that the MCO has affected food supply chains, for example with hundreds of tonnes of vegetables in Cameron Highlands being dumped because of movement restrictions and anecdotal reports of food manufacturing companies shutting down temporarily. These reports are inconsistent with the government’s assurances that food supplies will remain unaffected.

These have arisen as unintended consequences of government regulations. On March 19, the FAQs released by MITI stated that only companies manufacturing essential goods would be permitted to carry on their operations. Any essential goods companies wanting to continue operations during the MCO must reduce their number of employees by at least 50 per cent, alongside other hygiene requirements to avoid spreading the Covid-19 virus.

Two days later, another statement issued by MITI confirmed that logistics and transport services providers are only permitted to deliver essential goods (intended for domestic consumption and not for export) produced by these approved manufacturing companies. And on March 23, it was made known that companies engaged in the food supply chain (and e-commerce and personal care businesses) would need to obtain certification from the Ministry of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs before being allowed to operate.

These requirements are confusing and excessively bureaucratic during a time of national crisis as they could create unnecessary hurdles in the supply chain of goods and services. The task force announced on March 24 consisting of MITI, the Ministry of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs and the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industries is a welcome move. The task force’s first job should be to coordinate and then relax these measures before they impact the food supply chain, which is a matter of basic survival for Malaysians during the Covid-19 crisis.

There are several reasons. First, numerous companies are struggling to comprehend the requirements and obtain the necessary approvals to continue operations. It is understood from personal reports that the MITI portal did not function on Saturday, March 21, leaving approvals pending. E-mails and messages were also left unanswered. The requirements from different ministries overlap and there is poor communication from the government. There must be a better way for companies to get the clarity they seek during the MCO.

That clarity is important for a second reason, as the supply chain is deeply integrated in a way that makes it difficult to distinguish between “essential” and “non-essential”. For instance, the supply of chickens is listed as an essential good. However, there are small firms that produce screws that are used to put together chicken incubators ― would these be listed as essential goods, factories of which would then be given permission to continue operations? As the MCO progresses, the government must increasingly disentangle the causalities and connections.

This is just one example of many others in maintaining the food supply chain. Are these local manufacturers expected to justify their relevance to the “essential goods” industries to the government during this time? On what grounds would a civil servant be able to make a judgment call, especially now that even government operations are operating at below full capacity given the MCO? Food factories require the entire supply chain to function, and cannot operate if raw materials, chemicals for cleaning and waste-water treatment plants stop operating.

Finally, many of the Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) food producers may not be able to continue operating in the mid- to long-term on 50 per cent staffing. As it is, several supermarkets as well as food caterers have either ceased operations, or are facing shortages in their food supply.

A fluid situation with a paucity of relevant and updated information means that it is possible that the food supply chain will be broken in the coming days. Moving forward, government announcements need to be clear and consistent to avoid confusion and to allow the provision of essential medical goods to reach their required destinations to better address the growing Covid-19 crisis.

Specifically, we recommend the following seven steps be urgently taken, with appropriate consultation with food, environmental and public health specialists from the Health Ministry (MOH).

1. All food producers must remain open

The primary concern is the health and safety of workers. Food producers should remain open by providing them with easy to understand health regulations, which includes emphasis on regularly washing hands, and using Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). They need to be made aware of their essential role in keeping Malaysians stable and fed. Self-isolation conditions would be expected for anyone who falls sick, while keeping abreast of Malaysian government and WHO regulations. The standards departments of all food producers must observe all MOH guidelines for routine hygiene and Covid-19 precautions.

2. All transport lines should not be hindered

Local suppliers are currently unable to move produce to supermarkets or small grocery stores because transport is either unavailable or subject to police roadblocks. The police must allow food supply trucks through. A list of vehicles that are allowed to pass can be provided to the police. An online system of approvals can be quickly deployed. Spare IT capacity can be obtained by MDEC or MaGIC if necessary.

3. Steady flow of raw materials to food factories and producers

Individuals involved in the production and transportation of raw materials should be considered as essential workers. Food production should be as efficient as possible so that producers are not over-burdened. As above, additional health regulations and hand hygiene procedures should be introduced including the use of PPEs or gloves and masks. As international suppliers face delays due to their own restricted movement, food factories and producers need to establish a better relationship with local suppliers. The number and range of local suppliers must be diversified. Eligible employees should work from home.

4. Establish open dialogue between government and food suppliers

There should be open and transparent information sharing between the government and food suppliers. Rural areas can feel particularly remote and cut-off, and so farmer and fisheries cooperatives can also make real-time suggestions based on their issues. Suppliers should have a platform to inform government of their needs, which must be immediately addressed if it interferes with food production. Food suppliers such as supermarket chains, main grocers and small shops should collaborate to deliver private solutions to relieve pressure on government and encourage more efficient distribution.

5. Start a nationwide recruitment drive for people to join the local food workforce

The government can incentivise people to join the local food workforce by encouraging or providing tax incentives for companies to offer a decent wage and/or allowing students to work. If there is temporary under-employment in the tourism and hospitality industry, it can be channelled into the food industry.

6. Rely on smallholders to bolster the supply chain

Smallholders of plantations are an additional resource, and they have the added flexibility of making decisions quickly without the hierarchy of the larger agricultural companies. Smallholders should be considered an asset during this crisis. However, the government must make the process easier for smallholders, as they do not have the capacity to negotiate the cumbersome bureaucracy, paperwork or networking that large companies are more equipped to do.

7. Government to collaborate with external experts

The machinery of government is shifting towards implementation, leading to a relative lack of focus on policies, strategy-setting and predicting unintended consequences of policies. Therefore, the government should collaborate and engage food security experts in think-tanks, academia and among citizens. This network can provide surge analytical capabilities and help the government identify and manage blind spots.

We understand that public policies and implementation at this unprecedented crisis require steep trade-offs. However, we caution against unnecessary regulation that will impose a greater threat to the nation. With an MCO extension, we must avoid a food crisis on top of a health and an economic crisis. While stopping the spread of Covid-19 is the highest priority, the government must balance the risk of Covid-19 and the risk of hunger, rationing or impaired nutrition.  We look forward to the task force’s announcements on ensuring the food supply chain remains unbroken throughout the MCO period.

Tricia Yeoh (Fellow, IDEAS)
Rowena Razak (University of Oxford)
Altaf Deviyati (Director of Operations, IMAN Research)
Dr Khor Swee Kheng (University of Oxford)

𝑲𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒕 𝑹𝒂𝒌𝒚𝒂𝒕
Relevant Ministries: International Trade and Industry, Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs, Agriculture and Food Industries, Home
𝙋𝙧𝙤𝙟𝙚𝙠 𝙒𝙖𝙬𝙖𝙨𝙖𝙣 𝙍𝙖𝙠𝙮𝙖𝙩 (𝙋𝙊𝙒𝙍)
www.rakyat.org
25 March 2020

Posted in Economics, Health, Public Administration | Leave a comment

Live Covid-19 Resources Page

Posted on March 22, 2020 by Tricia

Hi!

I will be updating a live page on Covid-19 resources on my website. Feel free to make use of it and share the documents and links. There is too much information floating around that I hope this will be useful for anyone trying to make sense of the unfolding situation, or researching the issue.

Access the page here.

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Under the Movement Control Order, which level of government has the authority to decide what?

Posted on March 21, 2020 by Tricia

As at 4.24pm, Saturday 21 March 2020.

Many unverified messages are being forwarded. This short piece is to clarify what can and cannot be regulated and by which authority under the Movement Control Order that will last between 18 and 31 March 2020.

Operating hours of businesses and markets

First, regarding operating hours of businesses and markets. Under normal circumstances, there can be different rules made within different states. Local governments are the ones with the authority to make regulation for operating hours of markets, empowered by the Local Government Act 1976. By convention they also assume the authority of regulating operating hours of all businesses that fall under their domain, although it is unclear which legislation provides them with this authority. This is why different state governments are the ones issuing such regulations, because local governments come under state jurisdiction as listed in the Ninth Schedule of the Federal Constitution 1957. For example, the Malacca state government has determined that all eateries are to close between 7pm and 7am (except for drive-throughs).

However, in Pahang the notice was issued by the Chief Police Officer (CPO) of Pahang, not the state government. The police is acting on their powers under the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases Act 1988 and the accompanying gazetted Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases (Measures within the Infected Local Areas) Regulations 2020, which permits the police to assist in the control of such diseases. These regulations are what gives the Movement Control Order (MCO) its legal legitimacy, in effect from 18 to 31 March 2020.

Different guidelines in different states?

Can there be different guidelines from state to state? Again, under normal circumstances, this is perfectly fine. But because we are now operating under the MCO, as long as any of the local government guidelines are inconsistent with the MCO, the federal MCO will prevail. This is because ‘public health’ comes under the Concurrent List in the Federal Constitution, meaning that both federal and state governments have the authority over the prevention of diseases. And Article 81 of the Constitution says that state government authority should be exercised not to impede upon the federal government’s authority.

For example, the Ministry of Housing and Local Government has released a set of FAQs regarding the operations of the markets under the Movement Control Order (MCO). If the state or local governments’ regulations on markets are inconsistent with the federal government’s, the latter will override the former.

Regulation of vehicles

Finally, there are also messages sent regarding the requirement for only one passenger at a time within a vehicle. Senior Minister Datuk Fadillah Yusof said on 21 March 2020 that only one person can represent the family to go out and run essential errands. Section 31(2)(b) of the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases Act 1988 permits regulations on the “movement of any vehicle… to prevent the outbreak of infectious diseases.”

Because police comes under the “Federal list” of the Federal Constitution, they have the authority to regulate and monitor all vehicles as authorised officers throughout the country. This is police jurisdiction, and state or local governments cannot override the police in their actions.

Different police controls in different states?

Can the police impose different rules in different places? This depends on the definition of “infected area” under the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases Act 1988. The Attorney General’s Chambers had gazetted all states and three federal territories as infected area under the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases (Declaration of Infected Local Areas) Order 2020, but this applies only between 18 and 31 March 2020. If in the future, the area that is “infected” changes, it is possible that different rules can then be imposed in different states. However, this is subject entirely to the discretion of the federal government.  

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The political economy that Perikatan Nasional inherits – and will have to tackle

Posted on March 9, 2020 by Tricia

This article was first published on New Mandala on 6 March 2020 here.

As the dust settles on the political machinations from the top that threw Malaysia into unchartered territory – this was the first time since 1969 that the country had no sitting government for close to a week – it is useful to evaluate the political economy that the new Perikatan Nasional government inherits and will have to tackle. Perikatan Nasional takes over this week from the short-lived Pakatan Harapan, which survived for less than two years at the federal government after the latter’s historic defeat of single dominant party Barisan Nasional in 2018. Perikatan Nasional is a new coalition bringing Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (PPBM, the party that has since left Pakatan Harapan) together with former rivals United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) and the Islamic party PAS. How it handles the country’s already weak economy will determine its own future political stability.

Inheriting an economy of ethnic fault lines

In multiple post-2018 forums discussing the implications of what was then termed as “New Malaysia” one common theme stood out; the country is made up of ‘multiple Malaysias’. What urban middle-class voters failed to grasp was that because different people voted for the Pakatan Harapan for entirely different reasons, their idea of a modern, liberal and open political economy was not necessarily matched with that of their fellow counterparts in the rest of the country. And it is here that the ethnic fault lines that divide the country became even more apparent.

The Merdeka Center for Opinion Research polls post-May 2018 confirm this disparity, where perception towards Pakatan Harapan was consistently higher among non-Malays and lower among Malays. Its popular support fell to an all-time low of 35% in October 2019. Then-opposition parties UMNO and PAS fuelled a narrative that the Pakatan Harapan government was anti-Malay because it was dominated by the Chinese-majority Democratic Action Party (DAP) in its coalition, and insinuated that the government was therefore implementing policies that were unfriendly to low-income Malay households.

Such a perception was in part contributed to by actual policies approved by the Pakatan Harapan government. In its first national budget, dealing with the ramifications of the US-China Trade War and a growing fiscal deficit, in spite of a large dividend from national oil company Petronas, the government decided to halve subsidies to fishermen and farmers. Having abolished the Goods and Services Tax (GST) that it famously campaigned against in 2018, it found itself forced to trim down public spending at the expense of existing social welfare programmes.

Announcements of the civil service being reduced in size, a smoking ban in eateries, cash aid reductions and possibly worse, the appointment of non-Malays into key positions like the Minister of Finance and Attorney-General also contributed to the impression of Malays being undermined. Mega projects like the renewed East Coast Rail Link (ECRL) and Bandar Malaysia in the heart of Kuala Lumpur were renegotiated to plug the fiscal gap. But these came tied with business dealings and financial investments from China, a relationship that many view suspiciously as disadvantageous to Malaysia especially in terms of job opportunities for locals.

Pakatan Harapan’s attempts, but too little too late

To its credit, the Pakatan Harapan government recognised the need to address the lowest-income communities, where the bottom 40% of Malaysians earn less than USD916 a month. Most of these are not saving enough money for the future, if at all. Pakatan Harapan launched a Shared Prosperity Vision 2030 that had some of the right language needed to address the complaints of the rising cost of living, but it was shallow on actual policy. In its 2020 budget, it unveiled a series of programmes targeting those struggling to make ends meet, including affordable housing projects, restoring selected subsidies and targeted cash handouts.

But there may not have been enough time for these programmes to be rolled out sufficiently, and by the Tanjung Piai by-election in November 2019 in Johor, traditionally an UMNO stronghold, voter sentiment against Pakatan Harapan was strong enough that Barisan Nasional won with 65.6% of the vote. This galvanised resolve from UMNO and PAS, then in coalition under the Muafakat Nasional banner, and perhaps more crucially also put pressure on PPBM to implement more pro-Malay socio-economic policies.

The Covid-19 outbreak in January and February this year contributed to an already struggling economy, with retail and food and beverage businesses hit particularly badly as people were encouraged to stay home and avoid crowds. While the Pakatan Harapan government responded by drafting the Economic Stimulus Package 2020 that would roll out tax and cash incentives (for instance, one-off payments to taxi drivers, tourist bus drivers, tourist guides and registered trishaw drivers), it was yet another ‘too little, too late’ programme. Fighting against time while the political crisis was brewing within the Pakatan Harapan coalition, the government collapsed before it had the chance to announce the package and reap the full benefits from such populist measures. Indeed, Mahathir Mohamed went ahead with the announcement as interim Prime Minister on 27 February 2020, the positive impact of which Muhyiddin Yassin is now fortunate enough to enjoy.

Managing the race-based political economy

In his maiden speech as Prime Minister on 2 March, Muhyiddin already made overtures as to the approach he will have, by explicit mention and recognition of what people need: “money to buy daily essentials, children’s books and school material, paying water and electricity bills and home rental, housing and car loans, and other needs for the family.”

The bottom 40 percent – and even the middle 20 percent – of Malaysian society spend the bulk of their disposable income on the essentials that he listed, and ultimately want a “stable, peaceful and prosperous” country. These were words used by the Barisan Nasional government during campaigns, which Muhyiddin knows will send the right signal to the electorate: I will fill your pockets and you will live better lives. Sure enough, results from a YouGov survey report that 59% of low-income communities in Malaysia support the formation of the Perikatan Nasional government. This is compared with 19% of the high-income communities supporting PN.

Apart from the populist programmes that will likely increase in the form of handouts and more affirmative action policies for the Malay majority, the patronage system long practised by UMNO – and which we saw emerging in the Pakatan Harapan government, particularly in PPBM and to a certain extent, PKR – will surely return.

How does this affect the lowest-income communities, especially in rural parts of the country? It is in the kampung (village) areas that communities are an essential part of life. UMNO had incumbency advantages of having set in place a smooth, well-functioning system where members of the community would depend largely on local warlords for anything and everything, from wedding expenses to odd-job hires, from repairs for flood-damaged roofing to building youth-centred community halls.

During its 50 years in power, when UMNO delivered economic benefits to constituents it claimed credit entirely based on race. By politicizing race, it ensured its own survival as the Malay party that could, and would, provide. This made it difficult for Pakatan Harapan to detach the communities’ dependency, both real and imagined, on UMNO and its local Malay leader representatives. Worse, the communities felt insecure, thinking that these aid packages disbursed through entrenched patronage networks would disappear under Pakatan Harapan. And although an argument can be made that the upper-class urban Malays do not depend as much on these handouts as their relatives in the kampungs do, modern patron-client networks are still an important lifeline for those within the struggling urban and semi-urban poor.

Although partly regulated by its new coalition partners, UMNO will again have unparalleled access to the public resources it had previously used to oil the patronage machinery it did so successfully when in federal government. This will likely unfold in the same manner: the distribution of positions in government-linked companies (GLCs) and scores of other entities, contracts to friendly and supportive companies and jobs in the hundreds of politically-linked companies and those controlled by ministries and GLCs.

Recall that Pakatan Harapan’s earlier clarion calls was to uphold the rights of all Malaysians regardless of race or religion. Pakatan Harapan was later forced to come to terms with the reality of Malaysia’s political economy and in the middle of their short-lived term began to use the same language as UMNO, falling back to tried and tested race-based language and policies. The Shared Prosperity Vision 2030 document emphasizes that bumiputera outcomes (Malays and other indigenous groups) need to be given priority and is systematically embedded in every strategic thrust and enabler. Decoupling race from economic benefit would have been a solution, but one that Perikatan Nasional is unlikely to implement given its ethnic makeup.

“Stable, peaceful and prosperous”

And so, with increased in-fighting within the coalition up to its demise, Malaysians observed an increasingly unstable and weak government. This was made worse by the negative effects of Covid-19 and the trauma of uncertainty over the week in which there was no government in place. Lower down the food chain, the collective effect of this was likely that voters just wanted to carry on making a living, which they may have opined requires a stable political environment.

Here is where the new Perikatan Nasional government may actually thrive. In providing the age-old set of policies, patronage and programmes, it more importantly provides a sense of stability that the Malay majority expect and appreciate. The scale of grand corruption that Najib Razak was revealed to have undertaken was the last straw for many voters in the last general election. But once that element was removed, it is possible that voters will desire a return to what was before. Of course, this will come at a cost; the government will no longer be incentivised to adhere to any form of institutional reforms. This is a pity given that these reforms that would actually revive the slowing economy and provide assurance to investors that the Malaysian economy is open and operates on a level-playing field.

Muhyiddin’s first speech also committed to integrity and good governance, abolishing corruption and improving enforcement. His challenge will be to do this whilst simultaneously maintaining the patronage system that has been perceived to function well for members, supporters and the wider community. Malaysia is already signatory to six regional free trade agreements (with the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), China, Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and India) and there will be increased international pressure to improve regulation in public procurement and State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs, the more internationally known reference for GLCs). The latter two are areas which are most well-used for patronage purposes, a common practice of single dominant parties the world over.

Perikatan Nasional can choose to stay with the safe policies that allowed Barisan Nasional to rule for over 50 years. The question is whether internal and external pressures will eventually force them – or any government in power – to reform for long-term sustainability, or to carry on with more conservative social and economic measures that it believes will secure votes. More worryingly, will there be a return to authoritarian ways of silencing civil liberties for the sake of providing a stable, peaceful and prosperous nation that can get on with life and earn its keep?

Muhyiddin Yassin has a plethora of challenges ahead. He is under pressure to legitimise his government through a first parliamentary sitting in May, and will struggle to manage the three coalition parties and their competing electoral interests, where each of them cater to the same Malay-majority electorate and will invariably fight for the same seats. If Muhyiddin Yassin survives and can keep Perikatan Nasional together, he will still have to tackle the complex dynamics of Malaysia’s political economy in the months and years to come.

Posted in Economics, Elections, Ethno-Religious Politics, Public Administration, Transparency and Good Governance | Leave a comment

Malaysia’s New Perikatan Nasional Government: A Return of Barisan Nasional Policies?

Posted on March 2, 2020 by Tricia

This article was first published on FORSEA on 2 March 2020 here and republished on Malaysiakini on 3 March 2020 here.

Malaysia’s Pakatan Harapan coalition will go down in history as the shortest-lived government in the country. Since its ‘stunning’ electoral victory in May 2018 in which the single-party dominant regime of Barisan Nasional was defeated for the first time at the federal government, the coalition had attempted to tackle difficult institutional reforms and reframe race-based politics despite its slowing popularity.

Hardly two years later, the government collapsed in February 2020 after then-Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed resigned amidst intra-coalition dispute over leadership transition. This prompted a week-long crisis, eventually resulting in the installation of a new government in its place: Perikatan Nasional, bringing together the old Barisan Nasional parties, chief of which being UMNO (whose top leaders are still embroiled in multiple corruption charges linked to the global 1MDB scandal), PPBM (a break-off party from UMNO), alongside the Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS). Whilst Mahathir Mohamed and Pakatan Harapan are expected to protest against the King’s choice of the new Prime Minister based on technical grounds – and in effect, his new government – it is likely that this decision will not be reversed.

This article therefore explores the immediate consequences of the new government under Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin’s leadership. Will Malaysia see a return of Barisan Nasional politics and public policies?

BN policies: The sequel

Muhyiddin Yassin,  spent most of his political career with BN and up to his removal in 2015 was Najib’s Deputy Prime Minister. Image: Wikipedia Commons

This is likely to be the case, given that the new government consists of parties that had formed the previously defeated Barisan Nasional. While PPBM had contested alongside Pakatan Harapan to topple Barisan Nasional in the 2018 election, they had done so primarily as a protest against then Prime Minister Najib Razak, not for ideological reasons. And although it is an apparent victory for PAS to be back within the federal government after it withdrew from Barisan Nasional in 1977, the nature of the BN-PAS relationship may be the more difficult to predict. After having been sworn enemies and in direct competition with the other for over 40 years since then, cobbling together a common policy platform will be a first challenge in tackling the country’s many problems.

First, the new Perikatan Nasional’s task would be to manage the country’s economic woes. Already struggling with a fiscal deficit and projected decline in revenue, the previous budget saw lower expenditure, making it difficult for low-income communities to feel any impact of government spending. The government may be forced to look into restoring the unpopular Goods and Services Tax (GST) to plug the country’s fiscal gap, which was abolished by Pakatan Harapan, then arguing that the GST was the cause of people’s rising cost of living.

Managing fragile race relations

Second, it is likely that Perikatan Nasional will further deepen existing institutional race-based policy. Post 1969 racial riots, race-based affirmative action’s primary objective to alleviate Malay poverty with the hope of creating more equal outcomes. Over the following 40 years, the policy had been used as a catch-all umbrella for Malay privileges, strengthened by the constitutional phrase “special position” of the Malays. Fears of non-Malay dominance, especially since the rise of Chinese-majority Democratic Action Party (DAP) within the Pakatan Harapan government, led to increased demands by the Malay-Muslim majority electorate to have a greater share of the economic pie.

Real or imagined, Perikatan Nasional will have to allay these fears, and will likely have to depend on increased economic handouts to appease this community. In doing so, it will be faced with the same disgruntlement from its non-Malay electorate that Barisan Nasional had previously countered. The complaint of a non-level playing field, a more closed and protected economy will also have ramifications on how international investors perceive Malaysia as a market. But settling domestic challenges might take priority over economic investment, although in reality the two are intrinsically linked.

Managing already fragile race relations will be another thing on a growing list of issues to tackle, related to how it chooses to manage its economic policy. With PAS in the fray, a representative of whom will likely helm the Religious Affairs portfolio, it is likely that there will be more conservative social and religious policies being put into place. PAS had also been the champion of implementing the hudud law within Kelantan, then the only state it controlled, and it remains to be seen if this proposal will be supported by its new coalition partners. Criminal law is a federal, not state matter, so PAS never really had the mandate to push for this at the federal level – until now.

And on those reforms …

Third and finally, it is unlikely that efforts towards the institutional reform measures the Pakatan Harapan had begun will follow through. While some measures will be difficult to reverse, such as the new parliamentary select committees instated for better oversight and governance, it is unclear if the new government will have the political will to execute the commitments of the National Anti-Corruption Plan, for instance. Several Bills that were due to be tabled in the upcoming March parliamentary sitting, such as the Independent Police Complaints and Misconduct Committee Bill for police reform and the Political Funding Bill for more transparent and accountable political financing procedures will likely be shelved. In short, the institutional reform agenda may likely be cold-storaged.

In short, the Perikatan Nasional may turn to its previous Barisan Nasional-style policies. Its leader Muhyiddin Yassin, after all, spent most of his political career with BN and up to his removal in 2015 was Najib’s Deputy Prime Minister. Known as a stable establishment figure, he may be most comfortable executing the staid, time-tested staple of policies that allowed Barisan to survive for more than 50 years since independence.

If the coalition is stable enough to weather through the next few years, bearing in mind that PAS may still be dissatisfied with being the minor partner especially when it has been used to controlling the two Eastern coast states of Kelantan and Terengganu on its own, then ensuring that the majority race is comfortable, while dishing out just enough goodies for the minority races to be kept satisfied may be the formula that works for Perikatan Nasional.

Will we see a return of Barisan Nasional policies? The short answer is probably yes, with an added element of social conservatism that they perceive to be the desire of the country’s Malay-Muslim electorate.

Tricia Yeoh
Tricia Yeoh is currently a fellow at the Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs (IDEAS), and PhD Candidate, School of Politics, History and International Relations, University of Nottingham Malaysia.

Posted in Corruption, Economics, Elections, Ethno-Religious Politics, General Politics | Leave a comment

The rise of Perikatan Nasional and Muhyiddin Yassin as 8th PM?: Events in the political turmoil of Malaysia from Wednesday 26 February 4pm to Saturday 29 February midnight

Posted on March 1, 2020 by Tricia

The last four days have seen political parties change sides faster than seaside weather. In what seems like the end of the almost week-long poker game, the Agong announced at 4.40pm on Saturday 29 February that Tan Sri Muhyiddin Yassin would be sworn in the following day Sunday 1 March as Malaysia’s 8th Prime Minister. How did we get here? This piece is to once again follow chronologically the events over the last few days, in succinct form, to ensure that when we go back in history we will ensure that we follow the facts of what transpired. Especially in a week where politicians and parties were making U-turns, sometimes several times in a day, it is hoped that this will help to distinguish fact from fiction, the latter of which can occur on account of poor human memory.  

Wednesday 26 February

We left off at 3pm on Wednesday afternoon 26 February, where all awaited a press conference by Mahathir Mohamed at 4.45pm. In this PC, he broke silence about the reasons he resigned as Prime Minister, apologized for the predicament he put the country in and essentially called for a unity government with no party. He also put it on record that he would not be willing to work with Umno as a party, but that he would work with individuals who leave Umno and join other parties.

In a subsequent press conference by Anwar Ibrahim, he announced, alongside other Pakatan Harapan MPs from PKR, DAP and Amanah, that they would back him as Prime Minister.

Thursday 27 February

On Thursday 27 February, it was announced at 9.58am that the Istana would be summoning Mahathir at 11am.

At 10.30am, it was announced by Tuan Ibrahim Tuan Man from PAS that all UMNO and PAS MPs had signed statutory declarations for Muhyiddin Yasin as Prime Minister. However, this was later refuted by another PAS member Takiyuddin Hassan. It is unclear whether PAS supported Muhyiddin, another candidate, or did not put down a name at all.

At 12.15pm, Mahathir was seen leaving from the Istana after an hour’s meeting. There were also rumours of Anwar Ibrahim being summoned to the Istana. It was around this time that the atmosphere outside the Istana was building up to be carnival-like, with numerous companies taking the opportunity to give out goodies for branding purposes. One such company even led an exercise routine on the grassy area. I put in my notes: “Mild-mannered democratic consolidation.”

At 12.18pm, The Star reported that the Agong would meet with the Rulers in a Rulers Council meeting the following day, on 28 February.

At 12.30pm, Jonathan Yasin, one of the 11 MPs that had originally been listed together with Azmin Ali and Zuraida Kamaruddin as leaving PKR said that he is still a PKR member. At 1.48pm, however, he deleted that denial and replaced it with another post saying that any party matters would be discussed with the party.

At 1.09pm, Mahathir said that he accepted the Bersatu Chairmanship again. But another news portal states that he would be returning as Advisor, and not the Chair. This is an important point that would determine how things unfolded two days later. Although seemingly perfunctory, the distinction between “Chair” and any other position would cost him the ability to manage and make decisions for and on behalf of the party.

As for the states, it was reported at 12.05pm that there would be no change in the Kedah state government, in which Bersatu would be working with Pakatan Harapan. Interestingly, immediately following that at 2.19pm, the Johor palace confirmed that the Johor state government had now changed to a new government consisting of Bersatu and Barisan Nasional. This meant that there would be two different coalitions within two different states, making for a very strange situation where Bersatu would be working with PH in Kedah, but BN in Johor. This was formed after the Sultan interviewed 54 out of 56 assemblypersons and found there was a simple majority in Bersatu and BN’s favour.

At 2.47pm, it was reported that Muhyiddin was meeting Mahathir. Muhyiddin was sighted entering the PMO at 2.20pm and leaving after 3pm.

At 5pm, Mahathir launched a stimulus package as interim Prime Minister, which had been prepared prior to the collapse of the PH government. The Economic Stimulus Package 2020 is meant to address economic woes of the country following the Covid-19 situation. At the press conference following this launch, he said that after meeting with the 222 MPs over two days, there was no PM candidate with a clear majority, so he quoted the Agong as saying that the right forum to decide that would be at the Dewan Rakyat. Mahathir said that “So on March 2, a Parliament session will be called to determine who has the majority of support”. If the Dewan Rakyat failed to determine who should be PM, a snap election would be called.

At 11.21pm, PH issued a statement saying it was inappropriate for Mahathir to announce that Parliament would be convened, stating that they would prefer to observe the authority of the Agong.

Friday 28 February

The morning of Friday was relatively quiet and news-free. At 1.19pm, it was reported that the Speaker said there would be no special Parliamentary sitting according to procedures, where this could only take place after a royal decree from the Agong.

Pakatan Harapan also issued a statement saying that it would be better to wait for the Agong to announce.

At 4pm, the Istana issued a statement that no one has majority to be the new Prime Minister, and hence the Agong would meet with party leaders who would then nominate the PM candidate.

At 4.30pm, Bersatu said that all 36 MPs support Muhyiddin Yasin for PM. Bersatu previously had 26 MPs, so at the time of this statement I assumed that the additional 10 MPs were the group led by Azmin Ali, having left PKR and now joined Bersatu. Recall that the list originally included 11 people, but Jonathan Yasin announced he was remaining in PKR, leaving Azmin’s 10.

At 6.02pm, Sabah’s Warisan and UPKO, and Sarawak’s GPS were reported to back Muhyiddin as PM as well.

By the end of this day, it seemed likely that Bersatu, together with its new partners UMNO and other BN members MCA and MIC, and PAS, would be forming the new government under its Perikatan Nasional coalition, with Muhyiddin Yasin as its Prime Minister. That night, Pakatan Harapan would (as we would learn the following day) be meeting late into the night and into the wee hours of the morning, with Mahathir once again, apparently brokered by his daughter Marina Mahathir.

Saturday 29 February

If reports are true, then Pakatan Harapan had met with Mahathir till early Saturday morning, to issue a statement later that morning.

At 8.45am, Syed Saddiq of Bersatu Youth reiterated that he would not work with UMNO, whom he considered to be corrupt.

At 9.30am, Mahathir and PH both issued statements. Mahathir said that after having met with the PH leaders in the morning, he now had the numbers to be Prime Minister, and PH confirming that they would now back Mahathir.

At the same time, the Istana summoned political party leaders to meet with the Agong, and they were expected to meet at 10.30am.

At 12pm, Bersatu issued a statement signed by Muhyiddin Yasin saying that Mahathir had resigned his Chair position on 24 Feb, stating that according to its constitution if the Chair resigns, the President becomes its new chair. As such, Muhyiddin is the new Acting Chair. Around this time, photos were circulating on WhatsApp of Maszlee Malik of Bersatu in a home with Muhyiddin, Hadi Awang and Zahid Hamidi and several others.

In what showed an obvious split in the party, Bersatu issued a statement at 12.50pm that directly contradicted the previous statement. Signed by its Secretary General Marzuki Yahya, the statement said that Mahathir was still the Chair of Bersatu, and as such was the only one who could lead the party, citing parts of the party constitution. It seemed like the party was also facing its own constitutional crisis.

At 1.50pm, Anwar Ibrahim left the Istana and said that he represented the PH coalition and had expressed support for Mahathir as Prime Minister to the Agong.  Anwar said that he supported Mahathir as PM. He said that he was touched for the support for him, but chose to look at the national interest over personal agenda.

From 3pm onwards, there was a series of reports showing that Mahathir had support of several new MPs. This included Richard Riot (3.40pm) who was reported as leaving SUPP to join PKR. At 3.55pm: Warisan and UPKO of Sabah announced their support for Tun Mahathir separately. At 4.30pm, Maszlee issued a long two-page statement stating he was supporting Mahathir.

Despite renewed avowals of support for Mahathir, things took a turn when the Agong made an official announcement at 4.40pm that Muhyiddin Yasin would be the 8th Prime Minister, to be sworn in on the following day. Wan Saiful Wan Jan from Bersatu issued a statement hoping that this would mark the end of the political impasse over the past week. Berita Harian also reported the same news at 5.40pm.

At this point, it was uncertain how Muhyiddin and the new Perikatan Nasional were able to obtain the necessary number of MPs to form government. GPS of Sarawak had not yet given (at least recently) any indication of where its support would lean. Sure enough, at 6pm, a video circulating on WhatsApp showed that Muhyiddin thanked GPS, amongst others, for its support. Later, at 8.36pm, GPS officially said that they would support Muhyiddin as Prime Minister but clarified that while it supported Perikatan Nasional, it was not one of its member component parties.

At 7.40pm, Maszlee says that he supported Muhyiddin as the Prime Minister, but it is not clear whether this meant he was still part of Bersatu or whether he had left. In any case, a Facebook post at 8pm by Mukhriz Mahathir listed the six MPs supporting Mahathir as PM, and the list included Maszlee. The six he listed were 1) Mukhriz Mahathir – Jerlun 2) Ir Amiruddin Hamzah – Kubang Pasu 3) Syed Saddiq Abd Rahman – Muar 4) Dr Maszlee Malik – Simpang Renggam 5) Eddin Syazlee Shith – Kuala Pilah 6) Mahathir Mohamad – Langkawi.

In the meantime, civil society called for a gathering at Dataran Merdeka at 8.30pm, asking those who were “outraged by the betrayal” to come together. Anecdotal reports put the crowd size as almost double of the numbers that showed up at the first public gathering several nights before.

In yet another twist in a long series of twists and turns, PKR announced that Baru Bian who was amongst the “Azmin 10” MPs had now signed a new statutory declaration to go with Pakatan Harapan. As a result, Fahmi Fadzil of PKR claimed that PKR had 114 MPs in total, surpassing the 112 required to form government.

Pakatan Harapan Presidential Council met at 9pm, and at close to 11pm Mahathir Mohamed issued a statement containing the full list of MPs who were in support of Mahathir as Prime Minister. This included the six Bersatu MPs as previously mentioned, 40 from PKR, 10 from Amanah, 9 from Warisan, 1 from UPKO, 42 from DAP, 2 independents (including Bukit Gantang’s Syed Abu Hussin Hafiz Syed Abdul Fasal and Selangau’s Baru Bian), GPS (Jeffrey Kitingan) and one other independent from Sri Aman (Masir Kijat).

However, immediately after this statement was issued, both the Bukit Gantang MP and Sri Aman MP denied that they supported Mahathir and said they supported Muhyiddin. PH’s original list of 114 was therefore down by two, at 112 MPs. However, the list apparently mistakenly did not include PKR’s Hulu Selangor June Leow, so the list was updated at 11.49pm. This brings PH’s number to exactly 113 MPs, one more than needed to form government.

Muhyiddin is supposed to be sworn in tomorrow at 10.30am (Sunday 1 March 2020). In Mahathir’s statement, he says that he has sent a letter to the Agong to clarify the situation and hopes that the Agong will receive his letter and his explanation.

Evidently, Pakatan Harapan is hopeful that the Agong will take this list into consideration. However, it is unclear if the Agong will accept the letter after having already made the earlier announcement of Muhyiddin being appointed as the 8th PM. If he does not accept Mahathir’s late night case, then procedurally what PH can next do is wait for the parliamentary sitting on 9th March to call for a vote of no-confidence in Muhyiddin Yassin, in which case if PH has the numbers then they would win such a vote – and then nominate and vote for whoever they hope to be the 9th Prime Minister. However, a week is much too long in politics and it is obvious why the late intervention is the option that PH much prefers.

Constitutionally, it is up to the Agong’s discretion on whom he believes to command the majority of the House. Let’s see what unfolds tomorrow morning.

Update on the next morning, Sunday 1 March

As announced, Tan Sri Muhyiddin Yassin was sworn in as Malaysia’s 8th Prime Minister at the Istana at 10.30am.

Pakatan Harapan’s latest tally as clarified in a press statement is 112 MPs.

As stated above, one recourse for PH is to wait for the upcoming parliamentary sitting at which PH may display its vote of no confidence in the current PM. Until then, it is business as usual for the rest of us. PH was a short-lived government for less than two years, and we will now have the return of BN parties + Bersatu + PAS. I will be uploading some more analytical pieces in the days to come. Thanks for watching this space.

Posted in Elections, General Politics, Public Administration | 1 Comment

Mahathir vs Anwar, the day after the collapse of PH: political developments from 4pm 25 Feb to 3pm 26 Feb 2020

Posted on February 26, 2020 by Tricia

As it stands today, the Agong is still in the middle of meeting with all 222 MPs to ascertain who they will support as PM. Until the process is complete, all we have is speculation. But back to the timeline.

Tuesday, 25 February

Just before 4pm, GPS in Sarawak issued a statement saying they would fully support Mahathir as Prime Minister. With their support, it seemed at that point that all parties in Malaysia had indicated they wanted Mahathir as PM.

This is when, just before 5pm, Wan Saiful Wan Jan of Bersatu proposed that a unity government be formed. In such a situation, a unity government would comprise all parties in support of the PM, and the PM would have the prerogative to select Cabinet members across the political divide. This would be unprecedented – as many possible options are for the country at this point given the entire situation is unprecedented in our history – but the unity government proposal was short-lived.

At about 8pm, PAS and UMNO announced that they were against the unity government proposal, saying they would not want to be in coalition with DAP. They hence retracted their support for Mahathir for PM. Recall that they had been to the Istana just two days before on the understanding that the new coalition would be called Perikatan Nasional (not Pakatan Nasional as some had previously understood), with a reported 130 statutory declarations given to the Agong.

At 9.22pm, it was reported that the PH Presidential Council that was meeting at the PKR headquarters that evening had met a consensus, but that it would not be revealed until the following day (Wednesday). This was announced by Amanah deputy president Salahuddin Ayob. Khalid Samad said that they would not be asking for fresh polls as they already had a clear majority.

Based on some basic calculations, with GPS’ 18 MPs, this would actually mean more than just a simple majority for PH and friends in government, including DAP’s 42, PKR’s 39, Amanah’s 11, Warisan and Upko’s 10, and the 5 who exited from Bersatu alongside Mahathir. With 125 (at least from this count), this would be more than the 112 required.

At 11pm, Syed Saddiq announced that the Bersatu Youth wing would not work with UMNO, given their top leadership was still being charged on investigations of corruption including Zahid Hamidi.

And a bit on the states: in the evening at 7pm, the Johor BN chief announced that they would be forming a new state government with 5 crossover state assemblypersons from PKR, to the UMNO-PAS coalition. This would bring the total to 33 seats out of 56, in which only 29 is required to form a simple majority. If true, then PH would have lost 4 states including Perak, Kedah, Malacca and Johor, left only with Selangor, Penang, Negeri Sembilan, and two PH-friendly states Sarawak (under GPS leadership) and Sabah (under Warisan leadership). If so, then UMNO+PAS+Bersatu would gain three states, controlling the majority in the states of Perak, Malacca, Kedah, Johor, Kelantan, Terengganu and Perlis. This coalition would gain overall, increasing their state count (compared to the previous UMNO + PAS count) by three, and PH hence also losing three states in total.

In short, this was the day in which the unity government was proposed, then quashed almost immediately, and no further sign of the new government formation yet. Mahathir was photographed being back at his desk at work at the PMO.

Wednesday, 26 February

The day started with a slight slowing of the news compared to the previous few days.

At 7am, the Malaysian Insight reported that Bersatu was mulling a return to PH, following UMNO and PAS’ calling for fresh polls, which had thrown them into disarray.

At 10am, photos circulated on Whatsapp of Anwar Ibrahim and Wan Azizah celebrating their 40th wedding anniversary, smiles all around.

It is understood that the Agong had met with a total of 83 MPs on Tuesday the day before, and would be meeting with the remaining 139 MPs on Wednesday (today) starting with Bersatu, PKR, Amanah, Azmin’s camp, Sabah, DAP and other remaining MPs. In the meantime, the Malacca state exco was meeting, business as usual in the morning.

At noon, Bersatu issued a statement saying again that they would be supporting Mahathir as Prime Minister.  

At 12.48pm, photos of PKR MPs standing atop an open-top bus were circulated, with them waving and smiling on their way to the Istana.

At 1pm, Azmin Ali’s independent bloc issued a statement reiterating their support for Mahathir as Prime Minister. In the statement, they called for a “national reconciliation” as this would allow for a stable Malaysia in tackling the many challenges ahead.

In the meantime, the Istana which has been handling its media relations excellently, with already servings of KFC and McDonald’s the day before, prepared “ikan patin tempoyak” for the media waiting outside the Istana. Whoever is handling their media relations must be given a pat on the back. Well done to the Istana.

An anonymous source was quoted in FMT as saying that Azmin’s bloc would be joining Bersatu, including Santhara Kumar who would be joining as an associate member.

At 1.59pm, the Malaysian Insight reported that the PH decision was to support Anwar Ibrahim as Prime Minister. In such a scenario, PH would only have 92 MP seats, with DAP’s 42, PKR’s 39 and Amanah’s 11. The Straits Times also confirmed this. The most vocal among PH leadership seems to be Amanah’s Khalid Samad, who is asking Mahathir to do the right thing by giving Anwar Ibrahim the 8th Prime Ministerial position as committed to.

This is a gamble by PH. Calling for a minority government led by Anwar Ibrahim is itself unprecedented. And may cause the other parties to rally around the original plan by Azmin Ali, which was for Mahathir to be PM. In such a scenario, it would be PH’s 92 MPs versus however many MPs Azmin can cobble together under a “National Reconciliation” plan with a Mahathir PM, possibly even more if he can organise the parties he gathered at Sheraton, perhaps sans the unpalateable leaders that Mahathir was and is unwilling to work with (UMNO top leadership most of all). If so, this would see Bersatu + Azmin’s bloc + GPS + PAS + some UMNO forming a coalition and coming into power with a simple majority.

As at 3pm, Wednesday 26 February 2020, this is where it stands. What to expect in the hours to come: The result of the Agong having met all 222 MPs, and where Bersatu decides to go. Even if they want to join PH, will the PH parties accept them now? Whichever government comes into place will see a battering on all sides, a weakened coalition, with a more challenging time ahead to instate reforms or any sort of policy agenda.

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