Government must take specific steps to ensure food security during the MCO ― Projek Wawasan Rakyat

Posted on March 26, 2020 by Tricia

This is something I drafted alongside several others (names below the article) for Projek Wawasan Rakyat, published in the Malay Mail on 26 March 2020. Also available here.

MARCH 26 ― The extension of the movement control order (MCO) until April 14, 2020 was a necessary and proportional step by the government to contain the unabated spread of the Covid-19 virus. The national effort must now shift from only focusing on health risks, to also ensuring food security. Therefore, the government must urgently address its existing restrictions on the supply chain of goods to ensure Malaysians have enough food supply over a prolonged period of time. It is crucial for all Malaysians, especially the most vulnerable like the poor, sick or elderly.

There are already signs that the MCO has affected food supply chains, for example with hundreds of tonnes of vegetables in Cameron Highlands being dumped because of movement restrictions and anecdotal reports of food manufacturing companies shutting down temporarily. These reports are inconsistent with the government’s assurances that food supplies will remain unaffected.

These have arisen as unintended consequences of government regulations. On March 19, the FAQs released by MITI stated that only companies manufacturing essential goods would be permitted to carry on their operations. Any essential goods companies wanting to continue operations during the MCO must reduce their number of employees by at least 50 per cent, alongside other hygiene requirements to avoid spreading the Covid-19 virus.

Two days later, another statement issued by MITI confirmed that logistics and transport services providers are only permitted to deliver essential goods (intended for domestic consumption and not for export) produced by these approved manufacturing companies. And on March 23, it was made known that companies engaged in the food supply chain (and e-commerce and personal care businesses) would need to obtain certification from the Ministry of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs before being allowed to operate.

These requirements are confusing and excessively bureaucratic during a time of national crisis as they could create unnecessary hurdles in the supply chain of goods and services. The task force announced on March 24 consisting of MITI, the Ministry of Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs and the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industries is a welcome move. The task force’s first job should be to coordinate and then relax these measures before they impact the food supply chain, which is a matter of basic survival for Malaysians during the Covid-19 crisis.

There are several reasons. First, numerous companies are struggling to comprehend the requirements and obtain the necessary approvals to continue operations. It is understood from personal reports that the MITI portal did not function on Saturday, March 21, leaving approvals pending. E-mails and messages were also left unanswered. The requirements from different ministries overlap and there is poor communication from the government. There must be a better way for companies to get the clarity they seek during the MCO.

That clarity is important for a second reason, as the supply chain is deeply integrated in a way that makes it difficult to distinguish between “essential” and “non-essential”. For instance, the supply of chickens is listed as an essential good. However, there are small firms that produce screws that are used to put together chicken incubators ― would these be listed as essential goods, factories of which would then be given permission to continue operations? As the MCO progresses, the government must increasingly disentangle the causalities and connections.

This is just one example of many others in maintaining the food supply chain. Are these local manufacturers expected to justify their relevance to the “essential goods” industries to the government during this time? On what grounds would a civil servant be able to make a judgment call, especially now that even government operations are operating at below full capacity given the MCO? Food factories require the entire supply chain to function, and cannot operate if raw materials, chemicals for cleaning and waste-water treatment plants stop operating.

Finally, many of the Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) food producers may not be able to continue operating in the mid- to long-term on 50 per cent staffing. As it is, several supermarkets as well as food caterers have either ceased operations, or are facing shortages in their food supply.

A fluid situation with a paucity of relevant and updated information means that it is possible that the food supply chain will be broken in the coming days. Moving forward, government announcements need to be clear and consistent to avoid confusion and to allow the provision of essential medical goods to reach their required destinations to better address the growing Covid-19 crisis.

Specifically, we recommend the following seven steps be urgently taken, with appropriate consultation with food, environmental and public health specialists from the Health Ministry (MOH).

1. All food producers must remain open

The primary concern is the health and safety of workers. Food producers should remain open by providing them with easy to understand health regulations, which includes emphasis on regularly washing hands, and using Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). They need to be made aware of their essential role in keeping Malaysians stable and fed. Self-isolation conditions would be expected for anyone who falls sick, while keeping abreast of Malaysian government and WHO regulations. The standards departments of all food producers must observe all MOH guidelines for routine hygiene and Covid-19 precautions.

2. All transport lines should not be hindered

Local suppliers are currently unable to move produce to supermarkets or small grocery stores because transport is either unavailable or subject to police roadblocks. The police must allow food supply trucks through. A list of vehicles that are allowed to pass can be provided to the police. An online system of approvals can be quickly deployed. Spare IT capacity can be obtained by MDEC or MaGIC if necessary.

3. Steady flow of raw materials to food factories and producers

Individuals involved in the production and transportation of raw materials should be considered as essential workers. Food production should be as efficient as possible so that producers are not over-burdened. As above, additional health regulations and hand hygiene procedures should be introduced including the use of PPEs or gloves and masks. As international suppliers face delays due to their own restricted movement, food factories and producers need to establish a better relationship with local suppliers. The number and range of local suppliers must be diversified. Eligible employees should work from home.

4. Establish open dialogue between government and food suppliers

There should be open and transparent information sharing between the government and food suppliers. Rural areas can feel particularly remote and cut-off, and so farmer and fisheries cooperatives can also make real-time suggestions based on their issues. Suppliers should have a platform to inform government of their needs, which must be immediately addressed if it interferes with food production. Food suppliers such as supermarket chains, main grocers and small shops should collaborate to deliver private solutions to relieve pressure on government and encourage more efficient distribution.

5. Start a nationwide recruitment drive for people to join the local food workforce

The government can incentivise people to join the local food workforce by encouraging or providing tax incentives for companies to offer a decent wage and/or allowing students to work. If there is temporary under-employment in the tourism and hospitality industry, it can be channelled into the food industry.

6. Rely on smallholders to bolster the supply chain

Smallholders of plantations are an additional resource, and they have the added flexibility of making decisions quickly without the hierarchy of the larger agricultural companies. Smallholders should be considered an asset during this crisis. However, the government must make the process easier for smallholders, as they do not have the capacity to negotiate the cumbersome bureaucracy, paperwork or networking that large companies are more equipped to do.

7. Government to collaborate with external experts

The machinery of government is shifting towards implementation, leading to a relative lack of focus on policies, strategy-setting and predicting unintended consequences of policies. Therefore, the government should collaborate and engage food security experts in think-tanks, academia and among citizens. This network can provide surge analytical capabilities and help the government identify and manage blind spots.

We understand that public policies and implementation at this unprecedented crisis require steep trade-offs. However, we caution against unnecessary regulation that will impose a greater threat to the nation. With an MCO extension, we must avoid a food crisis on top of a health and an economic crisis. While stopping the spread of Covid-19 is the highest priority, the government must balance the risk of Covid-19 and the risk of hunger, rationing or impaired nutrition.  We look forward to the task force’s announcements on ensuring the food supply chain remains unbroken throughout the MCO period.

Tricia Yeoh (Fellow, IDEAS)
Rowena Razak (University of Oxford)
Altaf Deviyati (Director of Operations, IMAN Research)
Dr Khor Swee Kheng (University of Oxford)

𝑲𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒏𝒆𝒕 𝑹𝒂𝒌𝒚𝒂𝒕
Relevant Ministries: International Trade and Industry, Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs, Agriculture and Food Industries, Home
𝙋𝙧𝙤𝙟𝙚𝙠 𝙒𝙖𝙬𝙖𝙨𝙖𝙣 𝙍𝙖𝙠𝙮𝙖𝙩 (𝙋𝙊𝙒𝙍)
www.rakyat.org
25 March 2020

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Live Covid-19 Resources Page

Posted on March 22, 2020 by Tricia

Hi!

I will be updating a live page on Covid-19 resources on my website. Feel free to make use of it and share the documents and links. There is too much information floating around that I hope this will be useful for anyone trying to make sense of the unfolding situation, or researching the issue.

Access the page here.

Posted in Civil Society, Health, Public Administration | Leave a comment

Under the Movement Control Order, which level of government has the authority to decide what?

Posted on March 21, 2020 by Tricia

As at 4.24pm, Saturday 21 March 2020.

Many unverified messages are being forwarded. This short piece is to clarify what can and cannot be regulated and by which authority under the Movement Control Order that will last between 18 and 31 March 2020.

Operating hours of businesses and markets

First, regarding operating hours of businesses and markets. Under normal circumstances, there can be different rules made within different states. Local governments are the ones with the authority to make regulation for operating hours of markets, empowered by the Local Government Act 1976. By convention they also assume the authority of regulating operating hours of all businesses that fall under their domain, although it is unclear which legislation provides them with this authority. This is why different state governments are the ones issuing such regulations, because local governments come under state jurisdiction as listed in the Ninth Schedule of the Federal Constitution 1957. For example, the Malacca state government has determined that all eateries are to close between 7pm and 7am (except for drive-throughs).

However, in Pahang the notice was issued by the Chief Police Officer (CPO) of Pahang, not the state government. The police is acting on their powers under the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases Act 1988 and the accompanying gazetted Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases (Measures within the Infected Local Areas) Regulations 2020, which permits the police to assist in the control of such diseases. These regulations are what gives the Movement Control Order (MCO) its legal legitimacy, in effect from 18 to 31 March 2020.

Different guidelines in different states?

Can there be different guidelines from state to state? Again, under normal circumstances, this is perfectly fine. But because we are now operating under the MCO, as long as any of the local government guidelines are inconsistent with the MCO, the federal MCO will prevail. This is because ‘public health’ comes under the Concurrent List in the Federal Constitution, meaning that both federal and state governments have the authority over the prevention of diseases. And Article 81 of the Constitution says that state government authority should be exercised not to impede upon the federal government’s authority.

For example, the Ministry of Housing and Local Government has released a set of FAQs regarding the operations of the markets under the Movement Control Order (MCO). If the state or local governments’ regulations on markets are inconsistent with the federal government’s, the latter will override the former.

Regulation of vehicles

Finally, there are also messages sent regarding the requirement for only one passenger at a time within a vehicle. Senior Minister Datuk Fadillah Yusof said on 21 March 2020 that only one person can represent the family to go out and run essential errands. Section 31(2)(b) of the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases Act 1988 permits regulations on the “movement of any vehicle… to prevent the outbreak of infectious diseases.”

Because police comes under the “Federal list” of the Federal Constitution, they have the authority to regulate and monitor all vehicles as authorised officers throughout the country. This is police jurisdiction, and state or local governments cannot override the police in their actions.

Different police controls in different states?

Can the police impose different rules in different places? This depends on the definition of “infected area” under the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases Act 1988. The Attorney General’s Chambers had gazetted all states and three federal territories as infected area under the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases (Declaration of Infected Local Areas) Order 2020, but this applies only between 18 and 31 March 2020. If in the future, the area that is “infected” changes, it is possible that different rules can then be imposed in different states. However, this is subject entirely to the discretion of the federal government.  

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The political economy that Perikatan Nasional inherits – and will have to tackle

Posted on March 9, 2020 by Tricia

This article was first published on New Mandala on 6 March 2020 here.

As the dust settles on the political machinations from the top that threw Malaysia into unchartered territory – this was the first time since 1969 that the country had no sitting government for close to a week – it is useful to evaluate the political economy that the new Perikatan Nasional government inherits and will have to tackle. Perikatan Nasional takes over this week from the short-lived Pakatan Harapan, which survived for less than two years at the federal government after the latter’s historic defeat of single dominant party Barisan Nasional in 2018. Perikatan Nasional is a new coalition bringing Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (PPBM, the party that has since left Pakatan Harapan) together with former rivals United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) and the Islamic party PAS. How it handles the country’s already weak economy will determine its own future political stability.

Inheriting an economy of ethnic fault lines

In multiple post-2018 forums discussing the implications of what was then termed as “New Malaysia” one common theme stood out; the country is made up of ‘multiple Malaysias’. What urban middle-class voters failed to grasp was that because different people voted for the Pakatan Harapan for entirely different reasons, their idea of a modern, liberal and open political economy was not necessarily matched with that of their fellow counterparts in the rest of the country. And it is here that the ethnic fault lines that divide the country became even more apparent.

The Merdeka Center for Opinion Research polls post-May 2018 confirm this disparity, where perception towards Pakatan Harapan was consistently higher among non-Malays and lower among Malays. Its popular support fell to an all-time low of 35% in October 2019. Then-opposition parties UMNO and PAS fuelled a narrative that the Pakatan Harapan government was anti-Malay because it was dominated by the Chinese-majority Democratic Action Party (DAP) in its coalition, and insinuated that the government was therefore implementing policies that were unfriendly to low-income Malay households.

Such a perception was in part contributed to by actual policies approved by the Pakatan Harapan government. In its first national budget, dealing with the ramifications of the US-China Trade War and a growing fiscal deficit, in spite of a large dividend from national oil company Petronas, the government decided to halve subsidies to fishermen and farmers. Having abolished the Goods and Services Tax (GST) that it famously campaigned against in 2018, it found itself forced to trim down public spending at the expense of existing social welfare programmes.

Announcements of the civil service being reduced in size, a smoking ban in eateries, cash aid reductions and possibly worse, the appointment of non-Malays into key positions like the Minister of Finance and Attorney-General also contributed to the impression of Malays being undermined. Mega projects like the renewed East Coast Rail Link (ECRL) and Bandar Malaysia in the heart of Kuala Lumpur were renegotiated to plug the fiscal gap. But these came tied with business dealings and financial investments from China, a relationship that many view suspiciously as disadvantageous to Malaysia especially in terms of job opportunities for locals.

Pakatan Harapan’s attempts, but too little too late

To its credit, the Pakatan Harapan government recognised the need to address the lowest-income communities, where the bottom 40% of Malaysians earn less than USD916 a month. Most of these are not saving enough money for the future, if at all. Pakatan Harapan launched a Shared Prosperity Vision 2030 that had some of the right language needed to address the complaints of the rising cost of living, but it was shallow on actual policy. In its 2020 budget, it unveiled a series of programmes targeting those struggling to make ends meet, including affordable housing projects, restoring selected subsidies and targeted cash handouts.

But there may not have been enough time for these programmes to be rolled out sufficiently, and by the Tanjung Piai by-election in November 2019 in Johor, traditionally an UMNO stronghold, voter sentiment against Pakatan Harapan was strong enough that Barisan Nasional won with 65.6% of the vote. This galvanised resolve from UMNO and PAS, then in coalition under the Muafakat Nasional banner, and perhaps more crucially also put pressure on PPBM to implement more pro-Malay socio-economic policies.

The Covid-19 outbreak in January and February this year contributed to an already struggling economy, with retail and food and beverage businesses hit particularly badly as people were encouraged to stay home and avoid crowds. While the Pakatan Harapan government responded by drafting the Economic Stimulus Package 2020 that would roll out tax and cash incentives (for instance, one-off payments to taxi drivers, tourist bus drivers, tourist guides and registered trishaw drivers), it was yet another ‘too little, too late’ programme. Fighting against time while the political crisis was brewing within the Pakatan Harapan coalition, the government collapsed before it had the chance to announce the package and reap the full benefits from such populist measures. Indeed, Mahathir Mohamed went ahead with the announcement as interim Prime Minister on 27 February 2020, the positive impact of which Muhyiddin Yassin is now fortunate enough to enjoy.

Managing the race-based political economy

In his maiden speech as Prime Minister on 2 March, Muhyiddin already made overtures as to the approach he will have, by explicit mention and recognition of what people need: “money to buy daily essentials, children’s books and school material, paying water and electricity bills and home rental, housing and car loans, and other needs for the family.”

The bottom 40 percent – and even the middle 20 percent – of Malaysian society spend the bulk of their disposable income on the essentials that he listed, and ultimately want a “stable, peaceful and prosperous” country. These were words used by the Barisan Nasional government during campaigns, which Muhyiddin knows will send the right signal to the electorate: I will fill your pockets and you will live better lives. Sure enough, results from a YouGov survey report that 59% of low-income communities in Malaysia support the formation of the Perikatan Nasional government. This is compared with 19% of the high-income communities supporting PN.

Apart from the populist programmes that will likely increase in the form of handouts and more affirmative action policies for the Malay majority, the patronage system long practised by UMNO – and which we saw emerging in the Pakatan Harapan government, particularly in PPBM and to a certain extent, PKR – will surely return.

How does this affect the lowest-income communities, especially in rural parts of the country? It is in the kampung (village) areas that communities are an essential part of life. UMNO had incumbency advantages of having set in place a smooth, well-functioning system where members of the community would depend largely on local warlords for anything and everything, from wedding expenses to odd-job hires, from repairs for flood-damaged roofing to building youth-centred community halls.

During its 50 years in power, when UMNO delivered economic benefits to constituents it claimed credit entirely based on race. By politicizing race, it ensured its own survival as the Malay party that could, and would, provide. This made it difficult for Pakatan Harapan to detach the communities’ dependency, both real and imagined, on UMNO and its local Malay leader representatives. Worse, the communities felt insecure, thinking that these aid packages disbursed through entrenched patronage networks would disappear under Pakatan Harapan. And although an argument can be made that the upper-class urban Malays do not depend as much on these handouts as their relatives in the kampungs do, modern patron-client networks are still an important lifeline for those within the struggling urban and semi-urban poor.

Although partly regulated by its new coalition partners, UMNO will again have unparalleled access to the public resources it had previously used to oil the patronage machinery it did so successfully when in federal government. This will likely unfold in the same manner: the distribution of positions in government-linked companies (GLCs) and scores of other entities, contracts to friendly and supportive companies and jobs in the hundreds of politically-linked companies and those controlled by ministries and GLCs.

Recall that Pakatan Harapan’s earlier clarion calls was to uphold the rights of all Malaysians regardless of race or religion. Pakatan Harapan was later forced to come to terms with the reality of Malaysia’s political economy and in the middle of their short-lived term began to use the same language as UMNO, falling back to tried and tested race-based language and policies. The Shared Prosperity Vision 2030 document emphasizes that bumiputera outcomes (Malays and other indigenous groups) need to be given priority and is systematically embedded in every strategic thrust and enabler. Decoupling race from economic benefit would have been a solution, but one that Perikatan Nasional is unlikely to implement given its ethnic makeup.

“Stable, peaceful and prosperous”

And so, with increased in-fighting within the coalition up to its demise, Malaysians observed an increasingly unstable and weak government. This was made worse by the negative effects of Covid-19 and the trauma of uncertainty over the week in which there was no government in place. Lower down the food chain, the collective effect of this was likely that voters just wanted to carry on making a living, which they may have opined requires a stable political environment.

Here is where the new Perikatan Nasional government may actually thrive. In providing the age-old set of policies, patronage and programmes, it more importantly provides a sense of stability that the Malay majority expect and appreciate. The scale of grand corruption that Najib Razak was revealed to have undertaken was the last straw for many voters in the last general election. But once that element was removed, it is possible that voters will desire a return to what was before. Of course, this will come at a cost; the government will no longer be incentivised to adhere to any form of institutional reforms. This is a pity given that these reforms that would actually revive the slowing economy and provide assurance to investors that the Malaysian economy is open and operates on a level-playing field.

Muhyiddin’s first speech also committed to integrity and good governance, abolishing corruption and improving enforcement. His challenge will be to do this whilst simultaneously maintaining the patronage system that has been perceived to function well for members, supporters and the wider community. Malaysia is already signatory to six regional free trade agreements (with the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), China, Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and India) and there will be increased international pressure to improve regulation in public procurement and State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs, the more internationally known reference for GLCs). The latter two are areas which are most well-used for patronage purposes, a common practice of single dominant parties the world over.

Perikatan Nasional can choose to stay with the safe policies that allowed Barisan Nasional to rule for over 50 years. The question is whether internal and external pressures will eventually force them – or any government in power – to reform for long-term sustainability, or to carry on with more conservative social and economic measures that it believes will secure votes. More worryingly, will there be a return to authoritarian ways of silencing civil liberties for the sake of providing a stable, peaceful and prosperous nation that can get on with life and earn its keep?

Muhyiddin Yassin has a plethora of challenges ahead. He is under pressure to legitimise his government through a first parliamentary sitting in May, and will struggle to manage the three coalition parties and their competing electoral interests, where each of them cater to the same Malay-majority electorate and will invariably fight for the same seats. If Muhyiddin Yassin survives and can keep Perikatan Nasional together, he will still have to tackle the complex dynamics of Malaysia’s political economy in the months and years to come.

Posted in Economics, Elections, Ethno-Religious Politics, Public Administration, Transparency and Good Governance | Leave a comment

Malaysia’s New Perikatan Nasional Government: A Return of Barisan Nasional Policies?

Posted on March 2, 2020 by Tricia

This article was first published on FORSEA on 2 March 2020 here and republished on Malaysiakini on 3 March 2020 here.

Malaysia’s Pakatan Harapan coalition will go down in history as the shortest-lived government in the country. Since its ‘stunning’ electoral victory in May 2018 in which the single-party dominant regime of Barisan Nasional was defeated for the first time at the federal government, the coalition had attempted to tackle difficult institutional reforms and reframe race-based politics despite its slowing popularity.

Hardly two years later, the government collapsed in February 2020 after then-Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed resigned amidst intra-coalition dispute over leadership transition. This prompted a week-long crisis, eventually resulting in the installation of a new government in its place: Perikatan Nasional, bringing together the old Barisan Nasional parties, chief of which being UMNO (whose top leaders are still embroiled in multiple corruption charges linked to the global 1MDB scandal), PPBM (a break-off party from UMNO), alongside the Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS). Whilst Mahathir Mohamed and Pakatan Harapan are expected to protest against the King’s choice of the new Prime Minister based on technical grounds – and in effect, his new government – it is likely that this decision will not be reversed.

This article therefore explores the immediate consequences of the new government under Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin’s leadership. Will Malaysia see a return of Barisan Nasional politics and public policies?

BN policies: The sequel

Muhyiddin Yassin,  spent most of his political career with BN and up to his removal in 2015 was Najib’s Deputy Prime Minister. Image: Wikipedia Commons

This is likely to be the case, given that the new government consists of parties that had formed the previously defeated Barisan Nasional. While PPBM had contested alongside Pakatan Harapan to topple Barisan Nasional in the 2018 election, they had done so primarily as a protest against then Prime Minister Najib Razak, not for ideological reasons. And although it is an apparent victory for PAS to be back within the federal government after it withdrew from Barisan Nasional in 1977, the nature of the BN-PAS relationship may be the more difficult to predict. After having been sworn enemies and in direct competition with the other for over 40 years since then, cobbling together a common policy platform will be a first challenge in tackling the country’s many problems.

First, the new Perikatan Nasional’s task would be to manage the country’s economic woes. Already struggling with a fiscal deficit and projected decline in revenue, the previous budget saw lower expenditure, making it difficult for low-income communities to feel any impact of government spending. The government may be forced to look into restoring the unpopular Goods and Services Tax (GST) to plug the country’s fiscal gap, which was abolished by Pakatan Harapan, then arguing that the GST was the cause of people’s rising cost of living.

Managing fragile race relations

Second, it is likely that Perikatan Nasional will further deepen existing institutional race-based policy. Post 1969 racial riots, race-based affirmative action’s primary objective to alleviate Malay poverty with the hope of creating more equal outcomes. Over the following 40 years, the policy had been used as a catch-all umbrella for Malay privileges, strengthened by the constitutional phrase “special position” of the Malays. Fears of non-Malay dominance, especially since the rise of Chinese-majority Democratic Action Party (DAP) within the Pakatan Harapan government, led to increased demands by the Malay-Muslim majority electorate to have a greater share of the economic pie.

Real or imagined, Perikatan Nasional will have to allay these fears, and will likely have to depend on increased economic handouts to appease this community. In doing so, it will be faced with the same disgruntlement from its non-Malay electorate that Barisan Nasional had previously countered. The complaint of a non-level playing field, a more closed and protected economy will also have ramifications on how international investors perceive Malaysia as a market. But settling domestic challenges might take priority over economic investment, although in reality the two are intrinsically linked.

Managing already fragile race relations will be another thing on a growing list of issues to tackle, related to how it chooses to manage its economic policy. With PAS in the fray, a representative of whom will likely helm the Religious Affairs portfolio, it is likely that there will be more conservative social and religious policies being put into place. PAS had also been the champion of implementing the hudud law within Kelantan, then the only state it controlled, and it remains to be seen if this proposal will be supported by its new coalition partners. Criminal law is a federal, not state matter, so PAS never really had the mandate to push for this at the federal level – until now.

And on those reforms …

Third and finally, it is unlikely that efforts towards the institutional reform measures the Pakatan Harapan had begun will follow through. While some measures will be difficult to reverse, such as the new parliamentary select committees instated for better oversight and governance, it is unclear if the new government will have the political will to execute the commitments of the National Anti-Corruption Plan, for instance. Several Bills that were due to be tabled in the upcoming March parliamentary sitting, such as the Independent Police Complaints and Misconduct Committee Bill for police reform and the Political Funding Bill for more transparent and accountable political financing procedures will likely be shelved. In short, the institutional reform agenda may likely be cold-storaged.

In short, the Perikatan Nasional may turn to its previous Barisan Nasional-style policies. Its leader Muhyiddin Yassin, after all, spent most of his political career with BN and up to his removal in 2015 was Najib’s Deputy Prime Minister. Known as a stable establishment figure, he may be most comfortable executing the staid, time-tested staple of policies that allowed Barisan to survive for more than 50 years since independence.

If the coalition is stable enough to weather through the next few years, bearing in mind that PAS may still be dissatisfied with being the minor partner especially when it has been used to controlling the two Eastern coast states of Kelantan and Terengganu on its own, then ensuring that the majority race is comfortable, while dishing out just enough goodies for the minority races to be kept satisfied may be the formula that works for Perikatan Nasional.

Will we see a return of Barisan Nasional policies? The short answer is probably yes, with an added element of social conservatism that they perceive to be the desire of the country’s Malay-Muslim electorate.

Tricia Yeoh
Tricia Yeoh is currently a fellow at the Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs (IDEAS), and PhD Candidate, School of Politics, History and International Relations, University of Nottingham Malaysia.

Posted in Corruption, Economics, Elections, Ethno-Religious Politics, General Politics | Leave a comment

The rise of Perikatan Nasional and Muhyiddin Yassin as 8th PM?: Events in the political turmoil of Malaysia from Wednesday 26 February 4pm to Saturday 29 February midnight

Posted on March 1, 2020 by Tricia

The last four days have seen political parties change sides faster than seaside weather. In what seems like the end of the almost week-long poker game, the Agong announced at 4.40pm on Saturday 29 February that Tan Sri Muhyiddin Yassin would be sworn in the following day Sunday 1 March as Malaysia’s 8th Prime Minister. How did we get here? This piece is to once again follow chronologically the events over the last few days, in succinct form, to ensure that when we go back in history we will ensure that we follow the facts of what transpired. Especially in a week where politicians and parties were making U-turns, sometimes several times in a day, it is hoped that this will help to distinguish fact from fiction, the latter of which can occur on account of poor human memory.  

Wednesday 26 February

We left off at 3pm on Wednesday afternoon 26 February, where all awaited a press conference by Mahathir Mohamed at 4.45pm. In this PC, he broke silence about the reasons he resigned as Prime Minister, apologized for the predicament he put the country in and essentially called for a unity government with no party. He also put it on record that he would not be willing to work with Umno as a party, but that he would work with individuals who leave Umno and join other parties.

In a subsequent press conference by Anwar Ibrahim, he announced, alongside other Pakatan Harapan MPs from PKR, DAP and Amanah, that they would back him as Prime Minister.

Thursday 27 February

On Thursday 27 February, it was announced at 9.58am that the Istana would be summoning Mahathir at 11am.

At 10.30am, it was announced by Tuan Ibrahim Tuan Man from PAS that all UMNO and PAS MPs had signed statutory declarations for Muhyiddin Yasin as Prime Minister. However, this was later refuted by another PAS member Takiyuddin Hassan. It is unclear whether PAS supported Muhyiddin, another candidate, or did not put down a name at all.

At 12.15pm, Mahathir was seen leaving from the Istana after an hour’s meeting. There were also rumours of Anwar Ibrahim being summoned to the Istana. It was around this time that the atmosphere outside the Istana was building up to be carnival-like, with numerous companies taking the opportunity to give out goodies for branding purposes. One such company even led an exercise routine on the grassy area. I put in my notes: “Mild-mannered democratic consolidation.”

At 12.18pm, The Star reported that the Agong would meet with the Rulers in a Rulers Council meeting the following day, on 28 February.

At 12.30pm, Jonathan Yasin, one of the 11 MPs that had originally been listed together with Azmin Ali and Zuraida Kamaruddin as leaving PKR said that he is still a PKR member. At 1.48pm, however, he deleted that denial and replaced it with another post saying that any party matters would be discussed with the party.

At 1.09pm, Mahathir said that he accepted the Bersatu Chairmanship again. But another news portal states that he would be returning as Advisor, and not the Chair. This is an important point that would determine how things unfolded two days later. Although seemingly perfunctory, the distinction between “Chair” and any other position would cost him the ability to manage and make decisions for and on behalf of the party.

As for the states, it was reported at 12.05pm that there would be no change in the Kedah state government, in which Bersatu would be working with Pakatan Harapan. Interestingly, immediately following that at 2.19pm, the Johor palace confirmed that the Johor state government had now changed to a new government consisting of Bersatu and Barisan Nasional. This meant that there would be two different coalitions within two different states, making for a very strange situation where Bersatu would be working with PH in Kedah, but BN in Johor. This was formed after the Sultan interviewed 54 out of 56 assemblypersons and found there was a simple majority in Bersatu and BN’s favour.

At 2.47pm, it was reported that Muhyiddin was meeting Mahathir. Muhyiddin was sighted entering the PMO at 2.20pm and leaving after 3pm.

At 5pm, Mahathir launched a stimulus package as interim Prime Minister, which had been prepared prior to the collapse of the PH government. The Economic Stimulus Package 2020 is meant to address economic woes of the country following the Covid-19 situation. At the press conference following this launch, he said that after meeting with the 222 MPs over two days, there was no PM candidate with a clear majority, so he quoted the Agong as saying that the right forum to decide that would be at the Dewan Rakyat. Mahathir said that “So on March 2, a Parliament session will be called to determine who has the majority of support”. If the Dewan Rakyat failed to determine who should be PM, a snap election would be called.

At 11.21pm, PH issued a statement saying it was inappropriate for Mahathir to announce that Parliament would be convened, stating that they would prefer to observe the authority of the Agong.

Friday 28 February

The morning of Friday was relatively quiet and news-free. At 1.19pm, it was reported that the Speaker said there would be no special Parliamentary sitting according to procedures, where this could only take place after a royal decree from the Agong.

Pakatan Harapan also issued a statement saying that it would be better to wait for the Agong to announce.

At 4pm, the Istana issued a statement that no one has majority to be the new Prime Minister, and hence the Agong would meet with party leaders who would then nominate the PM candidate.

At 4.30pm, Bersatu said that all 36 MPs support Muhyiddin Yasin for PM. Bersatu previously had 26 MPs, so at the time of this statement I assumed that the additional 10 MPs were the group led by Azmin Ali, having left PKR and now joined Bersatu. Recall that the list originally included 11 people, but Jonathan Yasin announced he was remaining in PKR, leaving Azmin’s 10.

At 6.02pm, Sabah’s Warisan and UPKO, and Sarawak’s GPS were reported to back Muhyiddin as PM as well.

By the end of this day, it seemed likely that Bersatu, together with its new partners UMNO and other BN members MCA and MIC, and PAS, would be forming the new government under its Perikatan Nasional coalition, with Muhyiddin Yasin as its Prime Minister. That night, Pakatan Harapan would (as we would learn the following day) be meeting late into the night and into the wee hours of the morning, with Mahathir once again, apparently brokered by his daughter Marina Mahathir.

Saturday 29 February

If reports are true, then Pakatan Harapan had met with Mahathir till early Saturday morning, to issue a statement later that morning.

At 8.45am, Syed Saddiq of Bersatu Youth reiterated that he would not work with UMNO, whom he considered to be corrupt.

At 9.30am, Mahathir and PH both issued statements. Mahathir said that after having met with the PH leaders in the morning, he now had the numbers to be Prime Minister, and PH confirming that they would now back Mahathir.

At the same time, the Istana summoned political party leaders to meet with the Agong, and they were expected to meet at 10.30am.

At 12pm, Bersatu issued a statement signed by Muhyiddin Yasin saying that Mahathir had resigned his Chair position on 24 Feb, stating that according to its constitution if the Chair resigns, the President becomes its new chair. As such, Muhyiddin is the new Acting Chair. Around this time, photos were circulating on WhatsApp of Maszlee Malik of Bersatu in a home with Muhyiddin, Hadi Awang and Zahid Hamidi and several others.

In what showed an obvious split in the party, Bersatu issued a statement at 12.50pm that directly contradicted the previous statement. Signed by its Secretary General Marzuki Yahya, the statement said that Mahathir was still the Chair of Bersatu, and as such was the only one who could lead the party, citing parts of the party constitution. It seemed like the party was also facing its own constitutional crisis.

At 1.50pm, Anwar Ibrahim left the Istana and said that he represented the PH coalition and had expressed support for Mahathir as Prime Minister to the Agong.  Anwar said that he supported Mahathir as PM. He said that he was touched for the support for him, but chose to look at the national interest over personal agenda.

From 3pm onwards, there was a series of reports showing that Mahathir had support of several new MPs. This included Richard Riot (3.40pm) who was reported as leaving SUPP to join PKR. At 3.55pm: Warisan and UPKO of Sabah announced their support for Tun Mahathir separately. At 4.30pm, Maszlee issued a long two-page statement stating he was supporting Mahathir.

Despite renewed avowals of support for Mahathir, things took a turn when the Agong made an official announcement at 4.40pm that Muhyiddin Yasin would be the 8th Prime Minister, to be sworn in on the following day. Wan Saiful Wan Jan from Bersatu issued a statement hoping that this would mark the end of the political impasse over the past week. Berita Harian also reported the same news at 5.40pm.

At this point, it was uncertain how Muhyiddin and the new Perikatan Nasional were able to obtain the necessary number of MPs to form government. GPS of Sarawak had not yet given (at least recently) any indication of where its support would lean. Sure enough, at 6pm, a video circulating on WhatsApp showed that Muhyiddin thanked GPS, amongst others, for its support. Later, at 8.36pm, GPS officially said that they would support Muhyiddin as Prime Minister but clarified that while it supported Perikatan Nasional, it was not one of its member component parties.

At 7.40pm, Maszlee says that he supported Muhyiddin as the Prime Minister, but it is not clear whether this meant he was still part of Bersatu or whether he had left. In any case, a Facebook post at 8pm by Mukhriz Mahathir listed the six MPs supporting Mahathir as PM, and the list included Maszlee. The six he listed were 1) Mukhriz Mahathir – Jerlun 2) Ir Amiruddin Hamzah – Kubang Pasu 3) Syed Saddiq Abd Rahman – Muar 4) Dr Maszlee Malik – Simpang Renggam 5) Eddin Syazlee Shith – Kuala Pilah 6) Mahathir Mohamad – Langkawi.

In the meantime, civil society called for a gathering at Dataran Merdeka at 8.30pm, asking those who were “outraged by the betrayal” to come together. Anecdotal reports put the crowd size as almost double of the numbers that showed up at the first public gathering several nights before.

In yet another twist in a long series of twists and turns, PKR announced that Baru Bian who was amongst the “Azmin 10” MPs had now signed a new statutory declaration to go with Pakatan Harapan. As a result, Fahmi Fadzil of PKR claimed that PKR had 114 MPs in total, surpassing the 112 required to form government.

Pakatan Harapan Presidential Council met at 9pm, and at close to 11pm Mahathir Mohamed issued a statement containing the full list of MPs who were in support of Mahathir as Prime Minister. This included the six Bersatu MPs as previously mentioned, 40 from PKR, 10 from Amanah, 9 from Warisan, 1 from UPKO, 42 from DAP, 2 independents (including Bukit Gantang’s Syed Abu Hussin Hafiz Syed Abdul Fasal and Selangau’s Baru Bian), GPS (Jeffrey Kitingan) and one other independent from Sri Aman (Masir Kijat).

However, immediately after this statement was issued, both the Bukit Gantang MP and Sri Aman MP denied that they supported Mahathir and said they supported Muhyiddin. PH’s original list of 114 was therefore down by two, at 112 MPs. However, the list apparently mistakenly did not include PKR’s Hulu Selangor June Leow, so the list was updated at 11.49pm. This brings PH’s number to exactly 113 MPs, one more than needed to form government.

Muhyiddin is supposed to be sworn in tomorrow at 10.30am (Sunday 1 March 2020). In Mahathir’s statement, he says that he has sent a letter to the Agong to clarify the situation and hopes that the Agong will receive his letter and his explanation.

Evidently, Pakatan Harapan is hopeful that the Agong will take this list into consideration. However, it is unclear if the Agong will accept the letter after having already made the earlier announcement of Muhyiddin being appointed as the 8th PM. If he does not accept Mahathir’s late night case, then procedurally what PH can next do is wait for the parliamentary sitting on 9th March to call for a vote of no-confidence in Muhyiddin Yassin, in which case if PH has the numbers then they would win such a vote – and then nominate and vote for whoever they hope to be the 9th Prime Minister. However, a week is much too long in politics and it is obvious why the late intervention is the option that PH much prefers.

Constitutionally, it is up to the Agong’s discretion on whom he believes to command the majority of the House. Let’s see what unfolds tomorrow morning.

Update on the next morning, Sunday 1 March

As announced, Tan Sri Muhyiddin Yassin was sworn in as Malaysia’s 8th Prime Minister at the Istana at 10.30am.

Pakatan Harapan’s latest tally as clarified in a press statement is 112 MPs.

As stated above, one recourse for PH is to wait for the upcoming parliamentary sitting at which PH may display its vote of no confidence in the current PM. Until then, it is business as usual for the rest of us. PH was a short-lived government for less than two years, and we will now have the return of BN parties + Bersatu + PAS. I will be uploading some more analytical pieces in the days to come. Thanks for watching this space.

Posted in Elections, General Politics, Public Administration | 1 Comment

Mahathir vs Anwar, the day after the collapse of PH: political developments from 4pm 25 Feb to 3pm 26 Feb 2020

Posted on February 26, 2020 by Tricia

As it stands today, the Agong is still in the middle of meeting with all 222 MPs to ascertain who they will support as PM. Until the process is complete, all we have is speculation. But back to the timeline.

Tuesday, 25 February

Just before 4pm, GPS in Sarawak issued a statement saying they would fully support Mahathir as Prime Minister. With their support, it seemed at that point that all parties in Malaysia had indicated they wanted Mahathir as PM.

This is when, just before 5pm, Wan Saiful Wan Jan of Bersatu proposed that a unity government be formed. In such a situation, a unity government would comprise all parties in support of the PM, and the PM would have the prerogative to select Cabinet members across the political divide. This would be unprecedented – as many possible options are for the country at this point given the entire situation is unprecedented in our history – but the unity government proposal was short-lived.

At about 8pm, PAS and UMNO announced that they were against the unity government proposal, saying they would not want to be in coalition with DAP. They hence retracted their support for Mahathir for PM. Recall that they had been to the Istana just two days before on the understanding that the new coalition would be called Perikatan Nasional (not Pakatan Nasional as some had previously understood), with a reported 130 statutory declarations given to the Agong.

At 9.22pm, it was reported that the PH Presidential Council that was meeting at the PKR headquarters that evening had met a consensus, but that it would not be revealed until the following day (Wednesday). This was announced by Amanah deputy president Salahuddin Ayob. Khalid Samad said that they would not be asking for fresh polls as they already had a clear majority.

Based on some basic calculations, with GPS’ 18 MPs, this would actually mean more than just a simple majority for PH and friends in government, including DAP’s 42, PKR’s 39, Amanah’s 11, Warisan and Upko’s 10, and the 5 who exited from Bersatu alongside Mahathir. With 125 (at least from this count), this would be more than the 112 required.

At 11pm, Syed Saddiq announced that the Bersatu Youth wing would not work with UMNO, given their top leadership was still being charged on investigations of corruption including Zahid Hamidi.

And a bit on the states: in the evening at 7pm, the Johor BN chief announced that they would be forming a new state government with 5 crossover state assemblypersons from PKR, to the UMNO-PAS coalition. This would bring the total to 33 seats out of 56, in which only 29 is required to form a simple majority. If true, then PH would have lost 4 states including Perak, Kedah, Malacca and Johor, left only with Selangor, Penang, Negeri Sembilan, and two PH-friendly states Sarawak (under GPS leadership) and Sabah (under Warisan leadership). If so, then UMNO+PAS+Bersatu would gain three states, controlling the majority in the states of Perak, Malacca, Kedah, Johor, Kelantan, Terengganu and Perlis. This coalition would gain overall, increasing their state count (compared to the previous UMNO + PAS count) by three, and PH hence also losing three states in total.

In short, this was the day in which the unity government was proposed, then quashed almost immediately, and no further sign of the new government formation yet. Mahathir was photographed being back at his desk at work at the PMO.

Wednesday, 26 February

The day started with a slight slowing of the news compared to the previous few days.

At 7am, the Malaysian Insight reported that Bersatu was mulling a return to PH, following UMNO and PAS’ calling for fresh polls, which had thrown them into disarray.

At 10am, photos circulated on Whatsapp of Anwar Ibrahim and Wan Azizah celebrating their 40th wedding anniversary, smiles all around.

It is understood that the Agong had met with a total of 83 MPs on Tuesday the day before, and would be meeting with the remaining 139 MPs on Wednesday (today) starting with Bersatu, PKR, Amanah, Azmin’s camp, Sabah, DAP and other remaining MPs. In the meantime, the Malacca state exco was meeting, business as usual in the morning.

At noon, Bersatu issued a statement saying again that they would be supporting Mahathir as Prime Minister.  

At 12.48pm, photos of PKR MPs standing atop an open-top bus were circulated, with them waving and smiling on their way to the Istana.

At 1pm, Azmin Ali’s independent bloc issued a statement reiterating their support for Mahathir as Prime Minister. In the statement, they called for a “national reconciliation” as this would allow for a stable Malaysia in tackling the many challenges ahead.

In the meantime, the Istana which has been handling its media relations excellently, with already servings of KFC and McDonald’s the day before, prepared “ikan patin tempoyak” for the media waiting outside the Istana. Whoever is handling their media relations must be given a pat on the back. Well done to the Istana.

An anonymous source was quoted in FMT as saying that Azmin’s bloc would be joining Bersatu, including Santhara Kumar who would be joining as an associate member.

At 1.59pm, the Malaysian Insight reported that the PH decision was to support Anwar Ibrahim as Prime Minister. In such a scenario, PH would only have 92 MP seats, with DAP’s 42, PKR’s 39 and Amanah’s 11. The Straits Times also confirmed this. The most vocal among PH leadership seems to be Amanah’s Khalid Samad, who is asking Mahathir to do the right thing by giving Anwar Ibrahim the 8th Prime Ministerial position as committed to.

This is a gamble by PH. Calling for a minority government led by Anwar Ibrahim is itself unprecedented. And may cause the other parties to rally around the original plan by Azmin Ali, which was for Mahathir to be PM. In such a scenario, it would be PH’s 92 MPs versus however many MPs Azmin can cobble together under a “National Reconciliation” plan with a Mahathir PM, possibly even more if he can organise the parties he gathered at Sheraton, perhaps sans the unpalateable leaders that Mahathir was and is unwilling to work with (UMNO top leadership most of all). If so, this would see Bersatu + Azmin’s bloc + GPS + PAS + some UMNO forming a coalition and coming into power with a simple majority.

As at 3pm, Wednesday 26 February 2020, this is where it stands. What to expect in the hours to come: The result of the Agong having met all 222 MPs, and where Bersatu decides to go. Even if they want to join PH, will the PH parties accept them now? Whichever government comes into place will see a battering on all sides, a weakened coalition, with a more challenging time ahead to instate reforms or any sort of policy agenda.

Posted in Uncategorized | 1 Comment

Malaysia Post-PH Government, a documentation of political events from 21 to 24 Feb 2020

Posted on February 25, 2020 by Tricia

The movements of the political elite over the last few days have left Malaysians in confusion, not to mention the very real impact on economic and policy matters, and any semblance of reform initiatives. As of Monday 24 February 2020, RM43 billion has been wiped out from the KL Stock Exchange. Instead of a financial stimulus package due to be rolled out in the coming week, we are witness to a collapse of the short-lived Pakatan Harapan federal government, one year and seven and a half months since its ascension to power in May 2018 where dominant party BN was toppled for the first time in history.

This post is only to document the flurry of activities that took place between Friday 21 February and Monday 24 February 2020 in chronological order. A useful reference is this, this and this timeline. Analysis will come in due time.

As early as 14 February, a report by Zakiah Koya claimed that 138 MPs had already signed statutory declarations for Mahathir Mohamed to stay the full term in government. The report quotes a source saying that he was not involved in the obtaining of SD signatures. The numbers supposedly represented 18 from PAS, 26 from PKR, 13 from UMNO (out of its 39), and all 26 MPs from Bersatu.

Friday, 21 February

The highly anticipated Pakatan Harapan Presidential Council meeting was held at 8pm at the Perdana Leadership Foundation in Putrajaya, which Mahathir chairs. The meeting, the venue of which usually rotates between parties, was attended as usual by the 6 party representatives of each of the four political parties in PH. Based on media reports’ representation of parties’ positions, Anwar Ibrahim and those within his circle would have called for a fixed date for the handover of Prime Minister position to him; Azmin Ali and his side would have called for Mahathir to go the full term.

At the end of the long more than three-hour meeting, the Presidential Council decided to let Mahathir Mohamed set his own date for a power transition. They announced that Mahathir would hand over the reigns of power to Anwar after the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit (APEC) in November 2020, which Malaysia is due to chair. No fixed date was set. Anwar said that he would not allow party members to criticise the decision, while Syed Saddiq of Bersatu denied allegations that the party threatened to leave the coalition if Mahathir was pressured to step down.

Sunday, 23 February

This can be termed as the day of ‘private party meetings’ ending in the Sheraton dinner party.

Bersatu held a meeting at 9am on Sunday, chaired by Mahathir, at which the party decided to leave the PH coalition. It was at this meeting, which lasted almost 4 hours until just before 3pm, that others have speculated that the message was being circulated, that Anwar Ibrahim was rumoured to be meeting the Agong on Monday at 2.30pm (a prior engagement) for the purpose of informing him of a new government that he would be forming, after having secured the sufficient numbers of parliamentary seats. It is unclear whether this really took place, and if did, whether this was the main factor leading to Bersatu’s decision to leave the coalition. Mahathir was scheduled to meet the Agong, but did not go to the Istana Negara.

At 10am, a “private event” meeting was attended by ministers and MPs loyal to Azmin Ali’s faction in PKR.

At 12.30pm, Sarawak Chief Minister Abang Openg left for Kuala Lumpur. At 2pm, Sabah Chief Minister Shafie Apdal left for Kuala Lumpur.

At 2.51pm, after leaving from the Bersatu meeting, Mahathir left for his house in Mines where leaders from GPS, Warisan and UMNO gathered.

At 3pm (or 4pm – the media accounts differ), UMNO held a special Supreme Council meeting at PWTC. Annuar Musa said that the purpose of the meeting was to give members an update on the political developments in the country. UMNO President Zahid Hamidi informed his colleagues at this meeting that he would be with other political leaders heading to the Istana Negara.

At 5.40pm, about 20 vehicles consisting of luxurious sedans and MPVs appeared at the palace precinct as members of the media gathered near Gate 1 and Gate 3. At 6.15pm, four more VIP cars entered the palace, three of which were fitted with Sarawak registered number plates.

The political leaders who reportedly met with the Agong at the Istana Negara included Azmin Ali, Bersatu president Muhyiddin Yasin, Umno president Zahid Hamidi, PAS president Hadi Awang, Gabungan Parti Sarawak chairman Abang Johari Openg, and Warisan president Shafie Apdal.

PKR assemblyman Chong Fat Full stated to the Malay Mail in the morning (published at 6.30pm) that a new coalition would likely be announced on Sunday, saying that it had been discussed for a long time already, and the new coalition would be named Perikatan Nasional, including several leaders from DAP, Amanah, GPS, UMNO and PAS. In the same article, he is quoted to say that Azmin and allies have no intention of leaving PKR and if sacked, they would join existing political parties or form a new party. He also said that Mahathir would be meeting the Agong at 6pm that day and that a press conference would be held at 8.30pm that evening. But this press conference was never held, where Mahathir’s press officers confirmed at 6.58pm that he was instead resting at home and there would be no PC that evening.

At 6.45pm, a religious prayer event (majlis zikir) was due to start at Anwar Ibrahim’s residence in Segambut. PKR MPs sighted there were Saifuddin Nasution, Nik Nazmi Nik Ahmad, Abdullah Sani, Fahmi Fadzil and Wong Chen. Penang Mufti Wan Salim delivered the sermon at the event.

At 7pm the same day, Azmin Ali met with Bersatu, UMNO and PAS members in the boardroom of the Sheraton Resort in Petaling Jaya, where leaders were sighted by the media from as early on as 1.30pm. Present at Sheraton included Umno’s Tengku Adnan Mansor, Annuar Musa, Zahid Hamidi, Hishamuddin Hussein, Syed Saddiq, Zahid Mat Arip, and Ismail Sabri Yaakob, PAS’ Hadi Awang, Takiyuddin Hassan, Tuan Ibrahim Tuan Man and Nik Mohamad Zawawi Salleh, Bersatu’s Mustapa Mohamed, Muhyiddin Yasin, Marzuki Yahya, Redzuan Yusof (Melaka Bersatu Chief) and Ahmad Faizal Azumu (Perak MB), MCA’s Wee Ka Siong, Wee Jeck Seng, Chong Sin Woon, and Nicole Wong, MIC’s Vigneswaran, and Azmin Ali with his allies including Zuraida Kamaruddin. Maria Chin Abdullah was also present in Sheraton but later defended herself, saying that she wanted to state her position of disagreeing with the formation of a backdoor government.

Here is where it gets muddled, because by this time several news portals were reporting on the numbers of MPs that the supposed new grand coalition would have. NST reported that the number of seats backing Mahathir as Prime Minister was 130, reached through a collective agreement involving five political parties including Bersatu, UMNO, PKR splinter faction, PAS and Amanah. Malay Mail reported the number as 131. Later at 9.54pm, an UMNO source was reported by the NST as saying that “we have 139” parliamentary seats, who also said that the Agong advised them to refer to the previous Perak case (in which a constitutional crisis led to a change in government in 2009).

At 8.05pm, the Agong had reportedly left the Palace.

At 10pm, Anwar Ibrahim confirmed that several Bersatu and PKR members had defected, via Facebook livestream. At the prayer event held at his residence, he confirmed that there were attempts by several quarters to topple the Pakatan Harapan government, calling it a betrayal by Bersatu and several members of PKR. At 10.23pm, it was reported that UMNO’s Annuar Musa said that it was “very likely” that the new coalition would be formed, and would be announced by Mahathir. When asked if Pakatan Harapan was over, Annuar said “I think so”.

At 10.10pm, PKR leaders aligned to Anwar start arriving at his residence, including Tan Yee Kew and Fuziah Salleh.

At 11.15pm, Anwar’s political secretary Farhash Wafa Salvador Rizal said that Anwar is in a meeting with DAP and Amanah party leaders.

A summary of the day’s events is that despite much speculation of the supposed new coalition government, no press conference was held at the end of the day. From what I understand from various sources, there was supposed to have been a press conference but because Mahathir eventually decided that he was unwilling to form a government with the top leadership of UMNO and PAS, this was a dead end. What I am trying to establish is whether or not, during the past several months of back and forth, Mahathir was indeed unaware that any new coalition government would have required UMNO and PAS MPs, given the minimum of 112 parliamentary seats needed to form government.

Monday, 24 February

Malaysiakini’s live reporting was excellent, here.

On Monday morning, sometime between 8.19am and 10am, Wan Azizah, Anwar Ibrahim and Lim Guan Eng went to Perdana Putra to meet with Mahathir Mohamed, but the latter was not there.

Between 11am and 1pm, DAP and PKR convened meetings at their respective headquarters.

At 12.15pm, Lim Guan Eng was seen leaving Dr Mahathir’s residence in Seri Kembangan, Selangor.

At 2.03pm, Saifuddin Nasution, at a press conference in the PKR HQ, announced the sacking of Datuk Seri Mohamed Azmin Ali and Zuraida Kamaruddin from PKR. This was, he said, due to “open betrayal by several players who hold key roles”.

At 2.12pm, Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (Bersatu) president Tan Sri Muhyiddin Yassin announces that the party has pulled out of Pakatan Harapan (PH). Note that this announcement was based on the Bersatu meeting held the day before (Sunday, 23 February). Muhyiddin in his statement also said that all assemblymen of Bersatu signed SDs supporting and placing trust in Mahathir as the Prime Minister of Malaysia.

At 2.20pm, Prime Minister’s Office, through a press statement, announces that Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad sent his letter of resignation as Prime Minister to Yang di-Pertuan Agong Al-Sultan Abdullah Ri’ayatuddin Al-Mustafa Billah Shah at 1pm today.

At 2.21pm, Mohamed Azmin and 10 other ex-PKR MPs announced they quit the party and the PH coalition to form an independent bloc in Parliament. The 11 include, apart from Azmin, Zuraida Kamaruddin, Saifuddin Abdullah, Mansor Othman, Kamaruddin Jaafar, Rashid Hasnon, Santhara Kumar, Baru Bian, Ali Biju, Willie Mongin and Jonathan Yasin. These consist of 4 ministers (Azmin, Zuraida, Saifuddin, Baru), while the latter four are from Sabah and Sarawak (Baru, Ali, Willie, Jonathan).

At 2.30pm, Anwar and Dr Wan Azizah arrives at Istana Negara for an audience with the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, which was already previously arranged for. They left at 3.15pm.

At 3.08pm, Dr Mahathir resigned as Bersatu chairman. Following this, it was reported at 4.27pm that several aides confirmed that Mahathir would also be resigning from Bersatu, and that other leaders including Maszlee Malik, Rina Harun, Syed Saddiq, Mukhriz Mahathir and Radzi Jidin and Mahathir’s media advisor Kadir Jasin would be leaving Bersatu. However, as at the end of Monday 24 February, no official announcement was made as to Mahathir (or his other colleagues as listed above) leaving Bersatu.

A press conference by civil society groups led by Bersih 2.0 and its allies was held at 4.30pm at Bersih’s premises, at which a statement was issued and a call for a dissolution of Parliament and fresh elections to be held to seek a fresh mandate from the rakyat.

At 4.44pm, in what was probably a most important revelation, Anwar Ibrahim said that Mahathir denied involvement in the suspected attempt to form a new government without PKR, DAP and Amanah. He said that Mahathir’s name was used by those within PKR and outside, as he did not want to work with those associated with the previous regime. This was reiterated by Lim Guan Eng in his statement, saying that Mahathir’s resignation was a sign of protest against the attempt to form a government with the opposition parties.

At 4.45pm, Dr Mahathir arrived at Istana Negara for an audience with Yang di-Pertuan Agong. (Also at the same time, the Istana gave the media a pleasant treat of KFC). Mahathir left the palace at 6.18pm after a 90 minute meeting.

At 4.55pm, AG Tommy Thomas said he would not be issuing a statement.

At 6.46pm, Inspector-General of Police Tan Sri Abdul Hamid Bador Tan Sri Abdul Hamid Bador urges the public not to make any speculation in relation to the country’s current political situation.

At 6.55pm, Malaysiakini reported live that all 42 DAP lawmakers had signed SDs stating their support for Mahathir as prime minister.

At 7.15pm, Chief Secretary to the Government Datuk Seri Mohd Zuki Ali in a statement announced that Yang di-Pertuan Agong has accepted Dr Mahathir’s resignation and consented to his appointment as interim Prime Minister.

At 7.25pm, Penang CM Chow Kon Yeow says that Penang is committed to PH and will continue to be administer the state government.

At 8.15pm, Bersatu convened an emergency meeting at its headquarters in Petaling Jaya. A group of 30 youths outside the HQ chant “Hidup Tun” as party leaders arrive for the meeting.

At 9.25pm, Chief Secretary to the Government, in a statement, announces that Yang di-Pertuan Agong has revoked the appointments of all Cabinet ministers, effective today.

At 9.30pm, BN and PAS top leaders met for dinner at PWTC. Amongst those meeting were Zahid Hamidi, Ismail Sabri, Najib Razak, Mahdzir Khalid, Tajuddin Abdul Rahman and Azeez Abdul Rahim.

At 9.40pm, Azmin Ali’s political secretary Hilman Idham was seen entering the Bersatu headquarters. Others there are Muhyiddin Yassin, Redzuan Yusof, Syed Saddiq Abdul Rahman, Rina Harun, Marzuki Yahya, Maszlee Malik, Rais Yatim, Wan Saiful Wan Jan, Rafiq Naizamohideen, Mukhriz Mahathir, Hilman Idham, Mustapa Mohamed, Azizah Mohd Dun, and Shahbudin Yahaya.

At 11.25pm, Bersatu rejected Mahathir’s resignation as Chair of the party.

A summary of the day’s events is that: Mahathir quit as Prime Minister, and due to Azmin and co’s departure from PKR (11 MPs), plus Bersatu leaving from PH (26), this led to the collapse of the PH government (101), without the 112 required to form government. Mahathir is appointed as interim Prime Minister by the Agong, which is unprecedented in Malaysian history. The term “interim” does not exist in the Constitution, and the only precedence we have is that of a caretaker government, which has taken place only after Parliament dissolution in view of an upcoming general election. This is a matter for the constitutional lawyers to take up. AG on Tuesday 25 February has said that the interim Prime Minister has the prerogative to appoint any Cabinet ministers at his discretion, and that there is no time limit set on the interim PM’s position. That said, Parliament will be sitting within 14 days, on 9 March.

Tuesday, 25 February

But first, a note on states. Thanks again to Malaysiakini for the excellent work in compiling the numbers of state assemblypersons, here.

In short, the three states in which there can possibly be a change in government if UMNO, PAS and Bersatu were to team up against the other parties are in Perak, Malacca and Kedah. There is a possibility of a hung state assembly in Johor if UMNO, PAS and Bersatu are in coalition, against the PH partners DAP, PKR and Amanah. Negeri Sembilan and Selangor would not experience any change in government at all if all state assemblypersons in PKR remain with no defections. And the two states in which there would be no change in government at all even if there are defections from PKR are in Penang and Sabah.

As at 10.25am, the Kedah state government said that it was business as usual despite the technical fall of state government. MB Mukhriz is due to hold an exco meeting today.  

Also, at 11.20am, Johor UMNO announced that it is confident about forming a new state government together with Bersatu, thanks to a defection from PKR, as stated by Johor UMNO Chief Hasni Mohammad.

As at 12.15pm on Tuesday, Selangor MB Amirudin Shari has announced that the Selangor state government is stable and has met with the Selangor Sultan.

The Istana has also announced that it will be meeting with all 222 MPs individually, starting from 2.30pm Tuesday 25 February and will last till the following day (90 MPs will be interviewed on Tuesday and the remaining over the next day). It is understood that the Agong will be interviewing them individually for a maximum of 2 minutes each on the Prime Minister that they each support. This is unprecedented.

A group of anonymous civil society individuals are organizing a rally at 8.30pm tonight at Dataran Merdeka to protest against the potential backdoor government formation, while a score of other CSOs including ABIM and Iman Research have condemned the actions of those attempting the same. Police have stated they will be on standby for any eventuality.

In the afternoon, different individuals were sighted visiting the Istana including Hishamuddin Hussein, Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah, Nancy Shukri, Fadillah Yusof and Wan Junaidi Tuanku Jaafar.

These are the latest political developments as at 4pm on Tuesday 25 February.

Posted in General Politics, Public Administration, Uncategorized | Leave a comment

Following the money: Political financing in Malaysia

Posted on August 4, 2019 by Tricia

First published in The Asia Dialogue on 30 July 2019 here.

It is important to examine how political parties are financed, as this reveals who has the biggest influence on party decision-making. The questions of real concern are: does the money come with strings attached? Does this lead to political parties – and the governments they lead – compromising their political decisions and policy-making processes?

Until its fall in 2018, the National Front (Barisan Nasional) and its main component party, the United Malays National Organisation in Malaysia (UMNO), ruled Malaysia – hence it had a dominant party electoral authoritarian regime. Scholars had long documented how UMNO engaged in practices of widespread political patronage in the form of funding in exchange for business favours, which included access to contracts, speedy government approvals, and purchasing government land below its market value.

Large flows of money

UMNO’s control over the economy via government-linked companies (GLCs) also allowed it access to public resources it could wield for political purposes. Ruling for more than 60 years since the country’s independence, the lines between party and state had become increasingly indistinct. The accumulation of such resources created a grossly uneven playing field for the opposition to compete against the ruling coalition.

The 1MDB (Malaysia’s sovereign wealth fund), for instance, was revealed to be a massive political financing vehicle in the 13th general election campaign. RM 2.6 billion was found in then Prime Minister Najib Razak’s personal bank account, which he claimed was a donation from Saudi Arabia. In Najib’s ongoing trial, the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission confirmed that RM 212 million of 1MDB funds had been transferred to his political party, UMNO.

Essentially, the large sums of money flowing between business and political parties is symptomatic of several conditions. First, although the Election Offences Act limits campaign expenditure for individuals contesting a parliamentary seat (RM 200,000) and a state seat (RM 100,000), there are no limits on how much a party can spend during an election. Second, there is no restriction on foreign funding.

And third, political parties are governed under the Societies Act 1960, and so although they are required to submit their audited financial statement to the Registrar of Societies, they do not have to reveal the sources of their donations. The lack of transparency and accountability surrounding political financing therefore lends credibility to suspicions about how money influences politics and policy.

Efforts to reform political financing

Civil society had long called for political financing laws to be introduced. In response to Najib’s call to reform political financing in 2009, Transparency International published a book in 2011 called Reforming Political Financing in Malaysia that contained specific proposals for adoption.

Then in 2015, while embroiled in the 1MDB controversy, the government instigated a National Consultative Committee on Political Financing, which released its report in 2016. One proposal was for the enactment of a Political Donation and Expenditure Act, but no action was taken by the Barisan government to implement any of the report’s recommendations.

In the lead-up to the 14th general election in 2018, the opposition coalition Pakatan Harapan (Pakatan) released its election manifesto, which included a commitment to introduce a Political Finance Control Act which would adhere to various principles, including the state funding of parties according to a formula, identifiable sources of funding, audited accounts to be made available, a ban on political parties owning assets above RM 1 billion, and a ban on GLCs making political donations.

After coming into power in 2018, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed committed to tabling a new law on political financing. Following through on this, the government launched its National Anti-Corruption Plan (NACP) in January 2019, in which it commits to ‘introduce new legislation on governing political funding and to include an offence on lobbying’ by December 2020. However, at the time of writing, the National Centre for Governance, Integrity and Anti-Corruption – the government department in charge of drafting this legislation – has not yet sought consultation with civil society or members of parliament on the matter.

The future of political financing in Malaysia

In the past, opposition parties without access to such largesse resorted to raising funds through the different ad hoc ways possible: organising fundraising dinners, member contributions, and private donations. However, when the opposition Pakatan Rakyat (the previous iteration of the current Pakatan Harapan, which at the time included the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party but did not include the yet-to-be formed Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia) won over the rich, urbanised states of Selangor and Penang, this provided access to state-level resources for the first time.

Fees and allowances from political appointments – ranging from GLC directorships to elected and local council representation – were some of the ways party members could now contribute to financing their parties in a legitimate fashion. Newly in control of these rich states, the parties also had new opportunities to engage with business – another potential source of donations. Although this paled in comparison to the money available to UMNO, it nonetheless offered a platform from which to accumulate the resources necessary to face the incumbent party in the elections.

Pakatan has been in the federal government for over a year now, and to its credit, it has committed to a slew of institutional reforms. However, the institutional and legal framework that specifically governs the financing of elections and political parties has not changed. This means the new government is susceptible to the same influence from business. For example, residents are opposing a proposed development project within the vicinity of a popular park in urban Kuala Lumpur, the developers of which are connected to the Minister of Federal Territories (the ministry which oversees the administration of Kuala Lumpur).

Regulating and enforcing political financing is unpopular with many political parties as it impedes their flexibility in raising funds. Politics – and particularly elections – is an expensive business, after all. But parties ought ultimately to be accountable to their voters, not their financiers. At the very minimum, the law must ensure transparency of funding and the sources from which it flows. Failure to reform political financing puts Pakatan at risk of succumbing to the same political patronage that afflicted UMNO.

Tricia Yeoh is PhD Candidate at the University of Nottingham Malaysia and a Fellow at the Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs (IDEAS) Malaysia.

*Articles published by The Asia Dialogue represent the views of the author(s) and not necessarily those of The Asia Dialogue or affiliated institutions.

Posted in Elections, General Politics, Transparency and Good Governance | Leave a comment

Seeking fresh leads to Beng Hock’s death

Posted on July 20, 2019 by Tricia

First published in the New Straits Times on 17 July 2019 here.

IT has been 10 years since the “mysterious” death of Teoh Beng Hock, the aide of a Selangor state executive councillor being investigated for his use of allocation funds in 2009.

Monday, July 15 was the anniversary of his death. To date, no party or individual has been charged.

A quick refresher: Teoh was held overnight at Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) Selangor headquarters to have his statement taken, but died the next day, having “fallen” to his death.

The MACC report claimed that Teoh committed suicide, but the Royal Commission of Inquiry concluded that he was driven to suicide.

However, in September 2014, the Court of Appeal unanimously ruled that Teoh’s death was caused by multiple injuries from a fall from the 14th floor of Plaza Masalam, as a result of an unlawful act or acts of persons unknown, inclusive of MACC officers who were involved in his arrest and detention.

The state of Teoh’s consciousness prior to his fall is a crucial pillar of the suicide theory.

Three different forensic pathologists who were present at the second post-mortem — Dr Shahidan Mohd Noor, Dr Peter Vanezis and Dr Porntip Rojanasunan — concluded that Teoh sustained a pre-fall injury at the neck region, which the inquest’s coroner also agreed with, and the Court of Appeal referred to when concluding that there was foul play.

Dr Porntip held that he wasn’t conscious, as did one Court of Appeal judge.

If Teoh wasn’t conscious, how could he have committed suicide?

The Attorney-General recently decided to investigate Teoh’s case under section 342 of the Penal Code (wrongful confinement) instead of section 304 (culpable homicide).

Here are some aspects which should be included in the course of the investigation.

MATCH THE DNA FOUND ON TEOH’S BELT

The second DNA report prepared by Dr Seah Lay Hong stated that the DNA of “one other unknown male contributor” was detected at Teoh’s waist belt. This male contributor, who was in close proximity to Teoh before he died, has remained unidentified.

Re-collect DNA samples of all officers who were at the MACC Selangor premises on July 15 and 16 (2009) to match that of the “unknown male contributor”.

AUTHENTICATE THE ANONYMOUS LETTER BY MACC OFFICERS

According to the Malaysian Bar’s RCI submission, an anonymous letter dated Aug 5, 2009 written on an MACC letterhead made multiple allegations.

One of the allegations include that Hishamuddin Hashim (the MACC officer in charge of the operation) initially evaded the collection of his DNA sample, but later gave it in the privacy of his own office room; that it was his unique method of interrogation where he would “hold and lift a person by his belt from the front and shake him vigorously”; and that he had instructed his officers to wipe away fingerprints from the window where Teoh fell from.

The prime minister and MACC chief should make an open call for the author(s) of the anonymous letter to come forward.

The author(s) should be guaranteed protection under the Witness Protection Act 2009 (Act 696). Authenticating the letter means the investigators can use the letter’s contents.

INTERVIEW ALL OFFICERS INVOLVED IN THE CASE AGAIN

All officers involved in Teoh’s arrest and detention should be recalled for interviews.

In fact, all officers working in MACC Putrajaya and Selangor as at July 2009 should be interviewed. Those who reveal information should be guaranteed protection under the Witness Protection Act 2009.

LOCATE TEOH’S ORIGINAL STATEMENT

Teoh was interviewed twice during the course of that fateful night. The first was between 10pm and midnight on July 15, 2009, with no official statement taken. The second was between 1.30am and 3.50am on July 16, 2009, the statement of which was recorded, according to MACC.

But to date, the original statement with his original signature has never been produced. It is missing.

Only copies of the statement were made available to the RCI.

The MACC under the new chief should attempt to locate the original statement with the original signature.

COMPARE SAMPLES OF TEOH’S HANDWRITING TO ’MYSTERY NOTE’

More than a year after the inquest began, the police produced a “mystery note” which they said was found in Teoh’s backpack.

The handwriting experts were unable to match the handwriting with Teoh’s writing because no samples of Teoh’s writing was provided to the inquest or RCI.

Handwritten documents should be requested from Teoh’s family so that handwriting experts can compare them against the “mystery” note.

INVESTIGATE MACC OFFICERS FOR CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY AND OTHER OFFENCES

The relevant officers should be investigated for a range of offences as recommended by the Bar in its RCI submission.

The submission also stated that they were involved in criminal conspiracy in the cover-up of Teoh’s death, giving false evidence and fabricating evidence with respect to Teoh’s death, and that they destroyed and tampered with evidence with the intent of saving a person from punishment with respect to Teoh’s death.

It has been 10 long years of waiting. It is hoped the investigation will expand beyond merely wrongful confinement.

Time for a closure. The family and public can wait no longer.

The writer managed the case of Teoh Beng Hock’s death on behalf of the Selangor state government in 2009

Posted in General Politics, Human Rights, Selangor | Leave a comment